Dissenting Opinion by

Appellants were indicted for loitering and prowling. Act of June 24, 1939, P. L. 872, §418, as amended, 18 P.S. §4418.1 Assisted by counsel,2 they were tried be*500fore a judge and found guilty. Each was placed on one year’s probation.

Before the lapse of their probationary period, appellants were arrested and charged with burglary. Insufficient evidence forced the charges to be dropped. The Probation Department, however, was notified of appellants’ arrest and lodged a detainer against them for violation of probation.

A hearing was held at which only a probation officer testified. He testified, over objection,3 that appellants were both arrested “on the charge of suspicion of burglary” and that the detainer was lodged because they “were together again shortly after [the court’s] probation.” Apparently, appellants were together when they were suspected of burglary. The lower court held that the probation officer’s testimony was sufficient to show appellants had “consorted with known criminals,” i.e., each other, and had thereby violated a condition of their probation. Act of June 19, 1911, P. L. 1055, §4, 19 P.S. §1055.4 The court revoked ap*501pellants’ probation and sentenced each to one year’s imprisonment. This appeal followed.

Probation has traditionally been regarded as an act of grace by the court. See Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490 (1935).5 Whether the decision to grant probation is grace or not, once imposed, clearly it is a form of criminal punishment, having retributive, rehabilitative, and deterrent values. These values are achieved primarily through the imposition of conditions upon the probationer’s freedom of action.6 In the instant case, prohibiting “consorting with known criminals” punishes a probationer by depriving him of the companionship of those who may be his friends. It seeks to rehabilitate the probationer by forcing him to associate with a better class of citizen. It deters him from future crime by limiting his contact with those who may be likely to commit crimes.

While achieving the goals of society, probation also permits the probationer to pursue values of his own. He may have family with whom he wishes to establish a continuing relationship. He may have or seek employment or may enter a job-training program to *502qualify for the employment. He may pursue values that are peculiarly his own. In any ease, while on probation, the probationer establishes for himself a status, a status of freedom, which he desires to maintain.

Accordingly, probation is a form of punishment which allows the probationer to establish a status for himself. We should not, therefore, permit his probation to be revoked without the necessary procedural safeguards.7 Such safeguards are particularly necessary in this case because of the vagueness of the condition which appellants allegedly violated. Without procedural safeguards, “consorting” is amenable to unreasonably broad application, cf. Loving v. Commonwealth, 206 Va. 924, 147 S.E. 2d 78 (1966), rev’d on other grounds 388 U.S. 1 (1967), and abuse of police discretion. See Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939). Cf. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965). See generally A. Amsterdam, The Void-for-*503Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. Pa. L. Bey. 67 (I960).8

It has been recognized that the hearing at which the determination is made that the probationer violated a condition of his probation is a “critical stage” in the proceedings against him. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967); Commonwealth ex rel. Remeriez v. Maroney, 415 Pa. 534, 204 A. 2d 450 (1964); Commonwealth v. Tinson, 433 Pa. 328, 249 A. 2d 549 (1969).9 By labeling the hearing a “critical stage,” the courts have implied that the rights affected are sufficiently important to require the aid of counsel. The question for our consideration is what other procedural safeguards are necessary to protect the probationer from a denial of due process.10

Early in this century, a unanimous Superior Court said: “It is not obligatory on the court in inquiring into the conduct of the defendant while on probation to proceed according to the forms of law observed at the trial nor is the evidence to be received by the court limited to that which may come through the channel of a regular examination in court. It is the judgment of the court which is to be informed.” Commonwealth *504v. Fox, 69 Pa. Superior Ct. 456, 459 (1918).11 Nothing I say today disparages Fox. I would not require “the forms of law observed at the trial” to be observed at the probation violation hearing. In particular, I would not necessarily exclude hearsay testimony.

This case, however, illustrates what is required. Here, the sole evidence of violation of condition was the testimony of the probation officer. His only knowledge of the violation was a notation on his report that appellants had been seen together in such circumstances that they were suspected of burglary. He could not say what the circumstances were. He could not be cross-examined as to the truthfulness of the notation.

“[Tjhere can be no doubt as to the value of counsel in developing and probing factual and legal situations which may determine on which side of the prison walls appellant will be residing.” Commonwealth v. Tinson, supra at 333. Cf. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). In the instant case, counsel was unable to do just that. In essence, since the testimony of the probation officer was the whole case against appellants, they were denied effective assistance of their counsel. Cf. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); Commonwealth v. Cheeks, 429 Pa. 89, 99, 239 A. 2d 793 (1968).

In summary, therefore, the evidence presented at the probation violation hearing must be such that counsel can fully probe it. This does not necessarily rule out the use of written or oral hearsay. But it does require the evidence to be of such a character that *505the truthfulness of the alleged violation can be ascertained.12

I would reverse the judgment of sentence and the revocation order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County and remand this case to that court for a probation violation hearing and other proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Opinion

Judgment of sentence affirmed, and the defendants are directed to appear in the court below at such time as they may be there called, and that they be by that court committed until they have complied with the sentence, or any part thereof which had not been performed at the time the appeal was made a supersedeas.