Pittsburgh International Development Corp. v. Liquor Control Board
Pittsburgh International Development Corp. v. Liquor Control Board
Opinion of the Court
Opinion by
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County directing the Liquor Control Board (Board) to consider an application for transfer of a retail dispenser’s beer license. The Board refused to transfer the license holding that it ceased to exist after the term of one year safekeeping period with the Board had expired.
The original licensee, Joseph Vogel, obtained the transfer of a restaurant liquor license to his premises
On May 28, 1970, an application was filed with the Board to transfer the retail dispenser’s license surrendered by Vogel to Pittsburgh International Development Corporation, the present appellee, for use at 7215 McKnight Road, Ross Township. Because of the inability to obtain a lease at those premises, appellee attempted to amend the transfer application and change the address from 7215 McKnight Road to 4814 McKnight Road.
Appellee did withdraw its application on September 3, 1970 and subsequently submitted a re-application for a transfer of 4814 McKnight Road on December 9, 1970, after having finalized the lease for those premises. The delay between September 3 and December 9 was caused by appellee’s decision not to submit the re-application until it was assured that premises would be leased.
Appellee was then notified that the license had been cancelled by the Board on November 9, 1970. At appellee’s request, the Board held a hearing and turned down the application by finding, in effect, that no transferable license existed. On appeal, the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County remanded the matter to the Board and directed it to consider the December 9, 1970 application as an amendment to the May 28, 1970 application.
We are of the opinion that under these circumstances the decision of the lower court must be affirmed. By doing so, we do not pass upon the validity of the one year period as delineated in Regulation 115, Section 115.13. We simply view this as an amendment of the pending application which may be processed to conclusion as provided in the regulation.
This decision does not defeat the mandate that the Liquor Code be liberally construed in the interest of the public welfare and not in aid of persons seeking the transfer for private gain. Gismondi liquor License Case, 199 Pa. Superior Ct. 619, 186 A. 2d 448 (1962) ; Clinton Management, Inc. Liquor License Case, 188 Pa. Superior Ct. 8, 145 A. 2d 873 (1959). The transfer was not refused because of the potential deleterious effect on public welfare or because of violations of the Liquor Code. The appellee here was prepared to meet all the requirements imposed by the Liquor Code and the
. We also recognize tbe equities peculiar to this factual setting. Tbe appellee here bad made good faith and diligent attempts to complete tbe transfer. It bad, indeed, done all- in its power to prevent tbe cancellation by time lapse when it attempted to amend its then pending application for transfer by changing tbe address.
Tbe order of tbe lower court is affirmed.
This location was in the same township, less than one mile from the original location.
It should be noted that although this decision does not rest solely on the fact that the Board official advised withdrawal of the application, there are distinctions between this ease and the principle of constructive knowledge of the limits of an official’s authority. Payne's Appeal, 350 Pa. 22, 38 A. 2d 26 (1944) ; Luzerne Township v. Fayette County, 330 Pa. 247, 199 A. 327 (1938). In those cases which involved actions for damages, an award would force the State to pay out funds. In this situation, completion of the transfer results in benefits to the State.
Dissenting Opinion
Dissenting Opinion by
1 respectfully dissent. Here we are called upon to apply clear language of tbe Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board’s Regulation 115, section 115.13, to a fact situation which understandably invites a relaxation of tbe regulation to achieve a desired result.
Tbe pertinent part of Regulation 115 reads as follows: “In such case, tbe license which has been sur
Here it is admitted by appellee that, on November 9, 1970, when the one-year period from the date of surrender of the license ended, (1) a transfer of the license had not been effected; (2) there was no transfer application pending since it had withdrawn its application on September 3, 1970 and did not submit a reapplication for transfer until December 9, 1970.
The Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County and the majority are of the view that the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board should consider the December 9, 1970 application as an amendment to the May 28, 1970 application which appellee withdrew on September 3, 1970. The majority states that “[t]he delay between September 3 and December 9 was caused by appellee’s decision not to submit the re-application until it was assured that premises would be leased” and that . . under these circumstances the decision of the lower court must be affirmed.” I fail to comprehend any extenuating circumstances which would support such a conclusion. As the majority points out, “[t]he delay . . . was caused by appellee’s decision. . . .” Contrary to the majority, I view appellee’s attempts to complete the transfer anything but diligent.
Further, it is my view that appellee’s application of December 9, 1970 was a new one and not considered by
The bar of a friendly tavern is the ideal place to allow time to slowly slip away but in this case the bar of justice should not be expected to turn back the clock to recapture the time that appellee has squandered.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.