Opinion

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Dissenting Opinion by

This is an appeal from a judgment of sentence following a conviction for larceny and operating a motor vehicle without the consent of the owner of a 1963 Chevrolet.

On April 9,1971, at about 8:2Q p.m., Mr. Fred Langley drove his car, a 1963 Chevrolet, to the home of his wife at 2853 North 9th Street in Philadelphia. He parked his car in front of her house and went inside. At 8:80 p.m., he discovered the car missing and reported this to the police. Langley then borrowed a car from a friend and went to look for his car. At about 1:00 a.m. he found it parked outside a bar. The car was equipped with an “exit switch” that made the car impossible to start when activated. He activated the switch, parked the borrowed car, and waited. In about ten minutes, he allegedly saw the appellant come out of the bar with a tape recorder and a bag of tapes, all of which had been in the glove compartment of his ear. Appellant attempted to start the car, but could not. The police then arrived and arrested appellant, who *490testified lie had met a man. named “Blue” in the bar who gave him keys, the tape recorder and the tapes, and asked appellant to put them in the vehicle.

Appellant contends that the trial judge erred when he charged the jury that it could return a guilty verdict for the larceny of either the 1963 Chevrolet or the tapes and tape recorder. Appellant argues it was both erroneous and prejudicial to include the tapes and tape recorder as a separate offense. The trial judge delivered the following charge to the jury: “Here there has been evidence with respect to two larcenies. The Commonwealth asks that you find that the automobile was stolen and that the tape recorder and the tapes inside the automobile were stolen.” (Emphasis added.)

Defense counsel objected to the charge saying: “My only exception to the charge, Your Honor, is in explaining larceny and receiving stolen goods with regard to the automobile, the recorder and the tapes. But that is not alleged in the indictment. The tape recorder and the tapes are not in the indictment.”1 The assistant district attorney then moved to amend the bill of indictment to add the charge of larceny of the tapes and the tape recorder. Over defense counsel’s objection, the trial judge allowed the amendment, viewing the error if any as harmless.2

Pennsylvania Buies of Criminal Procedure 220 states very clearly: “The court may allow an indictment to be amended where there is an defect in form, *491the description, of the offense, the description of any offense or any property, or the date charged provided the indictment as amended does not charge an additional or different offense. . . .” (Emphasis added.) Amendment to indictment have been generally permitted, where the amendment is such that it cannot prejudice the accused. Sparks v. Commonwealth, 9 Pa. 354, (1848) (to correct a clerical error); Commonwealth ex rel. DePoe v. Ashe, 167 Pa. Superior Ct. 23, 74 A. 2d 767 (1950) (to correct a misstatement in the indictments of the date of the commission of crimes charged); Commonwealth v. Souder, 176 Pa. Superior Ct. 523, 108 A. 2d 831 (1954) (to correct a mistake in the designation of the indictment).3 Here, however, the amended indictment would “charge an additional or different offense,” if the jury could consider the tape recorder and tapes as a separate larceny.

In Commonwealth v. Wolfe, 220 Pa. Superior Ct. 415, 289 A. 2d 153 (1972), this Court vacated the lower court’s additional sentence of five to ten years pursuant to the “gun possession act,” 18 P.S. §4416 (b) because the violation of 18 P.S. §4416(b) was not included in the complaint or the indictments. We said at pages 419-420: “In a criminal prosecution, it is imperative that a defendant be given clear notice of the charges against him. The indictment upon which appellant was charged in the instant case contains no notice of a *492violation of 18 P.S. §4416 (footnote omitted). The indictments in Bryant and this case do not contain a reference to the use of a gun, but this would not be sufficient notice of the charge. A defendant should not have to guess which charges have been placed against him. If the charges in an indictment are not clear and explicit, a defendant cannot properly defend against them.” (Emphasis added.) Sentencing on an unspecified charge is a violation of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions. Commonwealth v. Bryant, 219 Pa. Superior Ct. 412, 281 A. 2d 678 (1971).4

In Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 80 S. Ct. 270 (1960),5 where the pivotal question was whether the petitioner was convicted of an offense not charged in the indictment. Mr. Justice Black, who delivered the opinion of the Court, said at 273: “While there was a variance in the sense of a variation between pleading and proof, that variation here destroyed the defendant’s substantial right to be tried only on charges presented in an indictment returned by a grand jury. Depriva*493tion of such a basic right is far too serious to be treated as nothing more than a variance and then dismissed as harmless error. (Emphasis added.)

By allowing the amendment at the end of trial, the trial judge deprived appellant of his “. . . substantia] right to be tried only on charges presented in the indictment. . . ,”6 (Emphasis added.)

The judgment of sentence should be reversed, and the case remanded for new trial, limited to the charge of larceny of the 1963 Chevrolet.7