In re Lease of Coal on County Lands
In re Lease of Coal on County Lands
Opinion of the Court
Opinion by
This is an appeal by Fred Fiore, owner of Fiore Coal Company, from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County .denying a petition for approval of a lease for the mining of coal on land located within Westmoreland County’s Institution District. We reverse and remand.
“2) Irregularity in accepting bids of two bidders.
“3) The approval of this sale would not be in the best interest of the people of "Westmoreland County.” Fiore has appealed from that order.
The Westmoreland County Commissioners appear before this Court in the anomolous position of supporting the denial by the lower court of their own petition for approval of the Fiore bid. The Commissioners defend their present position by asserting that confusion existed during the bidding procedure.
At the hearing no testimony was taken.
Section 2306 of The County Code, 16 P.S. §2306, provides:
“The Board of Commissioners may sell or lease . . . any real property belonging to the county. . . . In the event of such sale, or of a lease as lessor under which the lessee acquires on a royalty basis or otherwise the right to drill for oil or gas or to mine or remove coal, stone or other mineral products . . . the commissioners shall petition the court of common pleas, setting forth a description of the property to be sold or leased and the reason therefor. . . . The court shall thereupon fix a day for hearing, notice of which shall be given in at least two newspapers in said county, of. general circulation, once a week for three consecutive weeks. After hearing, the court shall make, such order and decree as shall seem right and proper. . . .” (Emphasis supplied.)
The proceeding below involved issues of fact and the court below decided this case on facts (confusion in advertising, irregularity in accepting bids and the best interest of the community) without any facts on the record.
It is true that the power conferred upon the Commissioners by Section 2306 is discretionary, and when public officials take action in discretionary matters a presumption arises that they are properly acting for the public good. Parker v. Philadelphia, 391 Pa. 242, 137 A.2d 343 (1958). Normally they may not be restrained from acting absent allegation and proof of fraud, misconduct, abuse of discretion, or capricious and arbitrary conduct. Hyam v. Upper Montgomery Joint Authority, 399 Pa. 446, 160 A.2d 539 (1960). However, Section 2306 requires that the court,' in ap
Therefore, we enter the following:
Ordeb
And Now, this 16th day of July, 1976, the decision of the lower court is reversed and the matter is remanded for an evidentiary hearing and decision on facts established on the record as the law requires.
Fiore’s first bid, entered March 18, 1975, was for $5.11 per ton or 21% per ton sale. Apparently, sometime afterward, private negotiations resulted in the guarantee to the County by Fiore of $5.27 per ton.
Act of August 9, 1955, P.L. 323, as amended, 16 P.S. §2306.
After the lower court disallowed the Fiore bid, the Commissioners petitioned the lower court for approval of the Weiss bid. A writ of supersedeas from this Court prevented the lower court from considering that petition. Subsequently, the Commissioners directed their solicitor to withdraw all petitions and now take the position that the matter is moot. It is inconceivable that such unilateral action in the face of a supersedeas order can have any such effect.
Fiore offered as a witness one of the Commissioners, a petitioner, apparently in support of the reasonableness and regularity of the Board’s award to Fiore. Although the formal offer was not made until after the court announced its order, we view this irregularity inconsequential in light of the informality of the proceedings.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.