Commonwealth v. Gonzales
Commonwealth v. Gonzales
Opinion of the Court
This case comes to us on appeal from the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County, Criminal Division, and involves defendant-appellant’s appeal from a conviction by a jury of public indecency.
On March 30, 1970, the appellant was observed masturbating while seated in a motor vehicle. Detective Paul Rose and one John Gabriel observed the defendant masturbating in his convertible automobile which was double parked in Penn Square, Lancaster, Pennsylvania, at about 3:30 P.M. He was convicted of public indecency by a jury on March 19, 1975. Defendant now claims that the evidence adduced at trial was not sufficient to convict him because his acts were not open nor notorious. This issue has been previously resolved by this Court in Commonwealth v. Gonzales, 249 Pa.Super. 359, 378 A.2d 335 (1977) wherein we held that the act of masturbating in an automobile, on a busy street in a city during daylight hours was an open and notorious act and that therefore sufficient evidence was
Although arrested in March of 1970 the defendant was not brought to trial until March 19, 1975. Since his arrest occurred prior to the effective date of Pa.Rules of Crim.Pro. 1100 that rule is inapplicable to the defendant. Commonwealth v. Perry, 468 Pa. 515, 364 A.2d 312 (1976). Therefore, the facts of this case relative to the five year delay in bringing the defendant to trial must be examined in light of the law in existence prior to Pa.Rules of Crim.Pro. 1100. In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), the U. S. Supreme Court devised a four prong test in order to determine whether a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights to a speedy trial had been violated. The four factors to be considered are: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion of the right; and (4) the prejudice to the defendant.
The record reveals that defendant was arrested in March of 1970. His preliminary hearing was held in April of 1970 after which he was bound over for the Grand Jury. After a true bill was returned against him by the Grand Jury he was scheduled for trial on June 22, 1970. For reasons not appearing on the record the trial was continued until September of 1970. On September 24, 1970, a public defender, appointed by the court to represent the defendant because defendant’s private counsel had been granted permission to withdraw from the case, requested a continuance of the case which was granted. During this time the defendant was confined in the Lancaster County Prison on a parole violation charge due to an unrelated incident. Defendant was released from prison on the parole violation charge in November of 1970 and bail in the amount of $500.00 was set and posted on the public indecency charge. During the bail
The defendant, then left Pennsylvania to visit his family in Puerto Rico returning to Pennsylvania some time after January 6, 1971. However, at the time of his arrest, defendant was living with an uncle at a Liberty Avenue address in Lancaster, Penna. and when he returned from Puerto Rico he went to York, Penna. and took up residence there. He did visit his uncle at his old address several times after his return from Puerto Rico. Defendant did not report for trial on January 11, 1971 nor did he communicate his whereabouts to his attorney, the police, the court nor the District Attorney’s Office. He was finally apprehended on a bench warrant on January 14, 1975 and tried and convicted on March 19, 1975. He was fined $50.00 plus costs and placed upon probation for one (1) year by the court below as a result of this conviction.
Defendant claims that his right to a speedy trial was violated by the five year delay in bringing him to trial. He also claims that the court below erred in the manner by which it conducted the speedy trial hearing as defendant testified first during that hearing and defendant thus claims that the court below improperly placed the burden of proving his Sixth Amendment claim on the defendant when the burden should have been on the Commonwealth. Applying Barker, supra, to the instant case we see that there was a five year delay between defendant’s arrest and his trial. However, the reason for the delay was defendant’s request for a continuance and subsequently defendant’s change of address without notification to anyone in authority about his new place of residence. Defendant did not appear for trial
Finally, defendant’s claim that the burden of proof at the speedy trial hearing was improperly placed upon him does not mandate a different result here. Whether the defendant or Judge Brown testified first had no bearing on the final decision as it was already a matter of record that defendant did not appear for his scheduled trial on January 11, 1971. The bail piece, signed by the defendant, notified him of his trial on that date. Although the proper procedure would have been for the Commonwealth to proceed with the burden of relating the peculiar circumstances of this case including the facts already of record rendered any such error harmless here.
Order affirmed.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.