Commonwealth v. Richie
Commonwealth v. Richie
Opinion of the Court
Appellant, Elanor Richie, contends that the evidence presented at her non-jury trial is insufficient to establish her guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and is therefore insufficient to sustain her convictions of theft
Appellant and her boyfriend, co-defendant, David Turk, were employed as cashiers at a self-service gas station/mini-mart (hereinafter station) in North Versailles, Pennsylvania. The station operated in three eight hour shifts, with only one employee, or the manager, as the cashier on each shift. The station also operated on a cash only basis, the cashier being solely responsible for that shift’s cash. At the beginning of each shift, the cashier made an abbreviated inventory, calculating approximately how much cash the previous shift should have collected and counting the amount the shift did collect.
Beginning with the third shift (from 11 P.M. to 7 A.M.) on Friday, January 12, 1979, until the first shift (7 A.M. to 3 P.M.) Sunday, January 14, 1979, the shifts were worked successively by David Turk, the manager, appellant, Commonwealth witness Lisa Stark, and the manager. During Turk’s shift the manager had seen appellant behind the counter with Turk, which was a violation of station rules. And when Lisa Stark commenced her shift, Turk was behind the counter with appellant. Further, Lisa Stark’s inventory showed that appellant’s shift was short of cash. Ms. Stark reported this to the manager immediately. When the mana
Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to convict her because the manager had equal access to the shift and “drop” money and could have committed the thefts. We perceive this argument as a matter of credibility: the manager’s testimony, which was confirmed in part by Lisa Stark, versus appellant’s denial. Under these circumstances, we decline to usurp the lower court’s determination of credibility. Commonwealth v. Darush, 256 Pa.Super. 344, 389 A.2d 1156 (1978).
Appellant also contends that because the corporation keeps a set of keys to the safe, someone other than the manager or the appellant or David Turk could have stolen the money in the “drop” envelopes. “The law [, however,] imposes upon the Commonwealth [only] the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, not beyond all doubt.” Commonwealth v. Nole, 448 Pa. 62, 65, 292 A.2d 331, 332 (1972). “[T]he burden of proof upon the Commonwealth has never been construed to require it to eliminate every conceivable hypothesis of innocence . . . Nole . .. [, supra]; Commonwealth v. Libonati, 346 Pa. 504, 31 A.2d 95 (1943).” Commonwealth v. Williams, 476 Pa. 557, 564, 383 A.2d 503, 507 (1978). “[And, t]he reasonable doubt which will prevent conviction must be the fact finder’s doubt[,] . . . not that of an appellate court. United States v. Stirone, 311 F.2d 277 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 935, 83 S.Ct. 881, 9 L.Ed.2d 766 (1963).” Commonwealth v. Williams, 447 Pa. 206, 208, 290 A.2d 111, 112 (1972). We cannot view appellant’s contention in a vacuum; viewing all
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3921(a).
. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903(a)(1) (Supp. 1981-82).
. The testimony at trial describing the inventory procedure was disjointed and convoluted. Although this may not be the procedure that was required to be employed, we believe it was the procedure that was employed.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.