Gancom (Employer) appeals from an order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Board) affirming the referee’s decision to award unemployment benefits to Booker T. Bates (Claimant). We affirm.

Employer discharged Claimant for willful misconduct when he allegedly failed a drug test, indicating a violation of Employer’s policy against the use of controlled substances. Claimant applied for benefits to the Job Center which found Claimant ineligible to receive benefits under 402(e) of the Unemployment Compensation Law.1 Claimant appealed and following a hearing at which both parties presented evidence, the referee granted benefits to Claimant, concluding that Employer did not meet its burden of proving willful misconduct because it did not show that Claimant had actually failed the drug test.

Employer appealed to the Board, which affirmed the referee’s decision. The Board made the following pertinent findings of fact:

2. The employer has a policy prohibiting the use of a controlled substance.

3. The claimant was aware of the employer’s policy.

4. The claimant had received a prior warning regarding violation of the employer’s policy on drug and controlled substance abuse.

5. On April 10,1993, the claimant worked two hours of his scheduled shift and left work for the day.

6. On April 12, 1993, the claimant arrived at work late for his scheduled shift.

7. Due to the claimant’s prior history of dependancy [sic] problems and these two instances of poor attendance, the employer ordered the claimant to take a drug screening test.

8. The claimant took the drug screening test.

9. On April 16, 1993, the claimant was involuntarily discharged by the employer for allegedly failing the drug test given to him.

10. There is no substantial evidence of record to support the allegation that the claimant failed the drug test.

(Board’s Findings of Fact, Nos. 2-10.) The Board explained that Employer offered only the test results as evidence to show that Claimant failed the drug test. Reasoning that the test results were inadmissible hearsay which is not competent to support a finding of fact, the Board concluded that Employer did not prove willful misconduct.

On appeal,2 Employer argues that: (1) the Board erred as a matter of law in characterizing the drug test results as inadmissible hearsay evidence, and thus not competent to support a finding of fact, and (2) the Board *654erred as a matter of law in failing to remand under Philadelphia Electric v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 129 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 417, 566 A.2d 1246 (1989) because the admission of the test results into evidence misled and prejudiced Employer.

Employer’s first argument is that the Board erred in concluding that the drug test results, although hearsay, could not support a finding that Claimant failed the drug test. The rule regarding hearsay evidence is set forth in Walker v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 27 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 522, 527, 367 A.2d 366, 370 (1976) (emphasis omitted), as follows:

(1) Hearsay evidence, properly objected to, is not competent evidence to support a finding of the Board.

(2) Hearsay evidence, admitted without objection, will be given its natural probative effect and may support a finding of the Board, if it is corroborated by any competent evidence in the record, but a finding of fact based solely on hearsay will not stand.

Here, the test results were admitted without objection; therefore, the second prong of Walker applies.

Employer contends that the test results may support a finding of the Board because they were corroborated by Claimant himself when he admitted: “I kind of knew [the termination] was coming because of the positive urinalysis.” (R.R. at 28A.) We disagree. In this ease, Claimant had every reason to believe that a positive urinalysis would lead to his termination because he had been warned in a letter that the next episode of drug abuse would subject him to immediate discharge.3 In fact, Claimant had been told he was discharged because the test results were positive.4 However, Claimant’s alleged “admission” did not acknowledge the truth of Employer’s information; rather, it was made in the context of remarks denying that he ever went to work under the influence of drugs.5 Therefore, Claimant’s statement could not act to corroborate hearsay evidence presented by Employer.

Employer also argues that Claimant’s failure to deny that the drug test was positive constitutes corroboration of the results. We disagree. Employer claims to rely on the rule expressed in Smith v. American Stores Co., 156 Pa.Superior Ct. 375, 379, 40 A.2d 696, 698 (1945), stating this rule as:

[t]he failure of a party to reply to a statement made in his presence or hearing is significant only where the nature of the statement, and the circumstances under which it was made, are such as [to] render a reply natural and proper.

Based on this language, Employer contends that because denial would be natural, Claimant’s silence should be deemed assent. However, Employer has omitted a portion of the rule, the remainder of which provides:

if one is restrained by fear or doubt as to his rights, or by the belief that his interests will be best promoted by his silence, then no inference of assent can be drawn from that silence. ‘Nothing can be more dangerous than this kind of evidence; it should always be received with caution, and never ought to be, unless the evidence is of direct declarations of that kind, which naturally calls for contradiction.’

*655Id. at 380, 40 A.2d at 698. We do not believe the rule is applicable here because the record contains no evidence of an accusation made in the presence of Claimant where Claimant failed to respond. What Employer would have us do is satisfy his burden of proof by relying on Claimant’s silence. This we will not do.6

Employer, also contends that the Board erred by failing to remand the case under Philadelphia Electric because the referee’s admission of the test results at the hearing misled and prejudiced Employer.7 However, Employer’s reliance on Philadelphia Electric is misplaced. There are two prongs to the Walker hearsay rule; Philadelphia Electric dealt with the first prong; i.e., the competency of hearsay evidence admitted over a proper objection. However, the issue in the case before us involves the second prong; i.e., the competency of hearsay evidence admitted without objection and without corroboration by any other competent evidence. Absent an evidentiary ruling by the referee admitting hearsay evidence over a proper objection, there is nothing in the record to mislead or prejudice Employer. Therefore, the rationale in Philadelphia Electric would be inappropriate here. In accordance with the second prong of the Walker hearsay rule, once the hearsay evidence was admitted without objection, Employer had the burden to produce other competent evidence to corroborate it; this he failed to do.

Accordingly, we affirm.

ORDER

AND NOW, this 18th day of April, 1994, the order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, dated August 17,1993, is affirmed.