Litterini v. Commonwealth, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing
Litterini v. Commonwealth, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing
Opinion of the Court
OPINION BY
The Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing (PennDOT) appeals an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County (trial court) sustaining the statutory appeal of Matthew R. Litterini (Licensee) from a one-year suspension of his operating privilege. The suspension was prompted by Licensee’s conviction in the State of New Jersey of the offense of driving while intoxicated (DWI) in violation of N.J.S.A. § 39:4-50(a). We reverse the trial court.
On July 24, 2002, Licensee was convicted of DWI for conduct that occurred in New Jersey on July 11, 2002. PennDOT mailed a notice to Licensee at his record address in Pennsylvania notifying him that, pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S. § 1532(b)(3) and the Driver’s License Compact (Compact), 75 Pa.C.S. § 1581,
On January 9, 2003, a de novo hearing was held before the trial court, at which PennDOT’s proferred documents were admitted without objection;
On February 11, 2003, the trial court entered its order. Licensee was a Pennsylvania-licensed driver on the date that he was convicted of a DWI in New Jersey, but the trial court held that, because Licensee was not domiciled in Pennsylvania at the time of his conviction, PennDOT lacked the authority under the Compact to suspend Licensee’s operating privilege. Accordingly, the trial court sustained Licensee’s appeal, and PennDOT appealed to this Court.
On appeal, PennDOT asserts that the trial court erred as a matter of law. It contends that it is of no moment that Licensee was not a Pennsylvania resident at the time of his DWI conviction in New Jersey. He continued to operate his vehicle under authority of a Pennsylvania license, which gave PennDOT authority under the Compact to suspend his license. We agree.
The trial court based its decision upon our holding in Berner v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 746 A.2d 1207 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2000). Its reliance on Berner was, however, misplaced.
In Berner, the licensee attended school in New York but maintained a Pennsylvania driver’s license. At the time of her DWI arrest in New York, the licensee produced her Pennsylvania license to the authorities. Prior to entering her guilty plea, however, the licensee surrendered that Pennsylvania license and obtained a New York driver’s license.
More to the point is our recent holding in Evans v. Com., Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 800 A.2d 1001 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2002). In Evans, the licensee established a permanent residence in Maryland while continuing to maintain his Pennsylvania license. After his conviction for DWI he surrendered his Pennsylvania license to Maryland and obtained a Maryland license. When Pennsylvania subsequently notified the licensee of his suspension, the licensee asserted that Pennsylvania was not the “home state” under the Compact. The licensee contended that because his Pennsylvania license had been surrendered to Maryland before PennDOT notified him of the suspension, PennDOT was divested of authority. We held, however, that it is the driver’s license held at the moment of conviction that is determinative. Because Pennsylvania was the “home state,” i.e., the licensing state, at the time of conviction, PennDOT retained the authority to suspend the licensee’s operating privilege.
Unlike the licensee in Berner, but very much like the licensee in Evans, Licensee held a Pennsylvania driver’s license at the time of his conviction on July 24, 2002.
For these reasons, the trial court is reversed, and the one-year suspension of Licensee’s operating privilege is reinstated.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 15th day of January, 2004, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County dated February 11, 2003 in the above-captioned matter is hereby reversed and the one-year suspension of Appellee’s operating privilege is reinstated.
. Under the Compact, at the time of the Licensee's conviction in New Jersey, a Pennsylvania-licensed driver may have had his operating privilege suspended for conviction of an offense to driving under the influence, con- ■ duct which is prohibited under 75 Pa.C.S. § 3731. We note that this section has recently been repealed and replaced with 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802, effective February 1, 2004.
. Indeed, Licensee stipulated to admission of PennDOT's evidence.
. Our scope of review of a decision in a license suspension case is to determine if the trial court’s findings are supported by competent evidence, whether errors of law have been committed, or whether the trial court's determinations demonstrate an abuse of discretion. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Tarnopolski, 533 Pa. 549, 626 A.2d 138 (1993).
. Berner obtained her New York license after satisfactorily completing the penalty require-merits imposed by New York on first time DWI offenders.
.We explained that PennDOT’s “authority under the Compact to suspend the operating privileges of a Pennsylvania licensee in accordance with Pennsylvania law arises when the Bureau [of Driver Licensing] receives proper notification that such a licensee has been convicted by a member state of a DUI offense substantially similar to the offense ... articulated in Article IV(a)(2) of the Compact. 75
. In fact, the record discloses that the notice of suspension was mailed by PennDOT to Licensee's address of record in Pennsylvania, Licensee having failed to notify PennDOT of his change of address in a timely manner. His address of record continued to be in Pennsylvania for purposes of notification of the suspension.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.