OPINION BY

The owners of several tracts of land along “old route 15” in Latimore Township challenged the procedure of the Township’s Board of Supervisors (Supervisors) employed in enacting new zoning regulations that rezoned their tracts from Commercial-Industrial to Agricultural-Conservation and made various other text and map changes to the 1987 Ordinance. The Zoning Hearing Board (ZHB) upheld the new zoning regulations. Landowners, Terry R. Rickert, Robert L. Junkins, M. Everett Weiser and his wife Olive L. Weiser appealed to the Court of Common Pleas of Adams County (common pleas), which reversed the ZHB. The Township filed the present appeal. We affirm.

On March 4, 2002, the Supervisors enacted the 2002 Zoning Ordinance, which encompasses 105 pages and appears to be a complete ordinance that essentially replaces the prior 1987 Ordinance. At the same time, they also adopted a zoning map that decreased the size of the Commercial-Industrial District and added two new zoning districts.1 These changes followed the adoption of a revised comprehensive plan in July of 2000, and a nearly two-year period during which the Planning Commission and the Supervisors considered and revised proposed changes to the 1987 Ordinance. For example, the record contains the transcript of a public hearing on October 16, 2000, at which the Supervisors took public comments on the draft of ordinance changes and, thereafter, referred the comments back to the Planning Commission in contemplation of draft revisions. Prior to enactment on March 4, 2002, the Planning Commission discussed the proposed changes at regularly scheduled public meetings on August 28 and September 25, 2001 and January 22 and February 26, 2002. In addition to review by the Township Planning Commission, the Supervisors submitted proposed revisions to the Adams County Planning Commission at various times during consideration and revision of drafts and received review letters on October 20, 2000, June 26, 2001 and March 4, 2002.

On January 24, 2002, the Supervisors published notice of a meeting scheduled for January 28 expressly to set a date to hear public comments on the proposed zoning ordinance and map. On February 15, the Supervisors published notice in the Gettysburg Times announcing the public hearing scheduled for March 4, “to consider a proposed amendment and the adoption thereof’ and informing that a copy of *1089the proposed ordinance was available at the Township building for examination without charge or that a copy could be obtained at cost upon request. On February 22, the Supervisors published two notices in the Gettysburg Times. One notice, in all capital letters, announced the time and place for the March 4, “special meeting for the purpose of considering and/or adopting a zoning ordinance amendment.” The other, appearing just below the first, announced the same information, directed that the proposed ordinance could be examined in the Township building and listed as a “summary of the proposed amendments,” a short general description of the subject matter of each article of the ordinance. In the same newspaper, on February 25, the Supervisors again published this notice containing the “summary.” Notably, the summary does not describe or even hint at which sections or in what manner the 1987 Ordinance is amended by the contemplated new ordinance.

In addition to these published notices, the Township posted approximately 24 notices at various sites around the Township. In particular, the posted notices were placed where map changes were contemplated in the area of the Residential-Agricultural District in the western part of the Township, along the Route 15 corridor where changes were contemplated in the Commercial-Industrial District and in an area in the eastern part of the Township under consideration for rezoning to Agricultural-Conservation II. ZHB Hearing May 23, 2002, Appellant’s Exh. 2. The Township did not post notices in the area where it proposed that a portion of the Residential-Agricultural District near Lake Meade be rezoned to the newly created Residential-Lake Meade District or near tracts in the northeast where minor changes were contemplated in the Residential-Agricultural and Residential-Suburban Districts.

Following the March 4 enactment, Landowners filed a timely procedural challenge to the ZHB. Landowners contended that the Supervisors adopted a new ordinance without strictly complying with the requirements in Section 607 and 608 of the Municipalities Planning Code (MPC),2 as amended, 53 P.S. §§ 10607 and 10608.3 In *1090particular, the Landowners contended that the Supervisors rather than the Township Planning Commission prepared the text and map of the new ordinance and that published notice failed to announce the map changes. Alternatively, Landowners asserted that even if considered as an amendment to the 1987 Ordinance, the Supervisors failed to submit the amendments to the Planning Commissions of both the Township and the County and failed to publish and post notice as required under Section 609 of the MPC, as amended, 53 P.S. § 10609.4 In particular, the Landowners contended that published notice did not announce the contemplated map changes and posted notices were inadequate in number and placement.5

*1091Following a hearing, the ZHB found that the ordinance contained revisions to “no more than five percent of the [1987] Ordinance.” Further, the ZHB noted that throughout the period of consideration and draft revisions Township officials and the County Planning Commission referred to the proposed ordinance as an amendment. Based on this and other evidence, characterized by the ZHB as “simply overwhelming,” the ZHB concluded that the ordinance amended the 1987 Ordinance. The ZHB concluded that the notices, both published and posted, complied with the MPC requirements for the enactment of ordinance amendments. The ZHB further found that the Planning Commissions for both the Township and the County had reviewed and commented upon the amendments as required. Consequently, the ZHB upheld the ordinance.

Landowners appealed to common pleas, challenging the sufficiency of evidence supporting the finding that the Supervisors enacted an amendment rather than a new ordinance and raising all of the procedural errors earlier asserted. Without taking additional evidence, common pleas agreed that the evidence established that the Supervisors adopted a new ordinance rather than mere amendments. Common pleas explained that comparison of the 1987 Ordinance and the newly enacted ordinance revealed that the Supervisors changed or added 91 sections amounting to 52% of the prior ordinance, defined 7 zoning districts rather than the 5 established in 1987, added substantially to the definitional section, and amended the zoning map. Common pleas also pointed to the lack of italics and underscoring in the usual style utilized by the Township for prior amendments.

Based on the conclusion that the Supervisors adopted a new ordinance, common pleas ruled that the enactment failed to comply with the MPC in that the Township Planning Commission did not prepare the new ordinance and the published notices of the public hearing were misleading in characterizing the ordinance as an amendment. In the alternative, common pleas ruled that even if considered as an amendment, the enactment failed to comply with the MPC requirements for posted and published notice. Common pleas deemed posted notice inadequate due to the lack of posting in areas of proposed map changes, such as Lake Meade, and deemed published notice inadequate because the summary failed to “provide any insight as to the major thrust” of the changes. Based on these conclusions, common pleas declared the ordinance void ab initio.

The Township filed the present appeal. It contends that the ordinance was an amendment, published notice describing it as such did not mislead, a fair reading of the published summary reveals sufficient information to alert the public to contemplated changes, and the posted notices complied with the MPC directive to post “at points deemed sufficient by the municipality along the tract to notify potentially interested citizens.” Section 609(b), 53 P.S. § 10609(b). Finally, the Township challenges the ZHB’s finding, which common pleas adopted, that the Supervisors prepared the ordinance.6

*1092The MPC imposes different requirements on the adoption of a new ordinance than on the enactment of amendments but they have in common the requirement for a pre-enactment public hearing pursuant to public notice. Published notice for either a new ordinance or an amendment is governed by the definition of “public notice” in Section 107.7 In their challenge to the ZHB, Landowners asserted flaws in compliance with the definitional requirements, which establish the timing of publication. Common pleas found no merit in these assertions, as did the ZHB, and we agree. The MPC requires publication once each week for two successive weeks not more than thirty days nor less than seven days prior to the hearing date. The Township caused publication on February 15, 22 and 25, noticing the March 4 hearing. Hence, the publications met the timing requirements under the MPC definition.

In ruling that the published notices were inadequate, common pleas focused on the published statement that the ordinance under consideration amended the existing zoning ordinance. Common pleas concluded that this statement misled potentially interested residents. For this reason, common pleas ruled that the published notices, in failing to state that a new ordinance was under consideration, did not accurately inform the public as to the “particular nature of the matter to be .considered,” as required under the definition in Section 107, 53 P.S. §§ 10107. While we agree with common pleas that the Supervisors failed to adhere to requisite procedures, we do not conclude that the published notice inaccurately stated the nature of the zoning ordinance. Rather, we conclude that the enactment is fatally flawed by the Supervisors’ failure to adequately post hearing notices along tracts subject to a map change.

Our analysis does not depend on our first determining whether the Supervisors enacted an amendment or adopted a new ordinance. In the present case, the challenged ordinance is equally susceptible to either characterization. The document appears to be a complete integrated ordinance and states that it repeals and replaces the prior ordinance. However, comparison of the 1987 Ordinance and the newly enacted ordinance supports the ZHB’s finding that the new ordinance changed only a portion of the prior ordinance. We conclude that the factors that common pleas pointed to, such as the quantum of changes affected, the absence of the conventional strike/add drafting format or the statement that the enacted ordinance repeals and replaces an earlier ordinance, do not provide a sound basis for distinguishing a new ordinance from amendments. In any event, resolution of the present case does not require us to determine whether the challenged ordi*1093nance is new or amendatory. We conclude that, regardless of the amount of change effected or the fact that the 2003 Ordinance replaced the 1987 Ordinance, insofar as this was not the first zoning ordinance adopted, the Supervisors did not err in calling the proposed legislation an “amendment” in the published notice.

The MPC does not define or otherwise clarify what critical distinctions mark the difference between a wholly new ordinance subject to the requirements of Sections 607 and 608 versus an amendatory ordinance subject to the requirements of Section 609. Clearly, the initial zoning ordinance adopted by a municipality must be prepared in accordance with Section 607 and enacted in accordance with Section 608. Other than this requirement, the MPC provides no bright line rule as to whether a municipality must announce comprehensive changes effected by the repeal and replacement of an existing ordinance as a “new” ordinance. Logically, it would seem that all zoning legislation after the adoption of the first ordinance is an amendment. However, proposed changes to an existing ordinance may be so numerous and broad in their affect that treating the proposed legislation as a new ordinance is appropriate. For example, in Budco Theatres, Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Board of Springettsbury Township, 159 Pa.Cmwlth. 257, 682 A.2d 1072 (1993), the municipality repealed and replaced its previous zoning ordinance based on a newly drafted comprehensive plan. Id. at 1075-76. Our court ruled that the municipality properly enacted the new ordinance under Section 608 and was not required to comply with the requirement in Section 609 for an additional public hearing on post-hearing changes in a proposed draft of zoning amendments. Id.

From a purely practical perspective, when a municipality undertakes, as it must do periodically, a review of its comprehensive plans for future land use, the legislative result may be very broad changes to the prior ordinance. Published notice that the municipality is considering an entirely new ordinance that replaces the previous ordinance certainly serves to put property owners on notice to inquire further into how they may be affected. Inasmuch as the purpose of published notice is to alert interested landowners, s e.g., Lower Gwynedd Township v. Gwynedd Properties, Inc., 527 Pa. 324, 329, 591 A.2d 285, 287-88 (1991), calling an ordinance that repeals and replaces the previous ordinance “new” serves the purpose. But, equally correct when considering enactment of a zoning ordinance that follows the enactment of the first ordinance, is notice that labels the proposed ordinance an “amendment.” The only crucial matter is that once the governing body determines that its proposed ordinance is either new or an amendment, it consistently labels the proposed legislation and complies with the applicable procedural requirements.8

*1094In the present ease, the Supervisors announced the proposed ordinance as an amendment and, therefore, they were obligated to comply with the posting requirements in Section 609(b), 53 P.S. § 10609(b). Section 609(b) directs that “notice of said public hearing shall be conspicuously posted by the municipality at points deemed sufficient by the municipality along the tract to notify potentially interested citizens.” This posting requirement serves to inform not only the Landowners directly affected by the map changes but also the public generally. In Johnson v. Zoning Hearing Board of Stroud Township, 144 Pa.Cmwlth. 479, 601 A.2d 927 (1992), we considered a similar argument regarding inadequate compliance with an earlier and slightly different version of Section 609(b). In Johnson we stated:

Generally, statutes calling for notice in a particular manner and form before a zoning law is adopted or amended are mandatory and nonwaivable. Kurren Appeal, 417 Pa. 623, 208 A.2d 853 (1965); Kelly v. Philadelphia, 382 Pa. 459, 115 A.2d 238 (1955). The procedures established by the legislature for the enactment of ordinances must be strictly followed in order for an ordinance to be valid. Lower Gwynedd Township v. Gwynedd Properties, Inc., 527 Pa. 324, 591 A.2d 285 (1991).

Id. at 484, 601 A.2d 927.

In challenging the adequacy of posted notice, Landowners pointed to the failure to post every one of their properties along Route 15. Section 609 does not require posting each tract subject to a map amendment; it requires posting at points along the affected tract sufficient to notify potentially interested citizens. The postings in the Route 15 corridor were adequate. However, the Township failed to post any notices of proposed map changes in the Lake Meade District in the southwest where an area was rezoned to AC-I and in the northeast where boundary changes were made in the area of the R-A and R-S District.9 The complete absence of postings in these areas is a fatal flaw that invalidates the enactment of the challenged ordinance. For this reason, common pleas properly declared the ordinance void.

Accordingly, we affirm.

ORDER

AND NOW, this 7th day of March, 2005, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Adams County in the above captioned matter is hereby AFFIRMED.