J-A23037-14 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellee : : v. : : DAVID LYNN HEFLIN, : : Appellant : No. 1700 WDA 2013 Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence entered on October 3, 2013 in the Court of Common Pleas of McKean County, Criminal Division, No. CP-42-CR-0000221-2013 BEFORE: DONOHUE, ALLEN and MUSMANNO, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 30, 2014

imposed following his conviction of stalking.1 We affirm.

The trial court set forth the relevant factual and procedural history in its Opinion, which we incorporate herein by reference. See Trial Court Opinion, 12/20/13, at 2-5.

On appeal, Heflin raises the following issues for our review: 1. -] sentence [M]otion by finding that the evidence admitted at trial was sufficient to support a conviction for stalking?

2. request for a continuance was an abuse of discretion and prejudicial to [Heflin] under the circumstances?

Brief for Appellant at 3.

See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2709.1(a)(1).

J-A23037-14 In his first issue, Heflin contends that the trial court erroneously applied the Commonweal

advances upon Victim were unwanted and causing her distress. Id. at 12- 14. Heflin argues that, in so doing, the trial court applied the mens rea of the crime of harassment (i.e., intent to harass, annoy or alarm) to a stalking charge, rather than applying the heightened intent required for a stalking conviction (i.e., intent to cause the victim substantial emotional distress).

Id. at 14. Heflin asserts that a conviction for stalking cannot be upheld upon a showing of the intent required for harassment. Id. at 15. Heflin claims that knowledge that one is causing another substantial emotional distress, alone, does not support a finding of intent to cause another substantial emotional distress. Id. at 12, 16.

Heflin also points out that the trial court did not make a specific finding that he had the malevolent intent required for a stalking conviction. Id. at 16. Rather, Heflin contends, the trial court merely found that he should have known, and did know, that he was causing Victim distress, and nevertheless continued to contact her. Id. Heflin claims that these findings do not establish that he intended to cause Victim substantial emotional distress. Id. at 17.

Further, Heflin asserts that his actions do not suggest that he had the intent to cause Victim substantial emotional distress. Id. at 23. In support,

-2- J-A23037-14 Heflin points out that he did not threaten, approach, call, or send Victim anything in the mail. Id. Heflin further points out that, although he made himself visible to Victim on several occasions, he remained at a distance, imploring her to talk to him. Id. The trial court set forth the relevant law and addressed issue, concluding that it lacks merit. See Trial Court Opinion, 12/20/13, at 5-10. We agree with the sound reasoning of the trial court and affirm on See id. ot raised in his Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal. See Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal, 11/4/13, at 1-3 (unnumbered). When an appellant is directed to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), the the error(s) to be addressed on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(ii)

error that the appellant intends to challenge with sufficient detail to identify Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) (stating that

closes that Heflin failed to raise the issue of whether the trial court erred by refusing to grant in his Statement. Therefore, it is waived.

-3- J-A23037-14 Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary Date: 9/30/2014

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