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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee v. LYNDA R. FARLEY Appellant No. 316 MDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 29, 2014 In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-22-SA-0000260-2013

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., WECHT, J., and PLATT, J.* MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED OCTOBER 07, 2014 Appellant, Lynda R. Farley, appeals from the judgment of sentence entered January 29, 2014, by the Honorable Bernard L. Coates, Jr., Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County. We affirm.

While on routine patrol on June 24, 2013, State Capitol Police Officer Michael Schmidt observed Farley driving a minivan down a one-way street.

See N.T., Summary Appeal Hearing, 1/27/14 at 4. The windows of the minivan were completely covered with signs and posters, so that the driver of the vehicle could not see out of the side or rear windows. See id. at 4, 6.

observed a six to eight inch television screen mounted on the front ____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

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dashboard of the minivan. See id. at 6. The television screen displayed a constant live video feed of a trailer connected to the rear of the van. See id. Farley admitted to Officer Schmidt that she had the monitor installed because she was not able to see out of the vehicle as the windows were covered. See id. at 9.

Based on his experience and training, Officer Schmidt opined that the camera and monitor system were not safe and charged Farley with violating Pa.C.S.A. § 4527, which regulates the use of television equipment in motor vehicles, and 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4524(b), restricting obstructions on a

January 27, 2014, Farley was convicted of both charges and fined $25.00 for each summary offense. This timely appeal followed.

On appeal, Farley raises the following issues for our review.

1. Whether insufficient evidence was presented to support a conviction of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4527, relating to the prohibition against television type receiving equipment forward of the

2. Whether the evidence presented was insufficient to convict Appellant of the offense of [75] Pa.C.S.A. § 4524(b) relating to obstruction on side and rear windows?

3. § 4524(b), relating to obstruction on side and rear windows violates the equal protection clauses of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions?

We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence as follows.

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The standard we apply when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a -finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the trier of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence. Furthermore, when reviewing a sufficiency claim, our Court is required to give the prosecution the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.

However, the inferences must flow from facts and circumstances proven in the record, and must be of such volume and quality as to overcome the presumption of innocence and The trier of fact cannot base a conviction on conjecture and speculation and a verdict which is premised on suspicion will fail even under the limited scrutiny of appellate review.

Commonwealth v. Slocum, 86 A.3d 272, 275-276 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted).

Farley first challenges her summary conviction under 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4527, pertaining to the use of television equipment in motor vehicles.

Section 4527 provides as follows.

(a) General rule.--No motor vehicle operated on a highway shall be equipped with television-type receiving equipment forward of the back of the driver's seat or otherwise visible to the driver.

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(b) Exception.--This section shall not apply to the following: (1) Television-type receiving equipment in a vehicle used exclusively for safety or law enforcement purposes as approved by the Pennsylvania State Police.

(2) Electronic displays used in conjunction with in-vehicle navigation systems.

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4527.

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-type receiving

interpretation of the term to be too narrow. The statute contains no requirement that the television-type equipment be capable of broadcasting

vehicle consisted of a six to eight inch television monitor that broadcast a constant, live video feed from the rear of the van. We find this device is sufficient to co - Farley raises an additional argument regarding the interpretation of an

as used in that subsection is disjunctive and distinguishes what types of television equipment must be approved by Pennsylvania State Police. Given this meaning, an exception would lie for either television-type receiving ____________________________________________

Notably, Farley does not support this assertion with evidence of record.

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equipment in a vehicle used exclusively for safety or television-type receiving equipment used for law enforcement purposes as approved by the Pennsylvania State Police. Farley argues that because her rear view television set was used for safety purposes, it qualifies as an exception under section 4527(b)(1), regardless of whether it was approved by state police.

the Commonwealth, such an interpretation would produce the absurd result of allowing civilian drivers to install television-type equipment, no matter how distracting or dangerous, merely under the guise of safety. When

Assembly does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution or Commonwealth v. Cahill, --- A.3d ---, ---, 2014 WL 2921806 at *3 (Pa. Super., filed June 24, 2014). We find it more reasonable

- exclusi to obtain the requisite approval by the Pennsylvania State Police for the rear camera and television monitor system in her vehicle, we find the exceptions listed under section 4527(b)(1) to be inapplicable. We therefore find the

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Farley next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain her summary conviction under 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4524(b), relating to obstructions

[n]o person shall drive a motor vehicle with any sign, poster or other nontransparent material, including ice or snow, upon the side wings or side or rear windows of the vehicle which materially obstructs, obscures or impairs the driver's clear view of the highway or any intersecting highway. The placement of a registration permit upon the side or rear window of a vehicle shall not be considered a material obstruction.

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4524(b). Farley essentially argues that because her vehicle could be classified as a multipurpose vehicle pursuant to 67 Pa.Code § 41.3, which are exempt from certain restrictions regarding obstruction of side or rear windows, her conviction under section 4525(b) was improper. Such an could satisfy another classification of vehicle. Farley concedes that her vehicle is not registered as a multipurpose vehicle. See N.T., Summary Appeal

Id. at 4. This evidence was more than sufficient to support under 75 Pa.C.S. § 4524(b).

Lastly, Farley contends that her conviction under section 4524(b) violates the Equal Protection Clause of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions. protections to equal protection and/or due process, a court must first

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Commonwealth v. Scarborough, 89 A.3d 679, 685-686 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted).

In considering whether state legislation violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. Const., Amdt. 14, § 1, we apply different levels of scrutiny to different types of classifications. At a minimum, a statutory classification must be rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.

Classifications based on race or national origin and classifications affecting fundamental rights are given the most exacting scrutiny. Between these extremes of rational basis review and strict scrutiny lies a level of intermediate scrutiny, which generally has been applied to discriminatory classifications based on sex or illegitimacy.

Id. at 686 (citing Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988)). Rational basis review is applicable under the Pennsylvania Constitution for laws that restrict Nixon v. Commonwealth, 839 A.2d 277, 287 (Pa. 2003).

Section 4524(b) does not implicate a protected class or a fundamental right. As the purpose of the statue is clearly designed to protect and promote public safety, our review must be rational basis. Given a rational basis review, section 4524(b) clearly serves a legitimate state interest in ensuring drivers of motor vehicles refrain from obscuring a clear view of the highwa vans do not have side or rear view windows, here the distinction lies in that

signage so that her view was completely obstructed in violation of section

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4524(b). Section 4524(b) rationally addresses this safety concern. This argument fails.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/7/2014

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