J-S52035-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 T.K. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellant v. D.M.A.

Appellee No. 769 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Order Entered February 7, 2014 In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Domestic Relations at No(s): CP-09-CR-01222-2013

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., ALLEN, J., and FITZGERALD, J.* MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED OCTOBER 17, 2014 Appellant, T.K. (“Father”), appeals from the order entered in the Bucks County Court of Common Pleas, which required Father to turn over to counsel for Appellee, D.M.A. (“Mother”), a copy of a deed of trust under which Father is a trustee and contingent beneficiary, in this child support matter. We affirm.

In its opinion, the trial court fully and correctly set forth the relevant facts and procedural history of this case.1 Therefore, we have no reason to restate them. ____________________________________________

Throughout its opinion, the trial court states that it held a hearing on February 7, 2014, to determine Father’s support obligation for the parties’ two children; and that the court directed Father to pay a fixed amount for (Footnote Continued Next Page) _____________________________ *Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

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Father raises three issues for our review: DID THE TRIAL JUDGE ABUSE HIS DISCRETION BY ORDERING [FATHER] TO PROVIDE A COPY OF A DEED OF TRUST TO [MOTHER] THAT WOULD VIOLATE THE PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY OF THIRD PARTIES?

DID THE TRIAL JUDGE ABUSE HIS DISCRETION BY ORDERING [FATHER] TO PROVIDE A COPY OF THE DEED OF TRUST TO [MOTHER] WHEN THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT [FATHER] WAS RECEIVING INCOME THEREUNDER?

DID THE TRIAL JUDGE ABUSE HIS DISCRETION BY NOT PROVIDING ANOTHER REMEDY BY WHICH DISTRIBUTIONS TO [FATHER] THAT WOULD BE INCOME FOR SUPPORT PURPOSES COULD NOT BE DISCLOSED TO [MOTHER] WITHOUT VIOLATING THE CONFIDENTIALITY AND PRIVACY OF THIRD PARTIES? (Father’s Brief at 4).

Preliminarily, we observe that appellate briefs must conform in all material respects to the briefing requirements set forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. Rosselli v. Rosselli, 750 A.2d 355 (Pa.Super. 2000), appeal denied, 564 Pa. 696, 764 A.2d 50 (2000) (citing Pa.R.A.P. 2101). See also Pa.R.A.P. 2114-2119 (addressing specific requirements of each subsection of brief on appeal). Regarding the argument section of an appellate brief, Rule 2119(a) provides: Rule 2119. Argument (a) General rule.—The argument shall be divided _______________________ (Footnote Continued) child support. The record makes clear, however, Father has primary physical custody of the parties’ children, and upon Father’s complaint for child support, the court determined Mother’s child support obligation.

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into as many parts as there are questions to be argued; and shall have at the head of each part—in distinctive type or in type distinctively displayed—the particular point treated therein, followed by such discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent.

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). Importantly, where an appellant fails to properly raise or develop his issues on appeal, or where his brief is wholly inadequate to present specific issues for review, a court will not consider the merits of the claims raised on appeal. Butler v. Illes, 747 A.2d 943 (Pa.Super. 2000) (holding appellant waived claim where she failed to set forth adequate argument concerning her claim on appeal; appellant’s argument lacked meaningful substance and consisted of mere conclusory statements; appellant failed to cogently explain or even tenuously assert why trial court abused its discretion or made error of law). See also Lackner v. Glosser, 892 A.2d 21 (Pa.Super 2006) (explaining appellant’s arguments must adhere to rules of appellate procedure, and arguments which are not appropriately developed are waived on appeal; arguments not appropriately developed include those where party has failed to cite any authority in support of contention); Estate of Haiko v. McGinley, 799 A.2d 155 (Pa.Super. 2002) (stating appellant must support each question raised by discussion and analysis of pertinent authority; absent reasoned discussion of law in appellate brief, this Court’s ability to provide appellate review is hampered, necessitating waiver of issue on appeal).

Instantly, the argument portion of Father’s brief is not divided into

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separate sections for each question to be argued. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a).

More importantly, Father cites no legal authority to support his claims on appeal.2 See id. Father’s failure to develop his claims on appeal with discussion and analysis of pertinent authority precludes meaningful review and waives his issues for appellate review. See Lackner, supra; Haiko, supra; Butler, supra. Moreover, after a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Alan M. Rubenstein, we conclude that even if Father had preserved his issues for our review, his claims would nevertheless merit no relief. The trial court opinion comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of the questions presented. (See Trial Court Opinion, filed April 11, 2014, at 4-10) (finding: initially, discovery order in question is immediately appealable under collateral order doctrine, where Father asserts deed of trust contains privileged information, court’s determination of purported privilege can be addressed without deciding underlying issue of child support, interests of beneficiaries’ alleged confidential information would potentially go unprotected without immediate review, and privacy concerns at issue are rooted in public policy; regarding merits of Father’s claims, deed of trust is ____________________________________________

The only citation to legal authority in Father’s appellate brief is in his statement of jurisdiction. See Father’s Brief at 2 (citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 742).

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relevant to underlying issue of child support, as Father may receive distributions in future which will impact his income for support purposes, and details regarding when Father will receive distributions may lead to admissible evidence in subsequent support hearing; discovery request is not unduly burdensome or unreasonable or beyond scope of discovery; Father does not cite any specific privilege that would prevent him from turning over copy of deed of trust to Mother’s counsel, but to extent Father asserts fiduciary duty to protect other beneficiaries’ information, there is no explicit statutory duty to keep that information private or recognized independent common law privilege in trustee-beneficiary relationship; Father failed to explain what information in deed of trust, if disclosed, would violate privacy and confidentiality of other beneficiaries; court gave absolute limiting instructions that copy of deed of trust cannot be disseminated to anyone other than Mother’s counsel and no additional copies can be made; Father presented no evidence that disclosure of deed of trust in this circumstance will endanger Father’s role as trustee or place him at risk of breaching fiduciary duty; thus, court’s order directing Father to provide Mother’s counsel with copy of deed of trust was proper). Accordingly, Father’s issues are waived for appellate review; had Father preserved his claims, we would have affirmed on the basis of the trial court’s opinion.

Order affirmed.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/17/2014

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