K. Dodgson v. PSP
Opinion
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Keith Dodgson, :
: Petitioner : :
v. : No. 540 M.D. 2014
:
The Pennsylvania State Police of the : Argued: September 16, 2015 Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, :
: Respondent :
BEFORE: HONORABLE DAN PELLEGRINI, President Judge1
HONORABLE BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Judge HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Judge2 HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER3 FILED: January 14, 2016
Before this Court in our original jurisdiction are the Preliminary Objections (POs) in the nature of a demurrer of the Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) to Keith Dodgson’s (Petitioner) “Amended Petition for Review in the Nature of a Writ of Mandamus Seeking to Compel the [PSP] to Change Petitioner’s Sexual Offender Registration Status in Accordance with the Law Addressed to the Court’s Original Jurisdiction” (Petition for Review). Petitioner alleges that the current registration and internet notification requirements imposed upon him by the Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA)4 are unconstitutional. According to Petitioner’s allegations, SORNA infringes on his protected right to reputation without due process of law, retroactively increases the terms of his registration requirement, and creates a severe hardship upon him by publishing registration information on the PSP’s public website with, unlike previous enactments of the law commonly referred to as Megan’s Law,5 no means of relief. (Petition for Review ¶¶ 11-12, 16-20.) The PSP objects, in five POs, to the Petition for Review by alleging that Petitioner has failed to state a claim. For the reasons set forth in this Court’s opinion in Taylor v. The Pennsylvania State Police, ___A.3d___ (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 532 M.D. 2014, filed January 12, 2016) (en banc), which involved almost identical claims and POs, we overrule the PSP’s POs.
Petitioner pled guilty to one count of Involuntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse (IDSI) with Person Less Than 16 Years of Age6 and Sexual Abuse of Children7 in the right to petition sentencing courts to exempt them from the internet notification provision of Section 9798.1 of Megan’s Law III, 42 Pa. C.S. § 9798.1 (expired December 20, 2012, pursuant to 42 Pa. C.S. § 9799.41), which provided [that] no less than 20 years have passed since the individual has been convicted in this or any other jurisdiction of any offense punishable by imprisonment for more than one year, or the individual’s release from custody following the individual’s most recent conviction for any such offense, whichever is later.
42 Pa. C.S. § 9795.5(a)(1).
1997, “resulting in a sentence of twelve (12) years of incarceration.” (Petition for Review ¶ 3.) Petitioner began registering as a sexual offender with the PSP under Megan’s Law III on October 29, 2009 in anticipation of his release from incarceration. (Petition for Review ¶ 8.) On December 3, 2012, Petitioner was notified by the PSP that, as a result of the enactment of SORNA, he was now classified as a Tier III offender and was required to register as a sexual offender for life, register four times each year, and have his registration information placed on the PSP’s website for life. (Petition for Review ¶ 10.)
Petitioner filed his initial Petition for Review on October 14, 2014 and filed the amended version at issue here on January 28, 2015. Therein, Petitioner alleges that: (1) SORNA retroactively increased the terms and period of his registration and imposes severe hardships upon him by placing him on the PSP’s website with, unlike Megan’s Law III, no means to request exemption from being listed on the website; (2) SORNA “is not tailored to meet the desired government[al] interest” of protecting the population from recidivists; and (3) SORNA infringes upon his constitutionally protected interest to reputation without due process of law by utilizing an irrebuttable presumption that all sexual offenders pose a high risk of re-offense that is not universally true and that alternative means to assess sexual sexual intercourse as defined in section 3101 (related to definitions), masturbation, sadism, masochism, bestiality, fellatio, cunnilingus, lewd exhibition of the genitals or nudity if such nudity is depicted for the purpose of sexual stimulation or gratification of any person who might view such depiction.
In its POs, the PSP first alleges that Petitioner has failed to state a claim because SORNA applies to Petitioner and Petitioner was properly classified under SORNA.9 (POs ¶¶ 28-41.) The PSP’s next two objections to the Petition for Review, set forth in the same PO, are rooted in an understanding that Petitioner is asserting a cause of action in mandamus. (POs ¶¶ 42-53.) The PSP’s first objection in this regard alleges that mandamus will not lie against the PSP because Petitioner’s claims are barred by the six-month statute of limitations applicable to these actions. The PSP cites to Curley v. Smeal, 41 A.3d 916, 919 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012) (Curley I), aff’d but criticized sub nom., Curley v. Wetzel, 82 A.3d 418 (Pa. 2013) (Curley II), as standing for the proposition that actions against a government officer “‘for anything he does in the execution of his office’” are subject to a six- month limitations period that begins to accrue “‘when the injury is inflicted and the right to institute a suit for damages arises.’” (POs ¶ 43 (quoting Curley I, 41 A.3d at 919).) According to the PSP, Petitioner’s right to institute a suit arose on December 20, 2012, the date SORNA’s requirements became effective, and the statute of limitations ran on June 20, 2013. (POs ¶¶ 46-47.) Because the instant suit was originally filed on October 14, 2014, well after June 20, 2013, Petitioner’s claims are barred by the six-month statute of limitations. (POs ¶ 48.) The PSP’s PO alleges, in the alternative, that even if Petitioner’s claims are not barred by the statute of limitations, mandamus will not lie against the PSP because Petitioner does not have a clear legal right to the relief sought, and the PSP lacks the duty and authority to provide such relief. (POs ¶¶ 49-53.)
The PSP also objects to Petitioner’s due process challenges on their merits.10 The PSP demurs to Petitioner’s due process challenges under three theories. First, PSP alleges that “‘whether the additional sanctions imposed under Megan’s Law II are punitive in nature is the threshold due process inquiry.’” (POs ¶ 55 (quoting Commonwealth v. Gomer Williams, 832 A.2d 962, 970 n.13 (Pa. 2003).) Because this Court in Coppolino v. Noonan, 102 A.3d 1254 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014), aff’d, __ A.3d __ (Pa., No. 132 MAP 2014, filed November 20, 2015) and the Superior Court in Commonwealth v. Perez, 97 A.3d 747 (Pa. Super. 2014) held that SORNA’s requirements are not punitive, Petitioner’s due process challenge also fails. (POs ¶¶ 56-57.)
Next, the PSP alleges that the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 8 (2003) (Connecticut II), established that Petitioner does not have a procedural due process right to challenge his registration requirement based on factors that “‘are [not] relevant under the statutory scheme.’” (POs ¶ 59 (quoting Connecticut II, 538 U.S. at 8).) According to the PSP’s allegations, no factors, apart from the offense committed, are relevant under SORNA and, as such, Petitioner has failed to state a due process claim. (POs ¶¶ 62-66.)
Finally, the PSP alleges that SORNA’s irrebuttable presumption that all sexual offenders required to register pose a high risk of recidivism poses no constitutional concerns. (POs ¶¶ 67-75.) The PSP notes that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in In re J.B., 107 A.3d 1 (Pa. 2014), recently struck down portions of SORNA as applied to juvenile offenders, but alleges that the Supreme Court’s holding in that case does not apply to adult sexual offenders. (POs ¶¶ 69-73.) Furthermore, the PSP alleges that controlling authority from both the United States and Pennsylvania Supreme Courts support the legislative finding that “‘[s]exual offenders pose a high risk of committing additional sexual offenses.’” (POs ¶ 74 (quoting Section 9799.11(a)(4) of SORNA, 42 Pa. C.S. § 9799.11(a)(4)).) The PSP alleges that, because Petitioner cannot prove that it is not universally true that adult sexual offenders pose a high risk of recidivating, Petitioner’s due process claims under the Pennsylvania Constitution fail as a matter of law. (POs ¶ 75.)
We addressed and resolved nearly identical averments and corresponding POs in Taylor11 and adopt the rationale set forth therein to resolve the POs in this matter. In accordance with Taylor, we overrule the PSP’s POs.
________________________________ RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Keith Dodgson, :
:
Petitioner :
: v. : No. 540 M.D. 2014 :
The Pennsylvania State Police of the :
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, :
:
Respondent :
ORDER
NOW, January 14, 2016, the Pennsylvania State Police’s (PSP) Preliminary Objections to the Amended Petition for Review in the above-captioned matter are OVERRULED. The PSP shall file an Answer to Keith Dodgson’s (Petitioner) claims set forth in Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Review within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order.
________________________________ RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Keith Dodgson, :
Petitioner : : v. : No. 540 M.D. 2014
: Argued: September 16, 2015 The Pennsylvania State Police of the :
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, :
Respondent :
BEFORE: HONORABLE DAN PELLEGRINI, President Judge
HONORABLE BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Judge HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Judge HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY JUDGE LEADBETTER FILED: January 14, 2016
For the reasons stated in Taylor v. Pennsylvania State Police (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 532 M.D. 2014, filed January 12, 2016), I must respectfully dissent in part from and concur in part in the decision of the majority.
_____________________________________ BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Judge
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