OPINION BY

Sean Ciccone appeals from the order entered on October 7, 2014, denying his Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”) petition. After careful review, we affirm.

Police charged Appellant with three counts of possession with intent to deliver (“PWID”), conspiracy to commit PWID, and possession of drug paraphernalia on January 6, 2011. Appellant entered a negotiated guilty plea on September 2, 2011, to two counts of PWID, and one count each of conspiracy to commit PWID and possession of drug paraphernalia. The facts underlying the plea were that police executed a search warrant at his residence on July 6, 2010. Upon entering the home, police saw a .22 rifle and marijuana in both the first floor bedroom and a back bedroom. Police also observed a double-barreled shotgun in the first floor bedroom and another shotgun in a separate bedroom. The first floor bedroom also contained bins for drying and packaging marijuana. In the basement of the home, police found over fifty marijuana plants, potting soil, and growing chemicals. The weight of the plants was approximately thirteen pounds.

Prior to sentencing, the Commonwealth provided notice that it would seek a. three-year mandatory minimum sentence, under 18 Pa.C.S. § 7508(a)(1)(h), based on the weight of the marijuana and the number of plants recovered. This aspect of the sentence was negotiated based on a five-year mandatory minimum sentence applying due to the proximity of the drugs to firearms. Per the negotiated plea, the court imposed a sentence of three and one-half to five years incarceration on one count of PWID on September 9, 2011.1 The court thereafter amended that sentence on December 16, 2011, to indicate that Appellant was eligible for the Risk Recidivism Reduction Incentive (“RRRI”) program, which permitted Appellant to be paroled after serving thirty-five months of his sentence.

Appellant did not file a direct appeal, but presented a timely pro se PCRA petition on April 9, 2012. The PCRA court appointed counsel on October 25, 2012.2 The court conducted evidentiary hearings on August 15, 2013, April 21, 2014, and June 27, 2014. At the August 15, 2013 hearing, Appellant agreed to waive all but two claims. Specifically, he asked the PCRA court to find plea counsel ineffective for declining to challenge the weight of the marijuana and in failing to contest the number of marijuana plants recovered.

Following the original two hearings, but prior to the last hearing, counsel filed an amended petition on June 18, 2014. In that petition, Appellant averred that his sentence was illegal based on Alleyne v. United States, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013). The PCRA court, at the conclusion of the evidentiary hear*1006ings, directed Appellant to file a brief within thirty days regarding his claims and provided that the Commonwealth would have an additional twenty days to file a response. The PCRA court denied relief on October 7, 2014.

This timely appeal ensued.3 The PCRA court directed Appellant to file and serve a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. Appellant complied, raising a single issue: whether he was illegally sentenced under Appren-di v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), wherein the Court ruled that, under the Sixth Amendment, any fact, other than a prior conviction, that increases a defendant’s maximum sentence must be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The PCRA court recognized that Appellant’s position was based on arguing for the retroactive treatment of Alleyne, which applied Apprendi to mandatory minimum sentences. See Alleyne, supra at 2163 (“facts[, other than a prior conviction,] that increase mandatory minimum sentences must be submitted to the jury” and found beyond a reasonable doubt). Since Appellant was sentenced under a mandatory minimum sentencing provision, the PCRA court treated the issue as raising an Alleyne claim rather than one under the earlier Apprendi case, and it denied relief based upon a finding that Alleyne did not apply retroactively in the PCRA setting.

The appeal was submitted to a three-judge panel, but this Court sua sponte granted en banc review. The present en banc panel consisting of P.J.E. Ford Elliott, P.J.E. Bender, J. Bowes, J. Shogan, J. Lazarus, J. (now Justice) Mundy, J. Olson, J. Ott, and J. Stabile, concluded that Alleyne applied retroactively, and granted Appellant relief.4 However, that decision was withdrawn after our Supreme Court disseminated Commonwealth v. Washington, 142 A.3d 810, 811 (Pa. 2016), wherein the Court held that Alleyne does not apply retroactively “to attacks upon mandatory minimum sentences advanced on collateral review.” We now re-visit Appellant’s position.

Appellant claims that his sentence is illegal under Alleyne and that he should be granted relief since this legality-of-sentence issue, which is cognizable under the PCRA, was presented in a timely PCRA petition. Appellant’s brief at 4. We first note that, in the PCRA context, appellate review is confined to a determination of “whether the PCRA court’s rulings are supported by the record and are free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Bardo, 629 Pa. 352, 105 A.3d 678, 685 (2014).

Appellant asserts that Alleyne and this Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Newman, 99 A.3d 86 (Pa.Super. 2014) (en banc), renders his sentence illegal and that he should have been granted relief since he filed a timely PCRA petition and his contention is cognizable. In Newman, *1007we struck down as unconstitutional the mandatory minimum sentencing provision of 42 Pa.C.S. § 9712.1, which applied when drugs were found in proximity to guns, because that statute allocated to the sentencing court the decision, under a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, as to whether the facts supported imposition of the mandatory sentence. Accord Commonwealth v. Wolfe, 140 A.3d 651 (Pa. 2016) (ruling that mandatory sentencing provision in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9718 was unconstitutional under Alleyne as it provided sentencing court was to determine its applicability at sentencing by a preponderance of the evidence and refusing to sever portion of statute that violated Alleyne); Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 117 A.3d 247 (Pa. 2015) (same reasoning applied to statute that provided for mandatory minimum sentence when drugs were sold near to schools, 18 Pa.C.S. § 6317). Significantly, these three decisions were all issued during a defendant’s direct appeal.

We recognize that, in a host of direct appeal cases, we have addressed Alleyne sentencing claims under the illegal sentencing paradigm and held that Alleyne issues present non-waivable legality of sentencing claims.5 We have invalidated many mandatory minimum sentencing statutes. Indeed, in Commonwealth v. Mosley, 114 A.3d 1072 (Pa.Super. 2015), a direct appeal, this Court has expressly struck down the mandatory minimum sentencing provision implicated in the present case, 18 Pa.C.S. § 7508, which increased a sentence based upon the weight of the drugs, as determined at sentencing by the court under the preponderance of the evidence burden of proof.

However, Appellant conflates the concept of illegal sentences with whether Al-leyne can.be applied retroactively in the collateral review context. The Washington Court clearly articulated that the fact that Alleyne may, raise a legality-of-sentence issue does not obviate the need for a retro-activity analysis as to whether Alleyne can be applied to a collateral attack on a judgment of sentence. Additionally, our Supreme Court squarely laid to rest the latter question by ruling that Alleyne is not retroactive under United States Supreme Court test for ascertaining retroactivity6 and by refusing to find Alleyne retroactive on. independent state grounds. It held that “Alleyne does not apply retroactively to cases pending on collateral review” so that the appellant’s sentence “is not illegal on account of Alleyne.” Washington, supra at 820. Thus, Appellant’s sentence is not illegal under Alleyne because Alleyne is inapplicable in this collateral proceeding.

While the Supreme Court did not address this concept, we likewise reject the position that a mandatory sentencing statute rendered illegal by Alleyne is void ab initio thereby rendering any sentence imposed thereunder invalid. This conclusion flows from the progression of the law on the subject. Before one can reach a reasoned examination of whether Alleyne *1008renders a mandatory minimum sentencing statute void ab initio, it is necessary to examine the case upon which it is premised, Apprendi v. New Jersey, supra. Ap-prendi involves the Sixth Amendment right to have an impartial jury determine each element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Apprendi fired bullets into the home of an African-American family who recently moved into an all-white enclave. He pled guilty in connection with that crime and other shootings. When the plea was entered, the prosecutor reserved the right to invoke a New Jersey hate crime statute while Apprendi retained the ability to contest its application. Under the hate crime provision, the maximum sentence that Apprendi could receive pursuant to the plea increased if a trial court found that, under a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, the defendant committed the crime to intimidate an individual or group based upon, inter alia, the victim’s race or color. A hearing was held on the applicability of the hate crime statute to the shooting that involved the African-American family, and the parties presented countervailing evidence regarding Ap-prendi’s motivation for the crime. The trial court concluded that the offense was racially motivated and sentenced the defendant to an enhanced term of imprisonment by applying the hate crime law.

The Apprendi Court concluded that Ap-prendi had a Sixth Amendment right, applicable to New Jersey by virtue of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, to have a jury determine beyond a reasonable doubt whether the crime was racially motivated. It premised that holding on the fact that the issue of the motivation for his crime increased the maximum sentence that Apprendi faced. Apprendi’s specific and oft-repeated holding is, “[A]ny fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 476, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243, n. 6, 119 S.Ct. 1215, 143 L.Ed.2d 311 (1999)).

It is of key importance in the pi-esent case to note that Apprendi’s holding was, prior to Alleyne, never applicable to a fact that increased a minimum sentence, including a fact that triggered a mandatory minimum sentence. The United States Supreme Court’s decision in McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79,106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986), involved Pennsylvania’s mandatory minimum sentencing statute 42 Pa.C.S. § 9712, which required imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence of five years if a defendant committed certain offenses while visibly possessing a firearm. Under § 9712, after a defendant was adjudicated guilty of the underlying offense, the sentencing court would determine by a preponderance of the evidence whether the defendant visibly possessed a firearm. If the defendant did, then the mandatory minimum sentence of five years had to be imposed.

The defendants in McMillan maintained that having a sentencing court decide the visible-possession issue offended their Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. Their position was that “visible possession of a firearm” was actually an element of any of the crimes that invoked § 9712, and thus, had to be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The United States Supreme Court rejected that argument. The McMillan Court upheld the constitutionality of § 9712 because it did not increase the statutory maximum penalty for any offense committed, failed to create a separate crime calling for an additional penalty, and was inapplicable until a defendant was convicted of the particular crime for which he was to be sentenced.

*1009Apprendi was filed subsequent to McMillan. Thereafter, in Hams v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 122 S.Ct. 2406, 153 L.Ed.2d 524 (2002), this nation’s High Court re-visited McMillan and its viability under Apprendi. The statute at issue in Harris provided for an increase in the minimum sentence if a sentencing court determined that the defendant brandished a firearm during the commission of the underlying crime. The Harris Court rejected a challenge to the holding of McMillan based on the Apprendi decision. Under Harris, mandatory minimum sentences that were imposed within the maximum ceiling set by a jury verdict did not violate a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.

Alleyne applied the holding of Apprendi in the mandatory minimum sentencing context. Alleyne and his accomplices committed an armed robbery of a store manager who was driving the business’s deposits to a bank, and he was charged with various federal offenses. An applicable federal law provided for an increase in the mandatory minimum sentence by two years if a firearm was brandished during the crime. The jury did not indicate on its verdict slip that the gun in question was visible, but the sentencing court applied the enhanced sentence of two years. Al-leyne objected and maintained that raising his mandatory minimum sentence based on the sentencing court’s finding that he displayed the firearm violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. The trial court, applying Harris, dismissed Al-leyne’s complaint. After the federal appeals court affirmed, the United States Supreme Court reversed and overruled Harris.

The Alleyne Court observed that Harris distinguished between facts that increased a statutory maximum and those that increased a mandatory minimum sentence. It concluded that this differentiation was incompatible with the rationale of Appren-di since mandatory minimum sentences pertain to the permissible ranges of penalties that can be imposed upon a conviction for a crime. The United States Supreme Court reasoned that since “[m]andatory minimum sentences increase the penalty for a crime,” it “follows, then, that any fact that increases the mandatory minimum is an ‘element’ that must be submitted to the jury.” Alleyne, supra at 2155. The Court continued that

Apprendi’s definition of ‘elements’ necessarily includes not only facts that increase the ceiling, but also those that increase the floor. Both kinds of facts alter the prescribed range of sentences to which a defendant is exposed and do so in a manner that aggravates the punishment .... Facts that increase the mandatory minimum sentence are therefore elements and must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt.

Id. at 2158. Thus, Alleyne clearly abrogated existing law. Accord Washington, supra (observing that Alleyne created a new rule of law); Wolfe, supra at 653, (“During Appellee’s trial and prior to sentencing, the Supreme Court of the United States issued its Alleyne decision, overruling its own prior precedent and establishing a new constitutional rule of law[.]”).

Thus, when the statute at issue herein was enacted, as well as when the sentence thereunder was. imposed, it was, in fact, constitutional, and cannot be considered void from inception. McMillan, supra; Harris, supra. Alleyne overruled Harris and McMillan and rendered a constitutional statute unconstitutional as of the date that Alleyne was disseminated. Pennsylvania’s mandatory minimum statutes cannot be considered unconstitutionally void ab initio as the United States Su*1010preme Court initially upheld the identical sentencing paradigm in passing on the constitutionality of 42 Pa.C.S. § 9712. McMillan, supra; see also Commonwealth v. Stokes, 38 A.3d 846 (Pa.Super. 2011) (upholding 42 Pa.C.S. § 9712, but opining that the statute would fail if Harris and McMillan were overturned).

In Commonwealth v. Derhammer, 134 A.3d 1066, 1077 n.10 (Pa.Super. 2016) (emphasis added), we set forth:

There are exceptions to the [Ex parte ] Siebold, [100 U.S. 371, 25 L.Ed. 717 (1879)] pronouncement that an unconstitutional law is void from the outset. That is, where there are actions taken in justifiable reliance upon a judicial ruling that the statute was constitutional at one point in time, the statute is not always considered a nullity and as if it never existed. See 46 Am.Jur. 2d Constitutional Law § 196; Heilig Estate, 13 Pa. D. & C.3d 1, *8; see also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 199, 93 S.Ct. 1463, 36 L.Ed.2d 151 (1973) (limiting its decision in Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442, 6 S.Ct. 1121, 30 L.Ed. 178 (1886), which reiterated the constitutionally void ab initio doctrine espoused in Siebold by stating, “However appealing the logic of Norton may have been in the abstract, its abandonment reflected our recognition that statutory or even judge-made rules of law are hard facts on which people must rely in making decisions and in shaping their conduct.”); see also Thomas Raeburn White, Commentaries on the Constitution of Pennsylvania, 27-28 (1907) (discussing exceptions to unconstitutionally void ab initio doctrine).

Appellant’s sentence was not illegal when imposed, he was sentenced under the statute in justifiable reliance upon existing United States Supreme Court precedent that it was constitutional, and the statute is not a nullity. Appellant’s sentence can be considered illegal now only if Alleyne is held to apply retroactively. Our Supreme Court has clearly ruled in Washington that such is not the case.

Accordingly, the trial court did not commit an error of law or an abuse of discretion in concluding that Alleyne did not render Appellant’s sentence illegal. We thus affirm the denial of PCRA relief.

Order affirmed.

President Judge Emeritus Bender files a Dissenting Opinion.

Judge Mundy did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.

DISSENTING OPINION BY

I respectfully disagree with the Majority’s conclusion that this Court is compelled to deny Appellant relief from an unconstitutional and, therefore, illegal sentence. As Appellant raised his meritorious illegal sentencing claim in a timely PCRA1 petition, I believe he should be granted relief under the statutory authority of that provision alone, even if there is no mandatory requirement for retroactive application of the new constitutional rale at issue. Accordingly, I dissent.

The statute under which Appellant was sentenced, 18 Pa.C.S. § 7508(a)(1)(h), contravenes the Sixth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution, as those constitutional provisions were interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States in Alleyne v. *1011United States, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013). See Commonwealth v. Newman, 99 A.3d 86 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc) (striking down Pennsylvania’s statutory mandatory minimum sentencing scheme under Alleyne); Commonwealth v. Fennell, 105 A.3d 13 (Pa. Super. 2014) (applying Newman to Section 7508). Thus, there should be no question that Appellant is currently serving .an illegal sentence, viewed from the current state of the law. The issue before this Court is not, therefore, whether Appellant’s sentence is illegal and/or unconstitutional (it is both); the question before this Court is whether Appellant may seek relief for this continuing injustice under the auspices of the PCRA.

In my view, at least two theories potentially support granting relief. First, as discussed (and rejected) by the Majority, is whether Appellant is entitled to relief by the retroactive effect of Alleyne and its progeny, under the framework established in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (plurality). In Teague, the Supreme Court of the United States established a framework for determining whether retroactive application of new constitutional rulés is required on collateral review. The general rule holds that “new constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable” on collateral review, unless they fall within two exceptions. Id. at 310, 109 S.Ct. 1060.' “[T]he exceptions extend to rules prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense, ... and watershed rules of criminal procedure implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding.” Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 622 Pa. 543, 81 A.3d 1, 4 (2013) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

As the Majority in this case correctly surmised, in Commonwealth v. Washington, 142 A.3d 810 (Pa. 2016), our Supreme Court rejected a claim that the new rule announced in Alleyne falls within the scope of either of the two Teague exceptions. Despite my own misgivings about this conclusion,2 I recognize the binding nature of the Washington decision, and its consistency with other' pertinent authorities. See e.g., U.S. v. Winkelman, 746 F.3d 134, 136 (3d Cir. 2014) (holding that the “Alleyne decision does not fit into either” Teague exception category and, therefore, could not circumvent the federal Habeas Corpus statute’s 1-year period of limitation, ás it did not fall within the exception to that deadline provided for new rights recognized “by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review[,]” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3)). Accordingly, I agree that this Court cannot grant relief to Appellant premised on the theory that retroactive application of Alleyne is required under the Teague framework.

However, while Teague provides the framework to determine- whether retroactive application of Alleyne on collateral review is required, it does not at all bar Pennsylvania’s General Assembly .from providing relief to persons sharing, Appellant’s procedural posture. That brings us to the second theory supporting granting relief in this case: the PCRA statute explicitly provides for it. ,

It must be acknowledged that

the Teague rule of nonretroactivity was fashioned to achieve the goals of federal habeas while minimizing federal intru*1012sion into state criminal proceedings. It was intended to limit the authority of federal courts to overturn state convictions—not to limit a state court’s authority to grant relief for violations of new rules of constitutional law when reviewing its own State’s convictions.

Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 280-81, 128 S.Ct. 1029, 169 L.Ed.2d 859 (2008) (emphasis added).

Thus, Teague dictates whether a decision must be applied retroactively as a federal constitutional matter.3 It does not purport to be the last word on whether other remedies exist under Pennsylvania law for the correction of illegal sentences. Indeed, as Danforth suggests, when Teag-ue does not demand retroactive application of new constitutional rules, the states are still free to provide a remedy above and beyond what is required under Teague. I believe that such relief is afforded by the PCRA statute, but only for timely PCRA petitions.

A Pennsylvania state court’s authority to grant relief on collateral review is dictated by the PCRA statute. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9542 (“The action established in this subchapter shall be the sole means of obtaining collateral relief and encompasses all other common law and statutory remedies for the same purpose that exist when this subchapter takes effect .... ”). Moreover, the PCRA statute expressly states that it “provides for an action by which persons convicted of crimes they did not commit and persons serving illegal sentences may obtain collateral relief.” Id. (emphasis added).

Notably, Section 9542 does not delineate between sentences which were illegal when issued and sentences which became illegal at a later time. Indeed, the use of the term “serving” suggests that no such distinction was intended. This is not to say that the legislature did not contemplate retroactivity concerns. It is patently obvious that it did so given the provision addressing the retroactive effect of newly recognized constitutional rights in untimely PCRA petitions. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(l)(iii) (permitting consideration of an untimely PCRA petition where “the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively”). Indeed, it is precisely because the PCRA statute specifically addresses retroactivity concerns with regard to untimely PCRA petitions that the absence of retroactivity-concerned language in the provisions governing timely petitions strongly suggests the legislature was not concerned with retroactivity issues for timely PCRA petition. In any event, even if the PCRA is ambiguous with regard to retroactivity in those provisions, the principle of lenity generally dictates that whatever ambiguity exists must be resolved in favor of the defendant in criminal case.

The Majority cleverly avoids this second theory by narrowly framing the concept of an ‘illegal sentence’ as a sentence which was illegal at its inception. Accordingly, under such logic, since Appellant’s sentence was not illegal when issued, he is not now serving an illegal sentence. However, *1013I believe the Majority misapprehends what constitutes an illegal sentence, particularly with respect to the statutory language at issue, which does not speak to the state of the law at the time of sentencing, but instead to whether a petitioner is a “per-sone ] serving [an] illegal sentence[,]” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9542. See Majority Opinion at 1010 (“Appellant’s sentence can be considered illegal now only if Alleyne is held to apply retroactively.”) (emphasis added).

The problem with this assumption is that Teague-related retroactivity principles do not govern whether a sentence remains legal in the present, in light of a different understanding of constitutional law in the past when the sentence was imposed. The question of legality turns on whether Appellant’s sentence contravenes the Sixth Amendment and Due Process Clause as understood today under Alleyne. Retroactivity jurisprudence instead governs whether courts are required to grant relief from illegal sentences, regardless of the legality when they were imposed. Indeed, there would be no need for retroac-tivity principles at all in this setting if the only essential question is, “what was the state of the law when the sentence was imposed?’

The Teague decision, and the retroactivity principles it espouses, were specifically adopted from “Justice Harlan’s view of retroactivity for cases on collateral review.” Teague, 489 U.S. at 310, 109 S.Ct. 1060. In one of Justice Harlan’s concurrences, which later formed the basis for the Teague decision, he opined:

Habeas corpus always has been a collateral remedy, providing an' avenue for upsetting judgments that have become otherwise final. It is not designed as a substitute for direct review. The interest in leaving concluded litigation in a state of repose, that is, reducing the controversy to a final judgment not subject to further judicial revision, may quite legitimately be found by those responsible for defining the scope of the writ to outweigh in some, many, or most instances the competing interest in read-judicating convictions according to all legal standards in effect when a habeas petition is filed. Indeed, this interest in finality might well lead to a decision to exclude completely certain legal issues, whether or not properly determined under the law prevailing at the time of trial, from the cognizance of courts administering this collateral remedy.

Williams v. U.S., 401 U.S. 667, 682-83, 91 S.Ct. 1171, 28 L.Ed.2d 404 (1971) (J. Harlan, concurring) (emphasis added). Under Justice Harlan’s view, retroactivity principles do not operate to decide whether Appellant’s sentence is currently illegal given its apparent legality when imposed. Retro-activity principles concern whether the court should act to address an issue, “whether or not properly determined under the law prevailing at the time of trialt.]” Id. Moreover, Justice Harlan recognized that “those responsible for defining the scope of the writ,” i.e., the federal legislature, were properly tasked with weighing the interest in “readjudicating convictions” based on a subsequent understanding of the law, against the interest in the finality of judgments. Hence, retroac-tivity analysis concerns whether the courts are obliged to grant relief for illegal sentences, not whether sentences are illegal or not.

The test for illegality must be the state of the law in the present, not the state of the law at some prior time. If this were not true, there would simply be no need for retroactivity analysis for the application of new rules. By definition, the prior sentence would always be “legal” today because it was “legal” when issued. What is the purpose of retroactivity analysis in illegal sen*1014tence jurisprudence if, by definition, new rules never rendered illegal old sentences?

In sum, I believe that while it is clear that Washington precludes this Court from being required to give retroactive effect to Alleyne under Teague, the PCRA statute by its own terms provides relief from any illegal sentence if such a claim is raised in a timely PCRA petition. Under the current state of the law, Appellant’s sentence is illegal and, therefore, I believe his timely PCRA petition entitles him to relief under the terms of the PCRA itself. As the Majority reaches a different conclusion, I respectfully dissent.