Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2017

Com. v. Davis, R.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania · Decided February 28, 2017

Opinion

J -S80029-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 1 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee v. RAYMOND ROBERT DAVIS Appellant No. 284 MDA 2016

Appeal from the PCRA Order entered January 13, 2016 In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Criminal Division at No: CP-40-CR-0002292-2010 BEFORE: LAZARUS, STABILE, and RANSOM, JJ.

JUDGMENT ORDER BY STABILE, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 28, 2017 Appellant, Raymond Robert Davis, appeals from the January 13, 2016 order entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County ("PCRA court"), denying his petition for collateral relief pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. Appellant argues the PCRA court erred in not finding Alleynel applicable to his case.2 We

1 Alleyne v. United States, 133 S.Ct 2151 (2013). In Alleyne, the U.S. Supreme Court held that any fact increasing the mandatory minimum sentence for a crime is considered an element of the crime to be submitted to the factfinder and found beyond a reasonable doubt. 2 Appellant also argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue a claim under Alleyne. Because of our disposition on the first claim, we will not address the ineffective assistance claim.

J -S80029-16

agree. Accordingly, we reverse the order denying PCRA relief, vacate the judgment, and remand for resentencing.

The underlying facts are not in dispute3 and the PCRA court adequately summarized the procedural history in its January 13, 2016 opinion.4 On the applicability of Alleyne, the PCRA court determined that Appellant's instant PCRA petition was timely, but that he was not entitled to relief under Alleyne because "at the time Alleyne was decided, [Appellant]'s direct appeal had ended." PCRA Court Opinion, 1/13/16, at 16 (emphasis added).

We disagree.

Following a breakdown in the court's operation, the PCRA court stayed the filing of Appellant's second PCRA petition.5 An Appellant "should not be precluded from appellate review based on what was, in effect, an administrative breakdown on the part of the trial court." Commonwealth v. Leatherby, 116 A.3d 73, 79 (Pa. Super. 2015); see also Commonwealth v. Parlante, 823 A.2d 927, 929 (Pa. Super. 2003) (a trial court's misstatement of the appeal period constituted a breakdown in the

For detailed information about the facts of the case, see our decision on direct appeal. Commonwealth v. Davis, No. 911 MDA 2012, unpublished memorandum at 1-8 (Pa. Super. filed March 12, 2013).

4 See PCRA Court Opinion, 1/13/16, at 1-2 The PCRA court improperly stayed the proceedings on the second PCRA petition under the mistaken belief that a stay would preserve the timeliness of the petition.

-2 J -S80029-16

court's operation)). It is undisputed that Appellant was sentenced to a mandatory minimum based on the weight of the drugs in contravention to Alleyne. Moreover, the Commonwealth concedes that this matter should be remanded for resentencing. See Commonwealth's letter to the Superior Court Prothonotary dated September 9, 2016 (citing Commonwealth v. Ruiz, 131 A.2d 54, 60 (Pa. Super. 2015). Therefore, we conclude that Appellant is entitled to a remand for resentencing without application of any unlawful mandatory minimum.

Order reversed; judgment of sentence vacated; remanded for resentencing. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

J seph D. Seletyn, Prothonotary

Date: 2/28/2017

-3

Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.