J-A16005-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 J.R., IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellant v. L.T., Appellee No. 60 WDA 2017

Appeal from the Order Dated December 21, 2016 In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Family Court, at No(s): FD 07-003697-004

BEFORE: STABILE, J., FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., and STRASSBURGER,* J.

MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED AUGUST 28, 2017 In his tenth appeal, J.R. (Father) appeals from the order of December 21, 2016,1 which enforced the legal custody provisions of the parties’ March 24, 2015 custody order. We affirm and remand for a determination of counsel fees to be awarded to Mother. ____________________________________________

There are actually two orders at issue in this appeal. As explained by the trial court: The reason there are two orders is because each party submitted a proposed order with their respective motion. For housekeeping purposes, [the trial court] typically will deny one proposed order in full with the direction to “see order of same date.” The [trial court] will then use the second proposed order as the template for its ultimate decision. Here, the [trial court] mistakenly abandoned this good practice in the haste of the motions argument … [.]

Trial Court Opinion, 2/8/2017, at fn. 1.

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

J-A16005-17

The trial court summarized the protracted history of this case as follows.

[Father and L.T. (Mother)] are parents to a nine-year-old son [J.R. Jr., born April 2007 (Child)]. The history of this custody case is the history of Father’s very litigious conduct. Litigation greatly increased after March 2015, when after a custody hearing, [the trial court] awarded Mother the sole legal custody authority to make medical and educational decisions on behalf of [Child]. Father was named the sole legal custodian on matters pertaining to [Child’s] optical, dental and orthodontic needs.

The driving force behind [the trial court’s] division of legal custody was Father’s record of animosity on this case. In its decision, which has long since been affirmed by [this Court, the trial court] noted instances of Father’s hostility and inability to communicate or cooperate with Mother. This behavior, which the [trial court] described then as stalking, was so egregious that it was — and still is — in [Child’s] best interests if the custody order separated the co-parenting as much as possible.

The physical schedule was ordered to be week on week off. The parties need not [obtain] the other’s prior approval to enroll the child in extracurriculars. And the legal decisions were divided such that the respective parent was put in exclusive charge of certain domains.

Among the reasons for this custody scheme was [the trial court’s] desire to make the custody order “as simple as possible, as clear-cut as possible,” an expression that soon became Father’s favorite chapter and verse as he has routinely quoted it back to the [trial court] in virtually all motions’ arguments and in nearly every one of Father’s petitions.

The genesis of the instant appeal was Mother’s discovery that Father had been taking [Child] to see a therapist, and that he had done so for 18 months, unilaterally, and in violation of the custody order. Father had told Mother that he wanted to take [Child] to a therapist in June 2015. Mother was against individualized therapy from the onset, but she had told Father she would reconsider her position if [Child] was first reevaluated by the cognitive psychologist who had previously determined that [Child] was too young for individualized therapy. It was Mother’s apparent understanding that [Child] did not receive individualized therapy as the parents never made arrangements -2- J-A16005-17

to have [Child] reevaluated. Father contends that Mother knew and thus implicitly consented. Fast forward 18 months later, when in December 2016 Mother inadvertently received a $100 bill for [Child’s] psychological services and learned that Father had gone against both Mother’s wishes and the [c]ustody [o]rder and enrolled [Child] in therapy anyway. Mother immediately brought the subject [petition for enforcement and special relief] seeking to end this practice as well as recoup the $100 copay.

At the motions’ argument, Mother articulated her reasons against individualized therapy, citing the previous evaluation that [Child] was too young. However, Mother was amicable to therapy if it was conducted in a family setting. Father could not articulate any of his reasons. Instead, he became so disruptive and hostile to both [the trial court] and opposing counsel, even after warnings from both [the court] and the deputy present in the room, that [the trial court] was forced to discontinue the motions’ argument and issue a ruling.

The ruling interpreted and enforced Paragraph 4 of the March 24, 2015 Custody Order which provides: “All decisions involving legal custody shall be shared with the exception of the following: [list omitted].” Absent from this list was any mention of mental health services. Thus, mental health issues would be one of the few matters where the parents would need to be in agreement before one parent took any action. At the motions’ argument, the [trial court] was prepared to enforce Paragraph 4, which would effectively prohibit Father from taking [Child] to individualized therapy absent Mother’s consent. However, despite Father’s disruption, Mother was able to articulate that she would not be opposed [Child’s] enrollment in therapy so long as it was conducted in a family setting. As such, [the trial court] ordered that Paragraph 4 continues to require mutual consent for mental health issues, save for family-style therapy, where Father can enroll [Child]. The [trial court] further ordered that [Child’s] mental health records shall be accessible by both parents, just like [Child’s] medical records, optical records, etc.[, and that Father pay the $100 copay Mother had received for Child’s therapy].

Trial Court Opinion, 2/8/2017, at 1-4.

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Father timely filed a notice of appeal, and complied with the trial court’s order directing him to file a concise statement of matters complained of on appeal. The trial court filed its opinion on February 8, 2017.

Father states the following inartfully phrased questions for our review.

1. Did the trial court err committing an abuse of discretion and/or an error of the law by, inter alia, modifying the custody order, notwithstanding its failure to conduct a modification hearing?

2. In regard to [] Mother’s access to [Child’s] records with CDTA, did the trial court err by even addressing the proposal to Paragraph 4(g) of the March 24, 2015 custody order of court [which] clearly grants both parties access to ALL records regarding [Child]. Mother already having access to the records makes the need to for it to be address[ed] null; since [] Mother does not have and never has had any legal or permitted access to [] Father’s records and therefore has no place in being addressed?

3. Did the trial court err by ignoring the duty set before it to ensure the best interest of [Child] comes before all else by forbidding [Child] to continue receiving services with the therapist he has grown familiar with over the period of eighteen months?

4. In her continued abuse of discretion, general bias, and incompetence, did the trial court err when order [] Father to pay the $100[.00] balance to CDTA? This err/question is two-fold;

a. [] Mother addresses the request to the [trial court] in a matter that deems it necessary due to [] Father’s non-compliance with the custody order of court, which is untrue.

b. The trial court’s refusal to speak to [] Father’s response and new matter which clearly addressed two key elements in support of his argument;

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i. The trial court’s custody order, including the same trial court’s words to both parties after having read it aloud on March 24, 2016 ii. [] Mother’s false and misleading statements within her original petition.

Father’s Brief at 2-3 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

“We review an order disposing of a petition for special relief under an abuse of discretion standard of review.” Kulp v. Kulp, 920 A.2d 867, 870 (Pa. Super. 2007). “An abuse of discretion requires proof of more than a mere error in judgment, but rather evidence that the law was misapplied or overridden, or that the judgment was manifestly unreasonable or based on bias, ill will, prejudice, or partiality.” Simmons v. Simmons, 723 A.2d 221, 222 (Pa. Super. 1998).

Following our review of the certified record, the briefs for the parties, and the relevant law, we conclude that the opinion of the Honorable Kathryn M. Hens-Greco correctly addresses and disposes of Father’s issues and supporting arguments. Specifically, the trial court found: (1) it did not modify the existing custody order without a hearing, it only enforced paragraph 4 of the parties’ agreement, which set forth that Mother and

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Father share legal custody as it pertains to the mental health of Child,2 and furthermore, it did not amend or supplement the custody order, but merely clarified that Mother would not oppose Father enrolling Child into family therapy; (2) it did not err in reaffirming what the custody order already allowed for, equal access to both parents to Child’s medical records, which the court relayed at the motions hearing, included Child’s mental health records; (3) it did not err in enforcing the custody order, and thus forbidding Father from continuing to take Child to individualized therapy; (4) it did not err in ordering Father to pay the copay incurred from Child attending therapy; and (5) Father’s claims that the trial court is incompetent and biased are meritless. Trial Court Opinion, 2/8/2017, at 5-10.

We agree with the trial court’s reasoning and conclusions.

Accordingly, we adopt the trial court’s February 8, 2017 opinion as our own, and affirm the trial court’s disposition of Father’s issues on the bases of this

____________________________________________

In agreeing with the trial court, we reject Father’s argument that because the custody order did not clearly state that Mother’s permission must be obtained before enrolling the Child in therapy, the trial court’s holding that Mother’s permission was necessary amounted to a modification of the order.

It is clear that order specified that all legal custody issues, with the exception of a few specific issues, were to be shared. Thus, Father was on notice that Mother must share in the decision-making as it pertains to enrolling Child in therapy.

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opinion.3 The parties shall attach a copy of the trial court’s opinion to this memorandum in the event of further proceedings.

Lastly, we address Mother’s request for counsel fees based upon Father’s “vexatious and frivolous behavior,” in which Mother avers that in addition to Father’s various filings in the trial court and this Court, which are based upon “fruitless claims,” Father has engaged in harassing behavior, including name-calling. Mother’s Brief at 16-20.

Under Pa.R.A.P. 2744, an appellate court may award counsel fees and other damages when it determines that “an appeal is frivolous or taken solely for delay or that the conduct of the participant against whom costs are to be imposed is dilatory, obdurate or vexatious.” An appeal is “frivolous” if the appellate court determines that the appeal lacks any basis in law or in fact.

Lundy v. Manchel, 865 A.2d 850, 857 (Pa. Super. 2004) (some citations omitted). “[A]n appellate court may award as further costs damages as may be just … if it determines that an appeal is frivolous or taken solely for delay or that the conduct of the participant against whom costs are to be imposed is dilatory, obdurate or vexatious. The appellate court may remand the case to the trial court to determine the amount of damages authorized by this rule.” Pa.R.A.P. 2744.

____________________________________________

We recognize that the opinion at two places on page one refers to December 2017 when it obviously meant December 2016.

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Upon review, we agree with Mother that Father’s conduct both immediately preceding this appeal and during the appeal has been obstreperous and vexatious. We note with displeasure that this is Father’s tenth appeal since March 2015, and reiterate, as we have found in the past, that “Father’s appeals are frivolous, dilatory, obdurate, and vexatious and his abuse of the legal process is unwarranted.” J.R. v. L.T, 161 A.3d 383 (Pa. Super. 2017) (unpublished memorandum).

Accordingly, we grant Mother’s request for counsel fees and remand this matter to the trial court for calculation of reasonable counsel fees.

Order affirmed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/28/2017

-8- Circulated 08/10/2017 01:29 PM

Allegheny County - Department of Court Records Civil Division - Filings Information

County caseID:FD-07-003697 Case Description:Thompson vs Rehak 004 Official Docket Entry, Sort By Document Number Ascending Document Filed Date Title/Entry Entry Classification Filed By Number 1 02/08/2017 Opinion Official Docket Entry Kathryn MHens-Greco

(Index Page-1) ... :. ,- .

1-Opinion .:

• •J .

IN THE COURT DFCdMMbN PLEAS:.QF.ALLEGHENY COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA FAMILYDlVI$ION

J. R., Plaintiff, OPJNIQN v. .No.:: FI)-07-003697-004'.

60WDA 2017 LT.,.

Defendant.

B·Y: Honorable k~tbryn ;Herw-Greco· 44(J RossStreet Suite 5077 Pittsburgh, :rA 1:;2,i:9.

COPIES TO: PrQ S:e'_Plaintiff: J.'.R'.,.Sr; 246: R~ptibf_i_~ Street 'J,+· Pittsburgh; PA 1521.1

Counsel for Defendant: .4._;.

Margaret Wei Prescott, Esq, i .,'" Women's Center &.:-Shelter of Greater Pittsburgh -Civil Law Project· .

P.(), 130~ 3742 Pittsburgh, PA 1523.0

. f,~: o~ f.~;·, . _,.

IN THECOUR.TOF.COMMON PLEAS ()FALLEGHENY COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA FAMILY .DIVISION J.R., Plaintiff, No.: FD~07~003'697-004 WDA'.2017 y. . I

L. T., Defendant.

OPINION i-IENS-GRECO,J. February 8, 2017 In this, his· tenth appeal, Plaintiff J.R. :("Father"), "pro se, appeals this Court's Orders I of .D~cernber'2L.2017 ,. which enforced the legal custody provisions' of the parties' Custody Order of March 24, 2015, and specified thaJ Father does not 'have the authority to unilaterally enroll the parties' nine-year-old son. in any individualized mental. health. therapy. The December 2017 Orders permitted, however; that F ather may enroll the child. in family therapy after Defendant LT. (''Mather'') teptesented that she would not contest therapy ifdonein a family setting.

1· The reason there: are two orders is because.each.party submitted a proposed order with: their respective motion. For . housekeepingpurposes, thisCourt typically will deny .one. proposed orderirr full with· the-directiorrto "see order of same date:'.' The Court will then use the second proposed order as the template for its ultimate decision, Here, the Court mistakenly abandoned this good practice in thehaste of the .motionsargurnent, some of which WilJ.lJe T~Wlc! below: · · In any event, ~~- i.t ~ta_n\:f~, Q!Jt! <).n:l~r '-c the 9r:<:t~r: th.it wasattached t9.:Fat!ter's pleading -1,Wgely strikes through all .of F~ther;.s: requested feJ ief, It on.lf lea,\'.es the firs! two. paragraphs~ the second paragraph is the substantive order: "[Father] rriay contiriue to take itie child'to receive psychoiogicai services if it JS family therapy:" The first paragrt[ph reads: ''·'(Mothdsf Petition 1s DENIEO/ but this. sentence should also have been.stricken through as ihe Court used.the proposed order attached to Mother's pell ii on as its template. · The other order -the order that was attached to Mother.'s' pet ii ion and the-one the Court.used .as its. template - also specifies that Father may coniinue to fake 'the. child to receive-psychological services if ii is. family therapy. This order is far more substantive as ii addresses, for example, issues ofco-pays and medical records. ·· · Both ofthese orders hit the docket - albeit one pi!fQi"~ and one ·aft~r (l:le D~1eiriber holjdays:» ~.nd, so both ar~ to be observed.

l I., RELEVAN't:FACTUAL AND PROCEDURA,iL HISTORY The ;p<!rties'.ar_e parents to a nine-year-old son_. The historyof this custody case .is the history of Father's very .titig-tQllS conduct Litigation greatly increased after March 2015, when - . ' .aftera cusfo:dy hearing, this Court awarded Motherthe sole 'legal custody authority to make medical c1nd educational decisions. on behalf of the child, Father was named the sole: legal custodian on matters pertaining to the .ehild's optical, dental ,m:19: orthodontic, needs. See Order of Court; dated. March 24; 201,5, .a.t Paragraph lt 'The' ddvingfoi:ce behind this Court's· division or legal cusjodywas Father-srecofd of animosity oh· this case. Se« T_1.\~1i Court Opinion, 495 WDA 2015,. dated May 29, 201:5.? at 8-~J4; see cdsQ Bernard. v, Greeh,602A.2d :1380, 1381 (Pa. Super. 1990) (quoting litre 'Wesley J.K, . .

445 A.2<:l i243·, 1_~49 (Pa. Super: J982). In its. decision, which has long since· been affirmed by the· Superior Court, this Court noted instances off ather' s .hostility and .inability to communicate orcooperate with Mother: This behavior, which the Court described then as stalking, was• so egregious tha; fr was - and still is.'---; in the child's best .interests if the custody order .separated the .eo-parenting as much as possible, Th~: physica] schedule was' ordered to be week on week off.

The: parties need not the other's :priot approval to enroll the chlld· 'in.extracurriculars. Arid the 'legal' decisions were giv_!ded such that the· respective patent was put in exdl!~fy~ charge -of certain domains. See Custody Order qf Court, -dated March. 24_; 2015.

Among: the reasons for this custody scheme was- this Court' s desire to make the, custody order "as simple as possible, ~~ clear-cut as possible," a:n, expression that.soon became.Father's favorite chapter and verse as he has routinely quoted it back to the Court iii virtual ly al I. motions' arguments and ju_ nearty ~very one .of Father's -petitions, See Transcript of Testirnon y ("T .T ."). dated DecemberZl, 2016,. at 4;

The, genesis; of the. instant appeal was Mother's discovery that Father had been taking the: child to. see a therapist .and that he had done so for is months, unilateral! y, .and in, violation ohlw custody order. See Mother's Petition for Enforcement and. S pecial Relief, dated December 21, 2016. Father had told Mother that he wanted to takethechild to a therapist in Jµne:2015.

Mother was against 'individualized therapy fromthe .onset, but-she had told Father she would reconsider her position. ifthe child was first.reevaluated by jhe cognitive psychologist who had. previously determined that the child was too young for individualized therapy; See TT., at 2~ 3; see .alstr Mother;'s Petition for Enforcement, at Exhibit B. ltwas Mother's apparent understanding that the child 9i<J not receive individualized therapy, as the.parents never made arrangements to have the child reevaluated. Father, contendsthat Mother. knew .and' illus implicitly consented, Fast forward 18 months 'later, when in December 2016 Mother inadvertently received a $100 bill for the child'_s psychological servicesand learned that Father had .gone 'against both Mother's wishes and the: Custody .Order: and enrol led the· child in therapy anywa)'. Mother immediately brought the subject petition seeking to end this 'practice as well as recoup the $100 copay; At the· motions" argument, Mother articulated her reasons against individualized' therapy, citing the previous evaluation that the. child was too, young. However, Mother W<_,lS amicable to therapy 'ifit was conducted .in. a famil.ysetdng., Father could not .articulate .af(y: of his reasons; .Instead, be became so disruptive and hostile to both this Court and opposing counsel, even after warnings, from both this Court and the deputy present in the room, that this Court was. forced to discontinue the motions" ,atgum.erit and .issue a ruling, See T.T ., at .8" 13, see geiief:clll)i' 1-13.

The rulinginterpreted and enforced Paragra_ph-4 of the March 24, 2015 Custody Order; which ptoVides::'"All decisions involvinglega] custody shall be shared With the .exception .of the, following: [list omitted]." Absent.from this. list was any mention ofmental. health services, Thus; mental health issues. Would be one of the few matters where the parents would, need to be 'in agreement before one patent took any 'action, At the motions' argument; the Court was prepared. to enforce Paragraph 4, which would effectively prohibit Fatherfrom faking the. child to individualized therapy absent Mother's consent. However, despite Fathe_r\s. disruption, Mother was ableto articulate that she Would not be opposed the child's· enrol lrnent- in therapy so long as it was conducted i11 a family setting, Ai; such, this Court ordered that Paragraph 4 continues to require .rnutual consentformental heahh issues, save for' fainily~style therapy, where Father can enroll the chi1d. TI:ie 'Court further ordered that the. child "s mental health records .shall be accessible by both parents. just like the child's. medical records, optical records, etc, Father'

n, DISCUSSION In.his 'timely-filed/ "Concise Statement ofErrors Complained of.on Appeal," father alleges, verbatim: l'. The. Trial Coµ_rt erred committing an abuse of discretion and/or an error of the law by, inter alia, modifying the. custody order, .nctwithstanding: its failure to conduct a modification hearing. · · 2. lu regard to 'Mother's, access to the child's records with: CPT A; the 'Thal Court erred by even addressing the: proposal as Paragraph 4{g.) of the: Match '14., 2015 Custody :Order..gf 'Court as it :clearly gr'11_1ts both parties. access to all records regarding the child. 'Mother· [already] .having .access to the, records makes the' need for it to be address'[ed] rtUIL The Mother does .not have and never has had any legal or permitted access· to the F\1the!';$ recordsl.] and therefore has no place in being addressed{sic].

J., The Trial Courterred by ignoringthe c:lt1ty set before it to .ensurethe best .interest of the, child comes before all .else by forbidding the child to: continue receiving services with the therapist he has growrrfarrnliar; With over-the period pf eighteen months.

gib¢it n9t concurrently-tiled 4. Irt.het continued abuse of discretion, general bias, and incompetence. the 1'ri<\l.Couit erred when.orderingthe Father to paythe $100 balance.to COTA. This err] or] is. two- foldh] a. l'l}e Mother addresses the request tQ the Courtin a matter that de.ems it necessary due to the Father's non-compliance with the 'Custody Orde; of Court, which is ti rttrue. b, The Trial Court's' refusal to 'speak to the Father's.Response.and 'New Matters which clearly addressed two key elements 'in support' of ~_is argument] :] ,1.. 'The: 1\i.Al Court' s Custody Order; including the same Thal Court's words to both parties ·I . after havingread' . ., . it aloud on March . 24,, ..

20Jg. .ii. The Mother's false. and misleading statements w.iJhfo her original Petition.

The Court addresses these statements in order ..

A. Modifi'<;~ti9n Father is .generallyoorrect thc1t a custody modification without c1 custody hearing would be erroneous. However, the Court sets forth a couple reasons why Father's. contentions are ' ' unfounded. For one· thing.jhe su]Jj'ect order merely enforced Paragraph.q . ofthe parties' Custody Order, Ibis was .no .substantial change in: custody. · The patties entered and ex. ited the Court with. unchanged rights and responsibilities regarding mental healthissues, namely that they must, reach a: consensus before taking.any action regarding mental health therapy. The only expansion -ff that is even the light term - of Paragraph 4: is 'chat Mother, out of her indifference or magnanimity, represented to the Court that she would.not contestFather's decision to eri.gage .in family thera~y With the child, ··urns, fhe December 21, 2016'0rder J11~re.iy stares' that Mother consents to a certain type of.mental health therapy; tr could even be said thatFathernow has the benefit.ofMother\con.senton.theretoi'd. 'This "expansion," i.e. the Court's authorization of unilateral engagement of family therapy, 'is not a modification. Even if it was, theCourt's modification is in F ether's .interest.

But perhaps. Father .is correct. Perhaps this Court' s order dTo erroneously modifythe: Custody Order (though C.AJ. v. D.$:M,3 seems to, allow ror some modifications outside of . . modification hearings ). If this Court acted without authority, then. Father would be 'prevented from enrolling the child .in any 'mental health therapy .. Ifin this 'latest 'appeal, Eather means t9: appeal tc>' the. Superior Court.forhis right to take the .child. to 'individualized. therapy; then he 'means to carry water in a sieve'. .I B. Medical Records I

ln his second concise .statement,' Father does not. allege that this Court erred, per se.

Father is satisfied .to just point out that 'the· Court was superfl uous ill ordering that both parerits . shall :ha:ye access the . child 's mental .health records. Fath et cites· to Paragraph 4(g} of the Custody Order. to argue .th_at the Court ,et.ltecidy granted both parents access to the .child's records, notwithstanding the fact that tberespective· parents have. their own .respective -decision-making domains, W,hile Paragraph 4(g} specifies that both parents shall .have access to the child'« records, the. types ofrecords specified. in Paragraph A(g) are medical, denial, orthodontic and optical, The, Custody Order is otli'erwise silent as to access to mental health. records, And so· the Court added 'language lo . fhe subject order .a.u.~hqdzing both parents 16 have access tQ pastand future mental health records -, The 'Court nips:in the bud tha.t futt.i.re skirmish.

C Best Interests In his. third concise Statement, Either alleges this Court erred. when it forbade F~Hh.er from . .continuing.the child's individualized therapy; as 'it is inthe. child's best interest to receive such treatment. Ironically; had this Court.granted therelief Fathermentions here, .itwould have erroneously modified the custody order without.holding a. proper proceediii~. In his third concise statement, Father inadvettentl.y \}dmits to, violating the Cust_ody Order for over a yeai\ ~·· 136 A3d.504, ~OS :(P4·, Super. 20f6).

I) .. Bias· and Incompetence .As this flna] section concerns th is Court's alleged bias and incompetence, the Court can only cite. In re.S. H., 879 ;\.2d 802, '808. (Pa.Super. 2005) and note that a mere .adverse rul ing, without more; does not demonstrate bias . But because Father took the trouble of fashioning a fourth concise statement, however prolix, this Comt_ takes the time to address it, Father's, fourth concise statement is two parts: (a) and (b), Part (b) has two .subsections :_ (g)(i) and (b)(ii} Section· (a) is indecipherable. It reads: "The Mother addresses the request to the. Court in ,i' matter that deems it neeessarydue to the t'ather's non-compliance with the · Custody Order of Court, which is untrue." Fa ther' s, statement: 4_(a) should be deemed waived, "When the trial court has to guess what issuesan ~p_pellant is appealing, that is hot enough tqr, a.meaningful review.]. .. ]in other· words.aconcise statement which. i's too vague to allow the courtto identify the .issues raised on. appeal is the. functional equivalent of no concise, statement at.all," Commonwealth: I!, Dowling, A.2d,683, :686 (Pa. Super, 200J}. See also CW. v. ND. 200 W:L 11173054 :(Pa. Super. . 2013) (Non-precedennal decision demonstrates the applicability bf Dowling to family 'law cases.)

This Court cannot .meamngfully address what it cannot understand, Likewise, the, Court C<Jl111.0t_ reasonably speak to Father's statement 4(b.),(ii). There, Father alleges that Mother's pleading included. false and misleading statements. Little 9~D be said on this point. Perhaps Fa'th~(s point is that Mother knew Father was taking the child to: indjvjdµalized.theta_py throughout the .last year. See TT., at ·8-9. Mother represented that she did. not know. Th~ ·point is actually. moot. ff Mother knew and consented, then Father was :no.t .afoul of Paragraph 4' .. Beta use mental heal th appointments are governed by Paragraph 4,. Mother reserved the· right to: revoke her consent And if Father refused to. cease the appointments,

Mother stiff reserved the tight to enforce Paragraph 4. What Father f~i.i_s to understand· is not every contrary representation by the opposing .. party is false and misleading,. .. Each .~. . . ·. parry .sets .

Jor,th allegations in a respective pleading, It is the. nature of the adversarial process, upon which the legal system is 'based, rhat one. party will :not find historically' accurate the version of events set forth by the other, It 'is the. nature of this. Court: to take every allegation for what tr .is: an allegation, not gospel truth.

Left fol' last ate Father's final points on jhis Court's "general bias and incompetence," ' .

According to, Father, examples ofthis Court's ,- • I bias are best exemplified by the '''w0rds the Court • ,,

spoke to, both.parties" and by the :Co1.JJ::t' s "refusal to speak" 'to.Father's pleading .. See F~thet"s Concise· Statement; .at 4(b)(i').

BY''wotds to both parties" Father means the Court's aforementioned phrase explaining its .2QJ5:()1stody Order to the parties; '?1 rrh_~ Court] tried to keep [the custody arrangement] as simple as, possible, as clear-cut as possible, '' fg(he.r attaches to nearly eVety one -ofhis motions 'thepage of the March 24, _10ts: transcripf that .includcs this di'alog11.e; 'See, e.g., Fathet~rs Response ,to Petition arid New Matter, dated . Decem.bec2l;.2016, docketed.January 6, 20:l?,; -at Exhibit B'.. He .quotes the phraseback to the Court by way of arguing that he, is in the right, (hat Mother is in thewrong, Set r.r, at 4,5, Despite its multiuse, the phrase has: never convinced the Court.to change its positionbefore, and does not do so here, .At the.motion argument, Father. argued that; despite, Paragraph 4·':s· language to: the contrary; Father was permitted to ''do what he· thought: was-appropriate during his week," which apparently included unilaterally enrolling the child in individual ized therapy. For authority, Father quotes the Marth.2015 transcri pt of the Court; s explanation for. its Custody Order. There; theCourt was explaining to Fath et that limiting the n.eed for co-parenting was in the 'c.hHct'·s best interests, that despite F.:ither's.

reservationsabout Mother'sabilities, this Cour; was .confident.that.each.parent was :perfectly · capable ofparenting the child during that ,pa1;ent;s respective week, without the unnecessaty interference of'the non-custodial parent.

Still, this Court was fully awarethat its seven-page Custody Order' could riot account for everything under. the. sun, That 'is why Paragraph 4 provides us a default shared legal .eustodyfor any .issue unnamed in the ensuing list., It would have been inappropriate for this Court to assign alegal.decision-makerto «potential issue.which may or may not everoccur. Father'suse of.the e·xcetpt in this. context is a gross misrepresentation, as Father surely knows for he\IstiaHy employs the phrase to petition this . Court to find Mqther fo .contempt. Ironically; Mother «lid nor seek to· hold Father in contempt. forhis decision to unilateral! y take the c::hMd to, therapy for over a year; over Mother' s faplicit objection before the therapy even began, over this: Court's explicit statement in the. Custody Order that all other legal. custody decisions must be shared.

Next, Father allegesthis Court showed its bias· arid incompetence when it "refused to speak" to Father's responsive :rlead.ing;, Fc1ther .refers to a portion of dialo~iie between.the Courr . and f iither: where- Father accused the Court of not.reading his· pleading, Ste T .T.; at '6~8:. Tb better understand :FcJ,ther's. position regarding legal custody, the Courr posed to Father .c1_ hypothetical= Whether Father believed ·µ1£1t_ M9ther would have the legal .authority to also act unilaterally even if she «lecided.to, say; commit the child to cl psychiatric 'institute. As Father nevefmentiened a psychiatric institute 'in his pleading; .he .apparently took this hypothetical to mean that the-Court did .not read his pleading, J(l., at 7-9. Later, when the Court asked Mother's counsel.for cl response to father's points, she re~liedby citing to :cJne~fobit attached toMother's petition. .Id., .at .lL Mother's reference to her exhibit .apparently infuriated Father, as this Court ; instructed .him to stop unnecessarily reading aloud aiJ. his pleading' S eX:bi_bi_ts, as they Were

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already attached to .his exhibit and thus. in the record. Id., at 6~7, Despite repeated warnings. <clod 'reminders: that the proceeding . was a motion's argument and not a hearing,. . . father . would not .stop interrupting 'Mother' s counsel and demanded the Court to answer whether Xt read the pleadings.

file, at I 1 ~13, Father was so disorderly that Court had.todiscontinue.the argument for the second consecutive time for the second .consecutive reason. At this point .in the proceeding; .it became dear that Father abandoned .his desire to .make constructive legal argument, de~id}ng instead to be .disruptivein Court and harangue Mother's attomey. Id., at 8:;8,. l'3 III. CONCLUSION, 'In prohibiting, F atherfrorn scheduling future individual ized rherapy' appointments, this Court.

merely enforced - as opposed to modified - the 'legal custody provision ofthe. par:tie( Custody Order . .As Father's ,violation ofthe order caused Mother to incur ,all 00 copa)', this Court.

properly ordered.Father to reimburse Mother. It was not. superfluous of this Court to order that the child's mental 'health records shall also be .aecessible by both parties, .In fashioning the orders of DecemberZ'l , 20 i:6, the Court did not .display bias. Its orders should be affirmed, I •

BY THECQ{JRI:

IO