E. Davis v. UCBR
Opinion
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Edna Davis, :
Petitioner : :
v. : No. 339 C.D. 2017
: Submitted: September 22, 2017 Unemployment Compensation :
Board of Review, :
Respondent :
BEFORE: HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge
HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge HONORABLE J. WESLEY OLER, JR., Senior Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE BROBSON FILED: December 11, 2017
Edna D. Davis (Claimant), acting pro se, petitions for review of an order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Board), which affirmed an Unemployment Compensation Referee’s (Referee) decision, denying Claimant unemployment compensation benefits pursuant to Sections 401(d)(1) and 402(b) of the Unemployment Compensation Law (Law).1 We now affirm.
Claimant filed for unemployment compensation benefits after she ceased employment with GGNSC (Employer), with her last day of employment being September 8, 2016. (Certified Record (C.R.), Item No. 5.) The Erie UC Service Center (Service Center) issued a determination finding Claimant eligible for benefits. (Id.) Employer appealed this determination. (C.R., Item No. 6.) A Referee conducted a hearing on December 1, 2016, at which neither party appeared. (C.R., Item No. 9.) As neither party attended the hearing, the substance of the hearing involved the Referee identifying the documents made available to him, including a document entitled “Claimant’s questionnaire,” and entering them into the record. Following the hearing, the Referee issued a decision and order, reversing the Service Center’s determination and finding Claimant ineligible for benefits pursuant to Sections 401(d)(1) and 402(b) of the Law.2 (C.R., Item No. 10.)
Claimant appealed the Referee’s decision to the Board, and the Board affirmed. (C.R., Item Nos. 11, 12.) The Board concluded that Claimant failed to establish her ability and availability for suitable work and failed to establish cause of a necessitous and compelling nature to quit. In so doing, the Board issued the following findings of fact:
1. GGNSC employed the claimant.
2. The claimant voluntarily terminated her employment. (C.R., Item No. 13 at 1.) With regard to Claimant’s ability and availability for suitable work, the Board reasoned:
When applying for benefits, the claimant provided the [Department of Labor and Industry] with contradictory information regarding her ability and availability for suitable work. Notably, the claimant stated that she is “not able to work due to [her] medical condition[.]” The Board concludes that in light of the claimant’s admission and contradictory information, the presumption of ability and availability for work has been rebutted. The claimant failed to present competent evidence that she is able and available for suitable work. Therefore, the Board concludes the claimant is ineligible for benefits under Section 401(d)(1) of the Law.
(Id. at 2.) With regard to Claimant’s failure to establish that she resigned from her work due to cause of a necessitous and compelling nature, the Board reasoned:
When applying for benefits, the claimant admitted to the [Department of Labor and Industry] that she took a leave of absence. Under the Law, a leave of absence constitutes a voluntary termination of one’s employment. The claimant failed to present competent evidence establishing a necessitous and compelling reason for voluntarily terminating her employment. Therefore, the Board concludes the claimant is ineligible for benefits under Section 402(b) of the Law.
(Id.)
On appeal to this Court,3 Claimant appears to argue that the Board erred as a matter of law in determining that (1) Claimant voluntarily quit her employment without a necessitous and compelling reason, and (2) Claimant was not able and available for suitable work. Specifically, Claimant argues that she is unemployed due to a lack of work stemming from a medical condition, and she was able and available for suitable work commensurate with her medical restrictions.
We will first address Claimant’s argument that the Board erred in determining Claimant voluntarily quit her employment without necessitous and compelling cause. Whether a claimant had cause of a necessitous and compelling nature for leaving work is a question of law subject to this Court’s review. Wasko v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 488 A.2d 388, 389 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1985). A claimant who voluntarily quits her employment bears the burden of proving that necessitous and compelling reasons motivated that decision. Fitzgerald v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 714 A.2d 1126, 1129 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998), appeal denied, 794 A.2d 364 (Pa. 1999). In order for a claimant to establish cause of a necessitous and compelling nature, she must show: (1) the existence of circumstances that created real and substantial pressure to leave employment; (2) that such circumstances would compel a reasonable person to leave employment; (3) that she acted with common sense; and (4) that she made a reasonable attempt to continue her employment. Comitalo v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 737 A.2d 342, 344 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999).
Here, Claimant asserted in her questionnaire that she was unable to perform her job function due to a medical condition and that she would only be able to work light duty. (C.R., Item No. 2.) There is no evidence in the record, however, to establish that Claimant made a reasonable attempt to preserve her employment or that she met the other requirement for a necessitous and compelling cause to quit. See Comitalo, 737 A.2d at 344. In fact, we note that Employer indicated on “Employer’s Notice of Application/Request for Separation and Wage Information” form that Claimant was a no call/no show; she . . . abandoned her job.” (C.R., Item No. 3.)4 Accordingly, the Board did not err in concluding that Claimant is ineligible for benefits under Section 402(b) of the Law, as she failed to establish that she voluntarily quit her employment with cause of a necessitous and compelling nature.
Because we conclude that the Board did not err in denying Claimant benefits based on Section 402(b) of the Law, we need not consider whether the Board erred in determining that Claimant was ineligible for benefits under Section 401(d)(1) of the Law.5
Accordingly, the order of the Board is affirmed.
P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge evidence that he is able to do some type of work and that there is a reasonable opportunity for securing such work.
Rohde v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 28 A.3d 237, 243 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011) (citations omitted). Here, as noted by the Board, Claimant indicated in her questionnaire that she is “not able to work due to [her] medical condition,” thus rebutting the presumption of her ability and availability for work. (See C.R., Item No. 2.) The burden then shifted to Claimant to prove that she is able to do some type of work and that there is a reasonable opportunity for securing such work. There is no evidence of record regarding whether she has such ability and opportunity. For that reason, were we to consider whether Claimant was “able to work and available for suitable work” under Section 401(d)(1) of the Law, we would conclude that the Board did not err in concluding that Claimant failed to meet her burden and, therefore, determining Claimant was ineligible for benefits under that section.
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Edna Davis, :
Petitioner :
:
v. : No. 339 C.D. 2017
:
Unemployment Compensation :
Board of Review, :
Respondent :
ORDER
AND NOW, this 11th day of December, 2017, the order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review is hereby AFFIRMED.
P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge
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