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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA v.

JOSEPH TAYLOR Appellant : No. 2552 EDA 2017 Appeal from the PCRA Order July 20, 2017 In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-15-CR-0003165-2001 BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., PANELLA, J., and STEVENS*, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED JUNE 22, 2018 Joseph Taylor appeals pro se from the order dismissing his fourth petition pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546, as untimely. We affirm.

On May 18, 1998, Taylor pleaded guilty to criminal attempt to commit homicide for shooting Ironne Cannon. The trial court sentenced Taylor to an aggregate term of fifteen to thirty years' imprisonment. Three years later, Cannon succumbed to injuries sustained in the shooting. Subsequently, the Commonwealth charged Taylor in relation to Cannon's death. A jury later convicted Taylor of first -degree murder and the court sentenced him to life in prison. This Court affirmed Taylor's judgment of sentence, and on November

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

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30, 2005, our Supreme Court denied Taylor's petition for allowance of appeal.

Taylor did not file a petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.

Over the next ten years, Taylor filed a series of PCRA petitions and appeals. After this Court affirmed the dismissal of his third PCRA petition, Taylor filed a "Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus" on May 22, 2017. In his petition, Taylor alleged that the trial court did not have the authority to impose a sentence for his first -degree murder conviction because Taylor's guilty plea to criminal attempt should have acted as a bar to prosecution. As such, Taylor averred that his sentence of life imprisonment was invalid. The PCRA court treated this petition as Taylor's fourth PCRA petition and issued a Rule 907 notice to dismiss without a hearing. Despite Taylor's response, the PCRA court dismissed Taylor's petition. Taylor filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court.

On appeal, Taylor contends that the PCRA court erred in treating his petition as a PCRA petition, subject to the PCRA's time -bar, rather than a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Instead, Taylor argues that his challenge to the validity of his sentence does not fall within the parameters of the PCRA because it is not a challenge to the legality or discretionary aspects of the sentence imposed.

The PCRA is intended to be the sole means for a petitioner to achieve post -conviction relief. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9542 ("The action established in this subchapter shall be the sole means of obtaining collateral relief and encompasses all other common law and statutory remedies for the same purpose that exist when this subchapter takes effect, including habeas corpus - 2 - J -S03028-18

and coram nobis.") Therefore, "[u]nless the PCRA could not provide for a potential remedy, the PCRA statute subsumes the writ of habeas corpus.

Issues that are cognizable under the PCRA must be raised in a timely PCRA petition and cannot be raised in a habeas corpus petition." Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 A.3d 462, 465-466 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citations omitted). See also Commonwealth v. Deaner, 779 A.2d 578, 580 (Pa. Super. 2001) ("It is well settled that any collateral petition raising issues with respect to remedies offered under the PCRA will be considered a PCRA petition.") Here, Taylor's claim of an invalid sentence rests upon his belief that the trial court did not have the authority to sentence him after his guilty plea. A challenge to the trial court's jurisdiction is squarely within the purview of the PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543 (a)(2)(viii) ("To be eligible for relief ... the petitioner must plead and prove...[t]hat the conviction or sentence resulted from one or more of the following: ... a proceeding in a tribunal without jurisdiction"). Thus, the court properly treated Taylor's writ as his fourth PCRA petition. See Commonwealth v. Hall, 771 A.2d 1232, 1235 (Pa. 2001) ("Where, as here, a defendant's post -conviction claims are cognizable under the PCRA, the common law and statutory remedies now subsumed by the PCRA are not separately available to the defendant.") Since the trial court properly treated Taylor's petition as a PCRA petition, the time limits of the PCRA applied. Under the PCRA, a petitioner must file any PCRA petition within one year of the date that his judgment becomes final.

See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment of sentence becomes final "at the - 3 - J -S03028-18

conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or the expiration of time for seeking review." 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). The PCRA's timeliness requirements are jurisdictional in nature; a court cannot address the merits of the underlying issues raised if the PCRA petition was not timely filed. See Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 994 A.2d 1091, 1093 (Pa. 2010).

Taylor's judgment of sentence became final on February 28, 2006, when the period for seeking review with the United States Supreme Court expired.

See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3); U.S.Sup.Ct.R. 13. Therefore, Taylor had until February 28, 2007, to file a timely PCRA petition. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §

9545(b)(1). Taylor's PCRA petition, filed over ten years later, is patently untimely and time -barred, unless he pleads and proves an exception to the time -bar. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii).

Taylor did not plead, and has not argued, that his petition qualifies for any of the recognized exceptions to the PCRA's time bar. As such, the PCRA court correctly dismissed Taylor's petition as untimely.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Jseph D. Seletyn, Prothonotary Date: 6/22/18

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