S.E. Redmond v. Bureau of Administrative Adjudication
Opinion
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Stacey Ella Redmond, :
Appellant :
: v. : No. 306 C.D. 2018
: Submitted: June 29, 2018 Bureau of Administrative :
Adjudication :
BEFORE: HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge
HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge OPINION NOT REPORTED MEMORANDUM OPINION BY PRESIDENT JUDGE LEAVITT FILED: September 11, 2018
Stacey Redmond, pro se, appeals an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial court) dismissing her appeal and affirming a decision of the Bureau of Administrative Adjudication (Bureau) of the City of Philadelphia that denied her request for a hearing to challenge seven parking violations and the booting of her vehicle. Upon review, we conclude that Redmond failed to exhaust her administrative remedies before filing an appeal with the trial court; thus, both the trial court and this Court lack jurisdiction over her appeal.
Between April of 2009 and May of 2016, the Philadelphia Parking Authority (Parking Authority) issued seven parking violations to two vehicles owned by Redmond.1 Redmond neither disputed nor made payment on any of the violations.
On June 27, 2017, due to Redmond’s outstanding violations, the Parking Authority immobilized Redmond’s current vehicle by placing a boot on it. That same day, Redmond paid all of the fines and penalties related to the outstanding violations so that she could have the boot removed from her vehicle.
On June 28, 2017, Redmond requested a hearing, presumably to contest the Parking Authority’s actions in placing a boot on her vehicle and requiring her to pay the fines and penalties for the seven parking violations. On June 30, 2017, the Bureau notified Redmond that her request for a hearing was denied because the statutory appeal period for the violations had expired. Thereafter, Redmond filed a notice of appeal to the trial court.
On March 2, 2018, the trial court heard argument on Redmond’s appeal. Following argument, the trial court concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to hear her appeal because she did not exhaust her administrative remedies. The trial court explained:
After receiving notice that a Parking Hearing Examiner would not hold a hearing regarding Redmond’s [violations] and/or the booting of Redmond’s vehicle, [she] had the option to file a motion to reopen the matters regarding her [violations] with a Parking Hearing Examiner. If the Parking Hearing Examiner denied her motion to reopen the matter, then Redmond had the option to serve a Notice of Appeal with the Parking Appeals Panel. If the Parking Appeals Panel affirmed the Parking Hearing Examiner’s determination, then, and only then, would the [trial court] have jurisdiction to hear Redmond’s appeal.
Trial Court Opinion at 5 (emphasis added). The trial court affirmed the Bureau’s decision and dismissed Redmond’s appeal. This appeal followed.2
On appeal, Redmond raises several issues, which we consolidate and reorder to facilitate our review. First, Redmond asserts that the trial court erred in dismissing her appeal on the basis that she failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. Second, Redmond argues that she was denied due process because she was deprived of the use of her vehicle without a hearing. Third, Redmond contends that the Parking Authority did not have authority to place a boot on her vehicle.
Turning to Redmond’s first argument, she contends that the trial court erred in dismissing her appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Redmond contends that she did exhaust her remedies by filing an appeal with the Bureau. After receiving the Bureau’s decision, Redmond believed that the next step was to appeal to the trial court. She did not know that she had to appeal the Bureau’s decision to the Parking Appeals Panel because she was unaware that entity existed. The Bureau responds that Redmond did not exhaust her administrative remedies because she did not contest liability on any of the parking violations at issue.
It is well-settled that “[a] party challenging administrative decision- making that has not exhausted its administrative remedies is precluded from obtaining judicial review.” Matesic v. Maleski, 624 A.2d 776, 778 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993) (citation omitted). This Court has stated that
[t]he doctrine of exhaustion prohibits prospective parties to administrative agency actions from bypassing that process and challenging the administrative action directly in the courts. The reasons for requiring exhaustion are that it is more efficient to allow an agency to proceed uninterrupted until its conclusion so that it can find facts, apply its expertise and exercise its necessary findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence.” Kovler v. Bureau of Administrative Adjudication, 6 A.3d 1060, 1062 n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) (citing 2 Pa. C.S. §754(b)). discretion. The doctrine also allows agencies the opportunity to correct their own mistakes.
Gardner v. Department of Environmental Resources, 658 A.2d 440, 445 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995) (citations omitted).
The City of Philadelphia has a two-step administrative appeal process for contesting parking violations. See PHILADELPHIA, PA, TRAFFIC CODE (PHILA. CODE) §§12-2807 - 12-2808 (2016).3 First, parking violation appeals are “conducted by a Parking Hearing Examiner.” See PHILA. CODE §12-2807(1) (“Each adjudication of a parking violation … shall be conducted by a Parking Hearing Examiner.”). An appeal from a determination of a Parking Hearing Examiner “shall be submitted to [the] Parking Appeals Panel.” PHILA. CODE §12-2808(2). Only after the Parking Appeals Panel issues its decision can an aggrieved individual file an appeal with the trial court. See O’Neill v. City of Philadelphia, 711 A.2d 544, 545 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998) (where a defendant denies liability, “a hearing is held before a [Bureau] hearing examiner, whose decision may be appealed to the [Bureau’s] Parking Appeals Panel, and thereafter to the Court of Common Pleas”).
Here, Redmond had an administrative remedy by which to challenge her parking violations, i.e., an appeal to a Parking Hearing Examiner. Redmond never appealed any of the violations.4 In short, Redmond failed to avail herself of the administrative remedy set forth in the Philadelphia Code.
Furthermore, when the Bureau’s Parking Hearing Examiner denied Redmond’s request for a hearing, she did not appeal that decision to the Parking Appeals Panel, as required by the Philadelphia Code. Instead, Redmond appealed directly to the trial court. Redmond’s failure to exhaust her administrative remedies precluded the trial court from assuming jurisdiction over her appeal. See Mundy v. Bureau of Administrative Adjudication (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1984 C.D. 2012, filed April 5, 2013)5 (holding that the petitioner’s choice to appeal the Parking Hearing Examiner’s determination directly to the trial court and failure to seek review before the Parking Appeals Panel as required by Section 12–2808(2) of the Philadelphia Code precluded the trial court from assuming jurisdiction over his appeal). Finally, Redmond’s ignorance of the existence of the Parking Appeals Panel does not excuse her duty to exhaust administrative remedies.6
In sum, Redmond failed to exhaust the available administrative remedies provided under the Philadelphia Code; consequently, the trial court and this Court do not have jurisdiction over her appeal.7 Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Redmond’s appeal.8
______________________________________ MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Stacey Ella Redmond, :
Appellant :
:
v. : No. 306 C.D. 2018
:
Bureau of Administrative :
Adjudication :
ORDER
AND NOW, this 11th day of September, 2018, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County in the above-captioned matter dated March 2, 2018, is AFFIRMED.
______________________________________ MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge
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