J-S69036-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : CHALLAN A. GALLEHER : : Appellant : No. 654 MDA 2018 Appeal from the Order Entered January 10, 2018 In the Court of Common Pleas of Bradford County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-08-CR-0000295-2006

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and MURRAY, J.

CONCURRING STATEMENT BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED JANUARY 08, 2019 I concur. It is clear that Appellant, who committed his crimes and entered a guilty plea long before SORNA went into effect, was not subject to SORNA’s registration requirements.1 See N.T. Sentencing, 1/15/07.

Therefore, I agree with the majority’s determination that Muniz is inapplicable here, and with its assertion that Muniz cannot save an untimely PCRA petition.2 I write separately, however, to point out that, as Appellant argues ____________________________________________

J-S69036-18

in his brief, he is in fact subject to registration, as the court acknowledged at sentencing: We believe the plea agreement, which exceeds the mandatory minimums in this case, [is] appropriate given the Defendant’s prior convictions for similar offenses and believe that with the lifetime Megan’s Law Registration, and anticipated lengthy maximum, that this Defendant can be kept under supervision and society protected sufficiently.

N.T. Sentencing, supra at 4.3 The trial court is correct that Appellant was not subject to registration and reporting requirements under SORNA, but in light of post-Muniz legislation, Appellant remains subject to the registration requirements set forth in Subchapter I, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.51-9799.75.4 ____________________________________________

§ 9799.51(b)(4) (“it is the intention of the General Assembly to address [Muniz and Butler].”) Specifically, our General Assembly modified Subchapter H's registration requirements for those offenders convicted of committing offenses that occurred on or after SORNA's effective date, i.e., December 20, 2012. Moreover, the General Assembly added Subchapter I to Title 42, Part VII, Chapter 97. Subchapter I sets forth registration requirements that apply to all offenders convicted of committing offenses on or after Megan's Law I's effective date (April 22, 1996), but prior to SORNA’s effective date (December 20, 2012), whose period of registration has not expired, as well as those offenders required to register under a former sexual offender registration law of this Commonwealth on or after April 22, 1996, but before December 20, 2012, whose period of registration has not expired. To clarify, Appellant is arguing that the registration requirement to which he is

-2- J-S69036-18

____________________________________________

subject (Megan’s Law III), was held unconstitutional in its entirety under Commonwealth v. Neiman, 84 A.3d 603, 615-16 (Pa. 2013), and therefore “cannot be revived through [post-Muniz] retroactive legislation.” See Appellant’s Brief, at 16. Because his petition is untimely, and no exception applies, the PCRA court correctly dismissed it. Commonwealth v. Taylor, 67 A.3d 1245, 1248 (Pa. 2013).