Appellants, David Keller, PA Property Portfolio, Inc., 1 and Northeast Investors Group, Inc. 2 (collectively "Plaintiffs"), appeal from four related orders, 3 entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County, granting opposing parties' preliminary objections with prejudice and dismissing Plaintiffs' complaints. After careful review, we affirm.

The facts underpinning all four actions are substantially similar and the questions of law are identical. Brief of Appellant, 4 at 3 ("this appeal is one of four appeals involving the exact same questions of law[ ]

*55 and general background history[.] The four ... appeals in question are 2902 EDA 2018, 2895 EDA 2018, 2926 EDA 2018, [and] 2628 EDA 2018."). Plaintiffs brought the instant suits to recover state and local transfer taxes 5 levied by the Monroe County Sheriff ("Sheriff") after successfully bidding on foreclosed properties at Sheriff's sales. 6 Plaintiffs, however, sought to recover these sums not from the Sheriff, but from the respective mortgage holders in each sale-namely, the instant Appellees-Bank of New York Mellon, Bank of America, and Wells Fargo Bank (collectively "the Banks").

In their pleadings, Plaintiffs argued that by being erroneously instructed by the Sheriff to pay the transfer tax, Plaintiffs overpaid for each property, creating a resultant windfall for the Banks 7 in violation of Northwest Savings Bank v. Knapp , 149 A.3d 95 (Pa. Super. 2016). In each amended complaint, Plaintiffs asserted claims for declaratory judgment, unjust enrichment, 8 equitable restitution, conversion, and special relief to pursue a class action claim. Amended Complaint, 2628 EDA 2018, 5/9/18, at 5-6; Amended Complaint, 2895 EDA 2018, 5/9/18, at 4-5; Amended Complaint, 2902 EDA 2018, 6/1/18, at 8-9; Amended Complaint, 2926 EDA 2018, 6/1/18, at 6-7. However, Plaintiffs never claimed to have filed exceptions to the Sheriff's proposed schedule of distributions under Pa.R.C.P. 3136, instead arguing they had no legal duty to comply with Rule 3136 under, inter alia , 9 Community Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. Luckenbach , 436 Pa. 472 , 261 A.2d 327 (1970). See Amended Complaint, 2628 EDA 2018, 5/9/18, at 7-9; Amended Complaint, 2895 EDA 2018, 5/9/18, at 9-10; Amended Complaint, 2902 EDA 2018, 6/1/18, at 16-17; Amended Complaint, 2926 EDA 2018, 6/1/18, at 12-14.

The Banks filed preliminary objections under Pa.R.C.P. 1028, each asserting the pleadings failed to state a valid cause of action as Plaintiffs failed to follow the statutory remedy under Rule 3136 for filing *56 exceptions to a proposed schedule of distribution from the Sherrif's sale. The Honorable Arthur L. Zulick and the Honorable David J. Williamson sustained the Banks' preliminary objections in each case, finding Plaintiffs' failure to allege filing timely exceptions to the Sherrif's sales' distribution schedules pursuant to Rule 3136 resulted in waiver. Moreover, the courts found themselves unable to grant equitable relief, as Plaintiffs failed to avail themselves of an adequate remedy at law. 10 Plaintiffs filed notices of appeal and subsequently complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).

Across all four briefs, Plaintiffs present the following identical issues, reproduced verbatim as follows:

1) Under Community Federal Savings v. Luckenback [Luckenbach] , [ 436 Pa. 472 ] 261 A.2d 327 (Pa. 1970), [do Plaintiffs] have legal standing to file exceptions under Pa.R.C.P. 3136 ?

2) Under Pa.R.C.P. 3136(c), does only a party holding a 'recorded' judgment/lien/mortgage under the lien priority statutes ( 42 Pa.C.S. Sections 8141 - 8142 ) have standing to file exceptions?

3) Even if Pa.R.C.P. 3136 applied under P[ennsylvania] "common law" and Shafer Electric v. Mantie [Mantia] , [ 626 Pa. 258 ] 96 A.3d 989 (Pa. 2014) does the failure to exercise a remedy at law[ ] preclude or bar a later civil action for "unjust enrichment?"

4) In view of the recent 3 ^rd Edition (2011) of [the] reinstatement [sic] of law on unjust enrichment and restitution, and section 4(2) in particular of 3 ^rd Edition (2011) of Restatement of Law on "Unjust Enrichment and Restitution" render "moot" the defense of failure to exercise available "remedy at law?"

5) [Plaintiff] was not a named party in the mortgage foreclosure case, and [was] not served with court process, therefore, under Martin v[.] Wilkes , 490 U.S. 755 [ 109 S.Ct. 2180 , 104 L.Ed.2d 835 ] [1989] is the appellant subject to Pa.R.C.P. 3136 ?

Brief of Appellant, at 1-3 (punctuation and capitalization adjusted) (emphasis and use of quotation marks in original).

Plaintiffs' appeals are from orders sustaining preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer. 11 We, therefore, review Plaintiffs' claims as follows:

Preliminary objections in the nature of [a] demurrer test the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff's complaint. The question presented by the demurrer is whether, on the facts averred, the law says with certainty that no recovery is possible. Thus, our scope of review is plenary and our standard of review mirrors that of the trial court. Accepting all material averments as true, we must determine "whether the complaint adequately states a claim for relief under any theory of law."

Schwarzwaelder v. Fox , 895 A.2d 614 , 618 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citations omitted).

*57 Plaintiffs assert a variety of theories in support of the proposition that the courts below erred in ruling that failure to follow Rule 3136 precluded the return of taxes improperly levied by the Sheriff. 12 We, however, must first explore the rules governing proceedings related to sheriff's sales provided by the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure before addressing plaintiffs' argument.

The Rules allow "any party in interest" to petition the court overseeing a sheriff's sale to enter "any ... order which may be just and proper under the circumstances." Pa.R.C.P. 3132. "The [R]ules also state that the time for petitioning the court should occur within a reasonable time proximity to the date of the sale and the filing of the schedule of distribution." Federal Nat. Mort. Ass'n v. Citiano , 834 A.2d 645 , 648 (Pa. Super. 2003). Rule 3136 lays out the time period for contesting amounts owed at a sheriff's sale, stating in relevant part:

The sheriff shall distribute the proceeds of sale in accordance with the proposed schedule of distribution, unless written exceptions are filed with the sheriff not later than ten (10) days after the filing of the proposed schedule.

Pa.R.C.P. 3136(d) (emphasis added). 13 If no party files exceptions or a petition to set aside the sale, the sheriff is obligated to execute a deed to the property. See Pa.R.C.P. 3135(a) ("[T]he sheriff, at the expiration of twenty days but no later than 40 days after either the filing of the schedule of distribution or the execution sale if no schedule of distribution need be filed, shall execute and acknowledge before the prothonotary a deed to the property sold.") (emphasis added).

The rules make clear that a party dissatisfied with the schedule of distribution has ten days to file exceptions. Concord-Liberty Sav. And Loan Ass'n v. NTC Properties, Inc. , 454 Pa. 472 , 312 A.2d 4 , 5 (1973). After the delivery of the sheriff's deed to the purchaser, the only possible attacks are those based on fraud or lack of authority to make the sale. Id. at 6 ("[A]fter the delivery of a sheriff's deed to a purchaser[,] the only attacks possible on the sheriff's sale are those based on fraud which vitiates the transaction, or a lack of authority to make the sale.") (citation omitted); see also Sklaroff v. Weiner , 204 Pa.Super. 273 , 203 A.2d 366 , 368 (1964) ("Where, as here, no fraud is alleged or shown but the only issue is the amount to which the holder of a valid lien is entitled out of the proceeds, the remedy under Pa.R.C.P. 3136 is adequate[.]"). If, after a sheriff's sale, an appellant "neglect[s] to pursue the procedural remedies available to him, appellant has waived such challenges." Citiano , supra at 648 .

Knapp , supra , offers a case-in-point example of how, under the Rules, purchasers of property at a sheriff's sale are obligated *58 to seek redress for the improper assessment of transfer taxes. In Knapp , just as in the instant case, county sheriffs sold real property to a third-party purchaser. Knapp , supra at 96. Following the sale, the sheriff added state and local transfer taxes to the winning bid, increasing the amount owed by the purchaser. Id. at 96-97. The purchaser in Knapp , however, properly filed timely exceptions to the sheriff's proposed schedule of distributions. Id. at 97. Consequently, this Court was obligated to reverse the lower court's order dismissing the third-party purchaser's exceptions to the sheriff's schedule of proposed distributions where the sheriff required the purchaser to pay transfer taxes associated with the sale. Id.

The instant facts differ in one critical respect-Plaintiffs failed to file timely exceptions (or any exceptions whatsoever) to the Sheriff's proposed distributions as required by Rule 3136. In light of the above-mentioned case law and an absence of any allegation of fraud, we find both that the remedy offered under Rule 3136 for protesting the schedules of distribution was adequate and that Plaintiffs' failure to avail themselves of a valid statutory remedy resulted in waiver. See id. ; see also NTC Properties, Inc. , supra at 5. As the remedy offered was adequate, Plaintiffs are precluded from seeking relief related to their unjust enrichment 14 claim as "equitable relief will be appropriate only where the statutory remedy is inadequate." Chartiers Valley School Dist. v. Virginia Mansions Apartment Inc. , 340 Pa.Super. 285 , 489 A.2d 1381 , 1386 (1985).

All of Plaintiffs' arguments directly or indirectly assert the inapplicability of Rule 3136 ; each one lacks merit. Brief of Appellants, at 1-2. Plaintiffs first argue Luckenbach , supra , divested Plaintiffs of standing to protest the Sheriff's proposed distributions of funds under Rule 3136. Id. at 6-9. Their reliance on Luckenbach , however, is entirely inapposite. In Luckenbach , our Supreme Court held that purchasers of real property at a sheriff's sale could not hold themselves out as lien creditors to participate in the fund created by the sheriff's sale as a means to recover damages caused by the previous homeowners. Luckenbach , supra at 474-75, 261 A.2d 327 . Moreover, the facts of Knapp illustrate that third-party purchasers not only have standing to file exceptions under Rule 3136, such purchasers are entitled to relief when county sheriff's erroneously levy transfer taxes so long as that purchaser timely files exceptions. Knapp , supra at 97.

Plaintiffs' second argument claims that Rule 3136(c) precluded Plaintiffs from having standing to file exceptions as Plaintiffs were not "lien creditors." Brief of Appellant, at 9-12. As above, this argument is not borne out by the plain text of Rule 3136(c), which, rather than addressing standing, details the sheriff's duty to provide a certified list of liens upon properties sold at sheriff's sales. 15

*59 Plaintiffs' third argument cites to Shafer Elec. & Constr. v. Mantia , 626 Pa. 258 , 96 A.3d 989 (2014), for the proposition that procedural law cannot preclude a party from seeking relief for unjust enrichment. Brief of Appellant, at 12-14. This argument incorrectly construes our Supreme Court's holding, which stated that the Home Improvement Consumer Protection Act ("the Act") did not preclude a plaintiff from recovering in quantum meruit , as the Act did not contemplate the preclusion of equitable common law remedies. Id. at 996 . More importantly, the Act is not at issue in this case.

Plaintiffs' fourth argument states that the Third "reinstatement [sic] of Law on Unjust Enrichment ... render[s] 'moot' the defense of failure to exercise available 'remedy at law[.]' " Brief of Appellant, at 14-17. Not only is this argument virtually unintelligible, it is rendered meaningless by the fact that "Pennsylvania courts have yet to adopt or apply the Restatement (Third) of Restitution in any context." Sabella v. Appalachian Development Corp. , 103 A.3d 83 , 100 (Pa. Super. 2014).

In their final argument, Plaintiffs assert that because they were not named parties in the underlying foreclosure cases, and thus not served with process, it would violate Due Process under the United States Constitution to require that Plaintiffs follow Rule 3136. Brief of Appellant, at 17-21. This argument is misguided. Plaintiffs were not parties to the underlying mortgage foreclosure suits because those matters were between the Banks and the relevant homeowners. Rather than searching for a constitutional remedy, the Plaintiffs would be better served by consulting the explanatory comment to Rule 3136, which states: "The rule ... does not require the sheriff to serve or notify the parties that a schedule has been prepared. As a result, the parties must monitor the sheriff's office on a daily basis to acquire the schedule in order to have the full ten days with which to prepare and file the exceptions." Rule 3136, comment.

For the reasons described above, we find no basis upon which the trial courts could have concluded that Plaintiffs stated a valid claim for relief under any theory of law. As such, we affirm the trial courts' orders sustaining the defendants' preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer.

Orders affirmed.