J-S29017-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 JOHN J. O’BRIEN, III, ESQ. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : JACQUELINE TUCKER : No. 3861 EDA 2017 Appeal from the Order Entered October 30, 2017 In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Civil Division at No(s): 2017-03096

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

JUDGMENT ORDER BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED JUNE 05, 2019 John J. O’Brien, III, Esquire (Plaintiff), appeals pro se from the trial court’s order, entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, denying his petition to “Reinstate Action for a ‘Snap’ Judgment.” After careful review, we dismiss the appeal.

Plaintiff’s brief contains a fragmented recitation of the facts of this case.

From what we can gather, Plaintiff’s firm represented Defendant’s family for more than 35 years, both personally and professionally with regard to Defendant’s sports film/video business. Plaintiff filed a claim in Magisterial District Court against Defendant for unpaid legal fees. When the claim was not settled in Plaintiff’s favor, Plaintiff filed an appeal to the Court of Common Pleas in Montgomery County. The trial court dismissed the appeal. Plaintiff now claims that the trial court “unilaterally dismissed the appeal without [Pa.R.C.P.] 237.1 10[-]day notice.” Id. at 4. Plaintiff asserts that “the J-S29017-19

Pennsylvania Supreme Court[1] must address a conflict between Rule 237.1 and District Justice Rule [1004(A)].”2 Id. See also David R. Nicholason, Builder, LLC v. Jablonski, 163 A.3d 1048 (Pa. Super. 2017) (appellant from magisterial district court judgment must perfect appeal by filing in court of common pleas timely complaint per Pa.R.C.P.M.D.J. 1004(A); appeal is subject to Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure only after appellant perfects appeal in the court of common pleas).

We note that: Although this Court is willing to liberally construe materials filed by a pro se litigant, pro se status confers no special benefit upon Plaintiff. To the contrary, any person choosing to represent himself in a legal proceeding must, to a reasonable extent, assume that his lack of expertise and legal training will be his undoing.

In re Ullman, 995 A.2d 1207, 1211-12 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citations omitted).

Here, Plaintiff’s appellate brief is woefully inadequate in terms of compliance with our briefing rules. Not only does Plaintiff fail to include a “Statement of ____________________________________________

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the Questions Involved,” see Pa.R.A.P. 2116, he also presents no “Summary of the Argument.” See Pa.R.A.P. 2118. Moreover, Plaintiff’s “Argument” section is three-quarters of a page long,3 does not explain how the trial court misapplied the rules under the particular facts of this case, and fails to expound upon how the court’s ruling was a “snap judgment.” Based on the overwhelming deficiencies in Plaintiff’s brief, we are compelled to dismiss the appeal. See Commonwealth v. Hardy, 918 A.2d 766, 771 (Pa. Super. 2007) (it is appellant’s duty when briefing issues to present arguments that are sufficiently developed with pertinent discussion, references to record, and citations to legal authorities).

Appeal dismissed.4 Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/5/19

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Plaintiff admits the first case does not apply to this appeal. The second case Plaintiff references quotes language from a dissenting opinion.

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