J-S31034-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : LAWRENCE REDDICK : : Appellant : No. 1638 WDA 2018 Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 22, 2018 In the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-04-CR-0002369-2016

BEFORE: OLSON, J., STABILE, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 24, 2019 Lawrence Reddick appeals from the judgment of sentence entered following his jury trial convictions for the first-degree murder of Dane Mathesius, the second-degree murder of William Cade Booher, conspiracy to commit robbery, three counts of robbery, and one count each of aggravated assault, firearms not to be carried without a license, and recklessly endangering another person (“REAP”).1 Reddick challenges the sufficiency and weight of the evidence, the legality of his sentence, and the discretionary aspects of his sentence. We affirm.

The trial court set forth the factual and procedural history of this case, which we adopt and incorporate herein. Trial Court Opinion, filed Dec. 18, 2018, at 1-11 (“1925(a) Op.”). ____________________________________________

118 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(a), 2502(b), 903(a)(1), 3701(a)(1)(i), 2702(a)(1), 6106(a)(1), and 2705, respectively.

J-S31034-19

Following trial, a jury convicted Reddick, who was 17 years old at the time of the crime, of the above-referenced offenses. The trial court sentenced Reddick to a term of 30 years to life imprisonment for the second-degree murder conviction, 35 years to life imprisonment for the first-degree murder conviction, nine to 20 years’ imprisonment for two of the robbery convictions, five to ten years’ imprisonment for the third robbery conviction, four to ten years’ imprisonment for the conspiracy conviction, five to ten years’ imprisonment for the aggravated assault conviction, and two to four years’ imprisonment for the carrying a firearm without a license conviction. The court imposed no further penalty for the REAP conviction, as it merged for sentencing purposes. The court ordered that the sentences for the murder convictions run consecutively to each other.

Reddick filed a post-sentence motion2 challenging the sufficiency and weight of the evidence, the legality of his sentence, and the discretionary aspects of his sentence. The trial court denied the motion. Reddick filed a timely notice of appeal.

Reddick raises the following issues: I. Whether [Reddick’s] conviction should be reversed because the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence to prove [Reddick’s] guilt beyond a reasonable doubt?

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2 Reddick filed a request to file a post sentence motion nunc pro tunc, which the trial court granted. He then filed his post-sentence motion.

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II. Whether [Reddick’s] conviction should be reversed because the verdict goes against the weight of the evidence presented by the Commonwealth at trial?

III. Whether [Reddick’s] sentence of 65 years to life is an illegal sentence, as it creates a de facto life without the possibility of parole sentence, unconstitutional under [Commonwealth v. Batts, 163 A.3d 410 (Pa. 2017)]?

IV. Whether the court abused its discretion at sentencing by running [Reddick’s] first degree murder sentence and second degree murder sentence consecutively to each other creating a de facto life without the possibility of parole sentence unconstitutional under Batts?

Reddick’s Br. at 8.

In his first claim, Reddick argues the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions. In his second claim, he contends the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. For both claims, he argues that two Commonwealth witnesses, Deonte Jones and Rasheid Hicks, lied to law enforcement during the investigation, and that the eye-witness to the shooting did not see the shooter’s face or what clothes the shooter was wearing.

Reddick’s claims challenge the credibility of the witnesses, which is challenge to the weight of the evidence, not a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Commonwealth v. Palo, 24 A.3d 1050, 1055 (Pa.Super. 2011) (where appellant challenged credibility of witness, he challenged weight, not sufficiency, of evidence).

When reviewing a challenge to the weight of the evidence, we review “the trial court’s exercise of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 192 A.3d 1149, 1152-53 (Pa.Super. 2018) (quoting Commonwealth v. Hicks, 151 A.3d 216, 223 (Pa.Super. 2016)). A reversal of a verdict is not warranted -3- J-S31034-19

“unless it is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice.” Id. at 1153 (quoting Hicks, 151 A.3d at 223). “The weight of the evidence is exclusively for the finder of fact, who is free to believe all, none or some of the evidence and to determine the credibility of the witnesses.”

Commonwealth v. Cramer, 195 A.3d 594, 600 (Pa.Super. 2018) (quoting Commonwealth v. Talbert, 129 A.3d 536, 545 (Pa.Super. 2015)). The fact- finder also has the responsibility of “[r]esolving contradictory testimony and questions of credibility.” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 747 A.2d 910, 917 (Pa.Super. 2000)). We give great deference to the trial court’s decision regarding a weight of the evidence claim because it “had the opportunity to hear and see the evidence presented.” Id. (quoting Talbert, 129 A.3d at 546).

The trial court set forth the applicable law. 1925(a) Op. at 28-29. It found the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence, noting the jury was free to determine the credibility of the witnesses. Id. at 29-30. We agree and conclude the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence. We affirm on the basis of the trial court opinion, which we adopt and incorporate herein.

Id. at 28-30.

Further, if Reddick had raised a sufficiency claim, we would conclude the claim lacked merit.

The trial court set forth the law on sufficiency of the evidence and the elements for each of the crimes. 1925(a) Op. at 14-24. It concluded that the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to support the convictions, -4- J-S31034-19

including the testimony of Deontae Jones, Xavier Fisher, and Rasheid Hicks that they heard Reddick and Fisher planning the robbery; Jones’ testimony of the details of the planning, which began days before the robbery occurred; surveillance footage from the location of the meeting; text messages sent between Fisher’s phone and Mathesius’ phone; N.R.’s testimony about how the robbery occurred; Jones’ and Hicks’ testimony that they left the area after they heard the gunshots, and met Reddick down the street; and testimony that Reddick cleaned the gun and tossed it into the bushes. Id. at 13, 24-28.

We agree that the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to establish Reddick committed the crimes. We would therefore affirm on the basis of the trial court opinion, which we adopt and incorporate herein. See id. at 12-28.

In his third claim, Reddick claims the aggregate sentence imposed of 65 years’ to life imprisonment is an illegal de facto life sentence. He reasons that such a sentence is illegal following Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012).

Reddick relies on cases from other jurisdictions to support his claim that a sentence is illegal where separate consecutive sentences result in a de facto life sentence.

A person under the age of 18 who commits murder cannot be sentenced to life without parole unless the Commonwealth proves “beyond a reasonable doubt, that the juvenile offender is permanently incorrigible and thus is unable to be rehabilitated.” See Commonwealth v. Batts, 163 A.3d 410, 459 (Pa. 2017). In Commonwealth v. Foust, this Court concluded that “de facto life sentences are cruel and unusual punishment when imposed on juveniles -5- J-S31034-19

convicted of nonhomicide offenses or juvenile homicide offenders capable of rehabilitation.” 180 A.3d 416, 434 (Pa.Super. 2018). In Foust, however, we also concluded that courts “must consider the individual sentences, not the aggregate, to determine if the trial court imposed a term-of-years sentence which constitutes a de facto [life without parole] sentence.” Id. at 438. The court concluded that a term of 30 years to life imposed on a juvenile did not constitute a de facto life imprisonment sentence. Id. Pursuant to Foust, we must view Reddick’s sentences as separate sentences to determine whether the trial court imposed a de facto sentence of life imprisonment. As in Foust, we conclude that Reddick’s separate sentences of 30 years to life and 35 years to life do not constitute de facto life sentences and, therefore, the sentences imposed by the trial court are not illegal.

In his final claim, Reddick claims the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the consecutive sentences. Reddick claims that by relying on policies in place before Batts that provide that concurrent sentences would fail to account for the gravity of the crimes, the “court abused its discretion in creating a de facto life without parole sentence.” Reddick’s Br. at 20.

Before addressing the merits of his discretionary aspects of sentence claim, we must determine whether: (1) the appeal is timely; (2) the issue was preserved; (3) the brief includes concise statement of reasons relied on for appeal; and (4) a substantial question is raised. See Commonwealth v. Edwards, 194 A.3d 625, 636 (Pa.Super. 2018).

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Here, Reddick filed a timely notice of appeal and preserved the issue in his post-sentence motion and Rule 1925(a) statement. Reddick did not include in his brief a concise statement of the reasons relied upon for appeal. However, because the Commonwealth did not object to this failure, the absence of the statement does not preclude are review. See Commonwealth v. Kiesel, 854 A.2d 530, 533 (Pa.Super. 2004) (“[W]hen the appellant has not included a Rule 2119(f) statement and the [Commonwealth] has not objected, this Court may ignore the omission and determine if there is a substantial question that the sentence imposed was not appropriate”). Further, we conclude that Reddick’s claim, that the court imposed consecutive sentences that resulted in an excessive sentence, raises a substantial question. See Foust, 180 A.3d at 439. We will therefore review the claim.

We review a challenge to the sentence imposed for an abuse of discretion and will not disturb a sentence unless the trial court abused its discretion. Commonwealth v. Bullock, 170 A.3d 1109, 1126 (Pa. Super. 2017). The Sentencing Code provides, [T]he sentence imposed should call for confinement that is consistent with the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). “The [trial] court is not required to parrot the words of the Sentencing Code, stating every factor that must be considered under Section 9721(b), however, the record as a whole must reflect due consideration by the court of the statutory considerations at the time of -7- J-S31034-19

sentencing.” Bullock, 170 A.3d at 1126 (internal alterations, quotation marks, and citation omitted).

Here, the court concluded: The undersigned has presided over this case since formal arraignment, and has conducted a careful review of the record. The Court has considered the presentence report, the sentencing guidelines, and all of the evidence presented and the arguments given at the sentencing hearing.

The Court has considered all of the factors provided for by section 9721(b) of the Sentencing Code, including the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense, the impact on the victims, the impact on the community, and [Reddick’s] rehabilitative needs. The Court has considered [Reddick’s] various age-related characteristics as stated in Miller, 567 U.S. at 477-78, 132 S.Ct. at 2468, and in [Commonwealth v. Melvin, 172 A.3d 14, 22 n.5., (Pa.Super. 2017)] . . . . The Court recognizes that [Reddick], who was convicted of committing this crime as a juvenile, is constitutionally different from, and thus less culpable than, an adult.

There are, however, numerous aggravating circumstances in this case which must also be considered. The evidence presented at trial showed a person who was approximately two months shy of being a legal adult, who made knowing decisions to conspire with others to commit an armed robbery at a false drug deal for $160 worth of marijuana.

After robbing the victims, [Reddick] then killed William Cade Booher, who was seated next to him, by shooting him five times in the area of his head and neck. Dr. Luckasevic, who conducted the autopsy, testified that the shots were fired within inches of the victim’s face, and that one of the shots was fired while the weapon was pressed tightly in contact with the victim’s face. [Reddick] then got out of the car.

Rather than simply fleeing with the stolen items, [Reddick] instead proceeded to the back of the car where he continued firing at the occupants. One shot struck Dane Mathesius in the back, resulting in his death. Thirteen-year-old [N.R.] fortunately escaped physical injury. However, he is left with the emotional scars of being the victim of an armed robbery -8- J-S31034-19

where he witnessed the bloody aftermath of his friend’s murder from only a car seat away. After leaving the scene, [Reddick] concealed evidence of the murder by cleaning off the murder weapon and hiding it in another person’s yard. [Reddick] then gave some marijuana to Rasheid Hicks. Later that night, [Reddick] contacted his co-conspirator, Deontae Jones, to warn him not to say anything.

Trial Court Opinion, filed June 22, 2018, at 11-12; see also N.T., 6/22/2018, at 48-73 (reviewing relevant law, facts of the case, gravity of the crimes, the pre-sentence report, and mental health evaluation, and imposing sentence).

This was not an abuse of discretion, and Reddick is not entitled to relief on this claim. See Foust, 180 A.3d at 440-41 (finding court did not abuse its discretion in imposing consecutive sentences for two murder convictions committed while defendant was juvenile, where trial court found “that separate punishments were necessitated by the nature of the offenses and the lives taken, notwithstanding the rehabilitation Appellant demonstrated while imprisoned for the past two decades”).

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/24/2019

-9- Circulated 08/26/2019 08:54 AM