Petitioner M.S. filed a petition for review in the nature of a complaint in mandamus and for declaratory relief (Petition) against the Pennsylvania State Police (PSP), relating to PSP's designation of Petitioner as a sex offender under Pennsylvania's Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA),1 which has now been replaced by SORNA II. Before the *1144Court is Petitioner's application for summary relief (Application), through which Petitioner seeks an order: (1) declaring that the application of SORNA registration requirements to him violates his state and federal constitutional rights, (2) declaring that he is not subject to registration under SORNA, and (3) directing PSP to remove his information from its public internet website and registry. We now grant Petitioner's Application, in part, on nonconstitutional grounds, and direct PSP to provide Petitioner with a hearing and adjudication as required by the Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa. C.S. §§ 501 - 508, 701 - 704, as more fully discussed herein.

I. BACKGROUND

In 2016, while a Cadet at the United States Coast Guard Academy, Petitioner was convicted at a trial by general court-martial of sexual assault in violation of Article 120(b)(3)(A) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 920(b)(3)(A).2 Petitioner was sentenced to be discharged from Coast Guard service and confined for one year. The sentence did not include a requirement to register as a sex offender. Petitioner appealed the UCMJ conviction and began to serve his sentence.3 After his release from confinement and return to Pennsylvania, Petitioner, consistent with a notification provided to him by the Department of Defense (DOD), reported to PSP on June 26, 2017. On June 27, 2017, while SORNA was still in effect, PSP designated Petitioner as a Tier III sex offender under SORNA4 based on the asserted similarity of his military offense to Section 3125(a)(4) of the *1145Pennsylvania Crimes Code, 18 Pa. C.S. § 3125(a)(4).5 On June 29, 2017, PSP notified Petitioner that it had designated him as a Tier III sex offender subject to lifetime registration and publication. On July 5, 2017, Petitioner objected to the determination and requested a hearing. PSP did not respond to the request.

Petitioner filed the subject Petition with this Court on July 31, 2017, generally asserting that PSP has improperly designated Petitioner as a Tier III sex offender pursuant to SORNA.6 More specifically, Petitioner asserts that PSP denied him due process, because it did not provide him with a meaningful opportunity to challenge his designation as a Tier III sex offender. Petitioner also contends that the application of SORNA to him violates his due process rights under Muniz . He further asserts that, because the military conviction is pending appeal, it is not final and cannot form a basis to compel registration. Finally, he asserts that he was not convicted of any offense under Pennsylvania law and was not convicted of any offense that would constitute a "comparable military offense or similar offense under the laws of another jurisdiction or country or under a former law of this Commonwealth,"7 and, therefore, he does not qualify for Tier III sex offender designation.

*1146II. ISSUES

Petitioner raises the following arguments in support of his Application. First, Petitioner argues that PSP violated his due process rights by designating him as a Tier III sex offender without providing him a meaningful opportunity to be heard. In furtherance of that argument, Petitioner contends that the SORNA registration requirements implicate his rights to reputation and liberty. Second, Petitioner argues that PSP violated his criminal trial rights when it unilaterally imposed what he refers to as "the punitive Tier III requirements of SORNA"8 in the absence of a criminal trial. As to this argument, Petitioner contends that, because registration requirements imposed as a result of the Tier III sex offender designation are punitive in nature, a jury (not PSP) would have to determine, by applying the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, whether Petitioner's actions subject him to designation as a Tier III sex offender. Third, Petitioner argues that SORNA's application of what he refers to as an unlawful irrebuttable presumption that every military offense under Article 120 of the UCMJ requires Tier III designation violates his due process rights. Finally, Petitioner argues that PSP erred in designating him as a Tier III sex offender under SORNA, because the military offense for which he was convicted was not comparable to a Tier III offense under Pennsylvania law. In support of this argument, Petitioner focuses on the different mens rea required by the offenses under Article 120(b)(3)(A) of the UCMJ and Section 3125(a)(4) of the Crimes Code and argues that Section 120(b)(3)(A) of the UCMJ "cast[s] a wider net" or is more broad than Section 3125(a)(4) of the Crimes Code, thereby rendering them not comparable. (Petitioner's Br. at 18.) As a result of the above arguments, Petitioner requests the Court to grant declaratory and injunctive relief to protect his constitutional rights.

Petitioner filed the Application and a memorandum of law in support thereof on February 5, 2018, seventeen days prior to the enactment and effective date of SORNA II. Subsequent to the enactment of SORNA II, PSP filed a brief and Petitioner filed a reply brief, neither of which acknowledged the passage of SORNA II. Although Petitioner did not file an amended petition for review following the enactment of SORNA II, it is apparent to the Court that any distinctions that may exist between SORNA and SORNA II are irrelevant for purposes of our disposition of the issues now before the Court. As such, although Petitioner's arguments are couched in terms of SORNA, we will refer to the provisions of SORNA II throughout our analysis, where appropriate.

III. DISCUSSION

As a threshold matter, we acknowledge our Supreme Court's cautionary instructions "that, as a general matter, it is better to avoid constitutional questions if a non-constitutional ground for [a] decision is available." In re Stevenson , 608 Pa. 397, 12 A.3d 273, 275 (2010). Based upon a review of the parties' arguments, two overarching observations become pellucid: (1) the omphalos of Petitioner's challenge is his belief that PSP was required to provide him with a hearing to challenge the propriety of its equivalency determination designating him *1147as a Tier III sex offender because he was not convicted of an expressly enumerated offense set forth in Section 9799.14(d) of SORNA or SORNA II; and (2) Petitioner, even in the absence of constitutional due process concerns, is entitled to a hearing under the Administrative Agency Law for the reasons discussed below.

The term "adjudication," as used in the Administrative Agency Law, is defined as:

Any final order, decree, decision, determination or ruling by an agency affecting personal or property rights, privileges, immunities, duties, liabilities or obligations of any or all of the parties to the proceeding in which the adjudication is made. The term does not include any order based upon a proceeding before a court or which involves the seizure or forfeiture of property, paroles, pardons or releases from mental institutions.

2 Pa. C.S. § 101. Section 504 of the Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa. C.S. § 504, provides, in part: "No adjudication of a Commonwealth agency shall be valid as to any party unless he shall have been afforded reasonable notice of a hearing and an opportunity to be heard." Failure to provide notice and an opportunity to be heard in connection with the issuance of an adjudication results in an invalid adjudication under Section 504 of the Administrative Law. See Philadelphia Cty. Med. Soc'y v. Kaiser , 699 A.2d 800, 806 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997) (en banc) ( Kaiser ).

In Kaiser , this Court considered whether a decision by Linda S. Kaiser, Commissioner of the Insurance Department (Commissioner), approving the change in control of six subsidiaries of Blue Cross of Western Pennsylvania (Western Blue Cross) and Pennsylvania Blue Shield (Blue Shield) and approving the proposed bylaws of Highmark, the consolidated successor of the former Western Blue Cross and Former Blue Shield, constituted an adjudication under the Administrative Agency Law, such that it was appealable to this Court. The Commissioner asserted that there was nothing to appeal to this Court, because her determination to allow the consolidation was not an appealable adjudication; rather, the Commissioner took the position that she had issued a determination from which no party could appeal, not even Highmark, had she denied its request.

For purposes of considering whether the Commissioner's determination constituted an adjudication for purposes of appellate review, we explained in Kaiser that "[t]o determine whether it is ready for judicial review, we must first determine whether the Commissioner's order is an 'adjudication.' If the agency action is not an 'adjudication,' then it is not subject to judicial review by way of appeal." Id. at 806. We observed:

Because, by definition, an agency action only results in an adjudication when there is a final order, ... only when those administrative appeals have been exhausted will the agency action become an adjudication subject to judicial review. Of course, if a party does not timely seek to have a hearing from an adverse agency adjudication, the adjudication becomes final and unappealable.

Even though the agency action has a direct impact on the person's rights or privileges, and is final so as to fall within the definition of an "adjudication", the action is not "valid as to any party unless he shall have been afforded reasonable notice of a hearing and an opportunity to be heard." 2 Pa. C.S. § 504. Until a hearing is held before the administrative agency and a record of that hearing made, Section 504 of the Administrative Agency Law provides that the adjudication is not valid or *1148effective. The reason behind this requirement is that judicial review, absent a valid administrative adjudication or proper record, is a "premature interruption of the administrative process." Moreover, until a hearing, and, if necessary, the taking of evidence where facts are disputed, the issues cannot be properly clarified, whether there is a direct interest of the party taking the appeal and questions of fact sufficiently resolved to create a record upon which judicial review can be conducted.

Id. (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted). Based upon this reasoning, we transferred the matter to the Insurance Department with instruction that it conduct a hearing pursuant to Section 504 of the Administrative Agency Law.

In the matter now before this Court, Petitioner was convicted of an offense not specifically enumerated in SORNA or SORNA II's Tier classification scheme. As a result, PSP necessarily engaged in a nonministerial act when it issued its equivalency determination designating Petitioner as a Tier III sex offender, because such a determination required PSP to determine whether the elements of the crimes were comparable for purposes of SORNA or SORNA II. Furthermore, PSP's equivalency determination affected Petitioner's personal rights or obligations, because the registration requirements have the potential to affect one's reputation9 and impose continuing obligations on registrants. It is also apparent that, in rendering its equivalency determination, PSP did not afford Petitioner an avenue to challenge the determination through "reasonable notice of a hearing and an opportunity to be heard," as required by Section 504 of the Administrative Agency Law. Thus, PSP's equivalency determination constituted an invalid adjudication under the Administrative Agency Law.

For these reasons, we conclude that PSP must, consistent with the Administrative Agency Law, provide a sex offender with a post-equivalency determination administrative appeal remedy,10 which must include reasonable notice of a hearing and an opportunity to be heard.11 Although *1149Petitioner requested a post-determination hearing, PSP did not respond to his request. Consequently, we declare that PSP must comply with the Administrative Agency Law and provide Petitioner with a post-determination administrative appeal remedy and a valid adjudication, which would then be appealable to this Court. See 42 Pa. C.S. § 702. Because we are able to resolve this matter under the Administrative Agency Law, we will not address Petitioner's constitutional challenges at this juncture. Furthermore, we will not address the merits of whether Petitioner should be designated as a Tier III sex offender based upon his conviction under Article 120(b)(3)(A) of the UCMJ, as that issue will be the subject of further administrative proceedings before PSP.12

ORDER

AND NOW, this 11^th day of June, 2019, Petitioner's application for summary relief is GRANTED to the extent that Petitioner sought an order from this Court, declaring that Respondent Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) must provide Petitioner with a post-determination administrative remedy and adjudication on the question of whether he should be designated as a Tier III sex offender as a result of his conviction for sexual assault under Article 120(b)(3)(A) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 920(b)(3)(A). PSP is directed to afford Petitioner an administrative remedy consistent with the accompanying opinion and the Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa. C.S. §§ 501 - 508, 701 - 704.