Com. v. Gagliana, D.
Opinion
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA :
v. :
: :
DESIREE GAGLIANA :
:
Appellant : No. 1156 EDA 2020 Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 21, 2020 In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-46-CR-0003992-2019
BEFORE: BOWES, J., LAZARUS, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED JUNE 02, 2021
Desiree Gagliana appeals from the judgment of sentence, entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, after she entered a negotiated guilty plea to possession with intent to deliver methamphetamine, a controlled substance.1
On February 21, 2020, in accordance with the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced Gagliana to 11½ to 23 months’ incarceration followed by three years’ probation. The court further ordered Gagliana to pay the costs of prosecution and an offender supervision fee. Gagliana filed a post-sentence motion seeking relief from the imposition of costs and fees on February 24, 2020, which the trial court denied on February 27, 2020, without a hearing. On April 6, 2020, Gagliana filed a notice of appeal to this Court.2 Both Gagliana and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Gagliana’s sole claim on appeal challenges the trial court’s imposition of the costs of prosecution and the supervision fee without holding a hearing to consider her ability, as an indigent person, to pay those costs and that fee. She is entitled to no relief.
On March 23, 2021, this Court issued its decision in Commonwealth v. Lopez, _ A.3d _, 1313 EDA 2018 (Pa. Super. 2021) (en banc). Like Gagliana, Lopez challenged the trial court’s imposition of mandatory court costs without first holding a hearing to determine his ability to pay, asserting that such a hearing is required under Pa.R.Crim.P. 706(c) 3 and Commonwealth v. Martin, 335 A.2d 424 (Pa. Super. 1975) (en banc) (holding court must hold ability-to-pay hearing when imposing fine), as well as sections 9721(c.1) and 9728(b.2) of the Sentencing Code.4 See 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9721(c.1) and 9728(b.2).
In rejecting Lopez’s claim, this Court concluded that “[w]hen the sections of Rule 706 are read sequentially and as a whole, as the rules of statutory construction direct, it becomes clear that [s]ection C only requires a trial court to determine a defendant’s ability to pay at a hearing that occurs prior to incarceration, as referenced in [s]ections A and B.” Lopez, supra at 5. While the trial court maintains the discretion to conduct an ability-to-pay hearing prior to imposing costs, “nothing in the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Sentencing Code or established case law takes that discretion away from the trial court unless and until a defendant is in peril of going to prison for failing to pay the costs imposed on him.” Id. at 11. Accordingly, Gagliana is entitled to no relief.
Gagliana also challenges the court’s imposition of the mandatory5 supervision fee, pursuant to 18 P.S. § 11.1102, without first determining her ability to pay. Specifically, Gagliana cites to 18 P.S. § 11.1102 (costs for offender supervision programs), and 37 Pa. Code § 68.21 (Imposition of Condition),6 for the proposition that the court was required to consider her ability to pay prior to imposing the fee.
In Commonwealth v. White, _ A.3d _, 1310 EDA 2020 (Pa. Super. 2021), a panel of this Court considered the same argument, and held that “[m]erely because a court has the discretion to waive the fee, does not mean that it abuses its discretion if it chooses not to do so.” Id. at *6. In so concluding, this Court noted that “neither [18 P.S. § 11.1102, nor 37 Pa. Code § 68.21] requires a court to first make a determination regarding a defendant’s ability to pay before imposing the [mandatory supervision] fee.” Id. (emphasis in original). ____________________________________________
The sentencing judge of the court of common pleas shall impose upon an offender, as a condition of supervision, a monthly supervision fee unless the court or a supervising agency designated by the court determines that it should be reduced, waived or deferred based upon one or more of the following criteria:
(1) The offender is 62 years of age or older with no income. (2) The offender is receiving public assistance. (3) The offender is enrolled as a full-time student for 12 semester credit hours in an educational organization approved by the United States Department of Education. (4) The offender is incarcerated. (5) The offender is not employable due to a disability, as determined by an examination acceptable to or ordered by the court. (6) The offender is responsible for the support of dependents and the payment of a supervision fee constitutes an undue hardship on the offender. (7) The client is participating in an inpatient treatment program. (8) Other extenuating circumstances as determined by the court or a supervising agency designated by the court.
37 Pa. Code § 68.21 (emphasis added).
Here, as in White, the court was not required to make a determination that Gagliana had the ability to pay the offender supervision fee before imposing it at sentencing.7 As a result, Gagliana is entitled to no relief from the court’s imposition of that fee without a prior determination of her ability to pay. See White, supra. See also Commonwealth v. Childs, 63 A.3d 323, 326 (Pa. Super. 2013) (quoting Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 917 A.2d 332, 337 (Pa. Super. 2007)) (“[The] trial court [need] only [] make a determination of an indigent defendant’s ability to render payment [on the costs of prosecution and offender supervision fees imposed] before [that defendant] is committed [for such non-payment].”).
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 6/2/2021
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.