Noll, H. v. Abeln, P.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 HEIDI NOLL : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA :

v. :

: :

PAUL ABELN :

:

Appellant : No. 228 EDA 2021 Appeal from the Order Entered December 15, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County Civil Division at No(s):

No. 2020-PF-1410

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., DUBOW, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.* JUDGMENT ORDER BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED OCTOBER 15, 2021

Paul Abeln (Father) appeals from the order entering Protection from Abuse (PFA) orders against both Father and Heidi Noll (Mother), pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 6101 et seq., on reciprocal PFA petitions.1 The order, entered on December 15, 2020, prohibited the parties from contact with one another, except as provided in the parties’ custody order, for a period of six months.

Instantly, the court’s PFA order expired on June 15, 2021. “As a general rule, an actual case or controversy must exist at all stages of the judicial process, or a case will be dismissed as moot.” In re D.A., 801 A.2d 614, 616 (Pa. Super. 2002) (quoting In re Duran, 769 A.2d 497 (Pa. Super. 2001)). “This Court will decide questions that otherwise have been rendered moot when one or more of the following exceptions to the mootness doctrine apply: 1) the case involves a question of great public importance, 2) the question presented is capable of repetition and apt to elude appellate review, or 3) a party to the controversy will suffer some detriment due to the decision of the trial court.” Ferko–Fox v. Fox, 68 A.3d 917, 920 (Pa. Super. 2013) (quoting Warmkessel v. Heffner, 17 A.3d 408, 413 (Pa. Super. 2011)).

This case does not present a question of great public importance, as Father raises claims that merely challenge the trial judge’s discretion in conducting matters before her court and the sufficiency of the evidence presented in this particular case. Likewise, this case does not present a question that is capable of repetition and apt to elude appellate review. A case is “capable of repetition, yet evading review” when “(1) the challenged action [is] in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there [is] a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party [will] be subjected to the same action again.” Commonwealth v. Roger Buehl, Appeal of Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 462 A.2d 1316 (1983), citing Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147 (1975) (emphasis added). Though the six-month order may be too short a time to be fully litigated on appeal, we cannot countenance as reasonable any expectation that Father will be subjected to this action again. Cf. Snyder v. Snyder, 629 A.2d 977, 980 n.1 (Pa. Super. 1993) (reviewing expired six- month PFA order on basis that it fell “into the well-recognized exception to the mootness doctrine of a case which has important public policy considerations and yet may escape review.”).2 Finally, since the court entered reciprocal PFA orders, the parties are on equal footing as far as attempting to point to a prior PFA as a means of blackmail or vindictiveness in a subsequent domestic relationship proceeding. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 6107.

Mootness “stands on the predicate that a subsequent change in circumstances has eliminated the controversy so that the court lacks the ability to issue a meaningful order, that is, an order that can have any practical effect.” Burke ex rel. Burke v. Indep. Blue Cross, 103 A.3d 1267, 1271 (Pa. 2 014). Here, expiration of the order has eliminated the controversy. We, therefore, dismiss this appeal as moot. See Ferko, supra.

Appeal dismissed.3 Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary Date: 10/15/2021