J-S16036-24 2024 PA Super 112

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : RICHARD LYN : No. 1808 EDA 2023 Appeal from the Order Entered June 8, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0007793-2022

BEFORE: STABILE, J., LANE, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.* OPINION BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED MAY 31, 2024 The Commonwealth as Appellant appeals from the order entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas on June 8, 2023, granting a suppression motion in favor of Defendant/Appellee, Richard Lyn. After a careful review, we reverse.

Briefly, police initiated a traffic stop on the vehicle Appellee was driving on October 14, 2022. Appellee tried to evade the police, crashed the vehicle, and fled on foot, leaving the car turned on. After a struggle, the police arrested Appellee. The police searched the vehicle from which Appellee had fled and recovered, inter alia, a firearm. Thereafter, the police obtained a search warrant. The Appellee filed a motion to suppress all physical evidence recovered from the vehicle. On June 8, 2023, the trial court granted the

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

J-S16036-24

suppression motion. On July 6, 2023, the Commonwealth appealed the suppression order.

The Commonwealth raises one issue for our review: Where police initiated a valid traffic stop, then defendant kept driving, crashed the car, and fled the scene on foot, did the lower court err by suppressing a gun found in the car that defendant had abandoned, thereby also abandoning any reasonable expectation of privacy he had in the car?

Appellant’s Br. at 4. The trial court acknowledges that it did err in granting the suppression motion.

To begin, we note our standard of review in addressing a challenge to the suppression court's order granting a suppression motion: When the Commonwealth appeals from a suppression order, we follow a clearly defined standard of review and consider only the evidence from the defendant's witnesses together with the evidence of the prosecution that, when read in the context of the entire record, remains uncontradicted. The suppression court's findings of fact bind an appellate court if the record supports those findings. The suppression court's conclusions of law, however, are not binding on an appellate court, whose duty is to determine if the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts.

Commonwealth v. Korn, 139 A.3d 249, 252-53 (Pa. Super. 2016), appeal denied, 159 A.3d 933 (2016).

In addressing the Commonwealth’s issue, we have reviewed the arguments in its appellate brief, Appellee’s arguments in his brief 1, the ____________________________________________

1 Appellee unconvincingly tries to distinguish similar cases by stating that the vehicle doors were closed, and the car motor was turned off. Appellee’s Br. at 15. This characterization is misleading as the keys were still in the ignition and the battery of the car was running, evidenced by the car radio still playing (Footnote Continued Next Page)

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certified record including the warrant affidavit, and the applicable law. We have also considered the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Roxanne E.

Covington. We conclude that Judge Covington’s opinion adequately addresses the error at issue and correctly concludes that the order in question should be reversed. We adopt the trial court’s opinion as our own.

We make one additional observation to supplement the trial court’s opinion. “A defendant moving to suppress evidence has the preliminary burden of establishing standing and a legitimate expectation of privacy.”

Commonwealth v. Burton, 973 A.2d 428, 435 (Pa. Super. 2009) (en banc).

Standing requires a defendant to demonstrate one of the following: (1) his presence on the premises at the time of the search and seizure; (2) a possessory interest in the evidence improperly seized; (3) that the offense charged includes as an essential element the element of possession; or (4) a proprietary or possessory interest in the searched premises. A defendant must separately establish a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched or thing seized. Whether defendant has a legitimate expectation of privacy is a component of the merits analysis of the suppression motion. The determination whether defendant has met this burden is made upon evaluation of the evidence presented by the Commonwealth and the defendant. Id. (citations omitted). ____________________________________________

as the officers commenced their search. The car doors were closed because Officer Devlin shut the doors and turned the car off. N.T. at 21.

Appellee further attempts to show how the Commonwealth’s rationale is flawed by describing hypothetical situations inapplicable to the present facts. One hypothetical includes a defendant fleeing on foot from a home, and the other hypothetical includes a defendant fleeing to avoid police after exiting a parked car. Appellee’s Br. at 14-15. Here, the car was in motion when police initiated the stop, then crashed, then was abandoned.

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In Burton, the driver was stopped for a routine traffic violation. When the police asked for identification, they discovered that none of the car’s occupants were the named lessee and none could establish their connection to the car or the named lessee. Our Court held that because the defendant offered no evidence to explain his connection to the vehicle or his connection to the registered owner of the vehicle, he “failed to demonstrate that he had a reasonably cognizable expectation of privacy in a vehicle that he did not own, that was not registered to him, and for which he has not shown authority to operate.” Id. at 436.

Here, Appellee’s girlfriend, Theresa Broderick, owned the car Appellee drove and crashed. N.T. at 35. She testified at the suppression hearing that he had her permission to drive her car on the day in question, attempting to establish that Appellee had a possessory interest in the vehicle. However, Appellee failed to establish the first element of standing—his presence on the premises at the time of the search—since he fled and abandoned the vehicle.

Because Appellee failed to submit to the traffic stop and fled from the premises of where the search occurred, he forfeited his opportunity to establish his possessory interest in the car, namely, that he had a connection to the registered owner and had her permission to use the vehicle. Burton, supra. Further, at the time the officers applied for a search warrant, they knew the arrestee was a male identified as Richard Lyn, and that the vehicle was registered to a female named Theresa Broderick. Commonwealth’s Ex. 1, Search Warrant Affidavit. The officers would have reasonably known that the -4- J-S16036-24

driver was not the registered owner. There is nothing in the affidavit nor was there testimony at the suppression hearing that Appellee explained his connection to the vehicle to the officers, or that he told the officers he had the owner’s permission to drive her car. Thus, Appellee did not demonstrate that he had a reasonably cognizable expectation of privacy in the vehicle that he did not own and from which he fled at the time it was searched, thereby abandoning the vehicle and its contents.

Accordingly, we adopt Judge Covington’s opinion as our own, and reverse the order granting Appellee’s suppression motion.

Order reversed.

Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judge Lane joins the opinion.

Judge Stabile concurs in the result.

Date: 5/31/2024

-5- Circulated 05/23/2024 03:19 PM

0019_Opinion

J-S16036-24 2024 PA Super 112

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : RICHARD LYN : No. 1808 EDA 2023 Appeal from the Order Entered June 8, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0007793-2022

BEFORE: STABILE, J., LANE, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.* OPINION BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED MAY 31, 2024 The Commonwealth as Appellant appeals from the order entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas on June 8, 2023, granting a suppression motion in favor of Defendant/Appellee, Richard Lyn. After a careful review, we reverse.

Briefly, police initiated a traffic stop on the vehicle Appellee was driving on October 14, 2022. Appellee tried to evade the police, crashed the vehicle, and fled on foot, leaving the car turned on. After a struggle, the police arrested Appellee. The police searched the vehicle from which Appellee had fled and recovered, inter alia, a firearm. Thereafter, the police obtained a search warrant. The Appellee filed a motion to suppress all physical evidence recovered from the vehicle. On June 8, 2023, the trial court granted the

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

J-S16036-24

suppression motion. On July 6, 2023, the Commonwealth appealed the suppression order.

The Commonwealth raises one issue for our review: Where police initiated a valid traffic stop, then defendant kept driving, crashed the car, and fled the scene on foot, did the lower court err by suppressing a gun found in the car that defendant had abandoned, thereby also abandoning any reasonable expectation of privacy he had in the car?

Appellant’s Br. at 4. The trial court acknowledges that it did err in granting the suppression motion.

To begin, we note our standard of review in addressing a challenge to the suppression court's order granting a suppression motion: When the Commonwealth appeals from a suppression order, we follow a clearly defined standard of review and consider only the evidence from the defendant's witnesses together with the evidence of the prosecution that, when read in the context of the entire record, remains uncontradicted. The suppression court's findings of fact bind an appellate court if the record supports those findings. The suppression court's conclusions of law, however, are not binding on an appellate court, whose duty is to determine if the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts.

Commonwealth v. Korn, 139 A.3d 249, 252-53 (Pa. Super. 2016), appeal denied, 159 A.3d 933 (2016).

In addressing the Commonwealth’s issue, we have reviewed the arguments in its appellate brief, Appellee’s arguments in his brief 1, the ____________________________________________

1 Appellee unconvincingly tries to distinguish similar cases by stating that the vehicle doors were closed, and the car motor was turned off. Appellee’s Br. at 15. This characterization is misleading as the keys were still in the ignition and the battery of the car was running, evidenced by the car radio still playing (Footnote Continued Next Page)

-2- J-S16036-24

certified record including the warrant affidavit, and the applicable law. We have also considered the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Roxanne E.

Covington. We conclude that Judge Covington’s opinion adequately addresses the error at issue and correctly concludes that the order in question should be reversed. We adopt the trial court’s opinion as our own.

We make one additional observation to supplement the trial court’s opinion. “A defendant moving to suppress evidence has the preliminary burden of establishing standing and a legitimate expectation of privacy.”

Commonwealth v. Burton, 973 A.2d 428, 435 (Pa. Super. 2009) (en banc).

Standing requires a defendant to demonstrate one of the following: (1) his presence on the premises at the time of the search and seizure; (2) a possessory interest in the evidence improperly seized; (3) that the offense charged includes as an essential element the element of possession; or (4) a proprietary or possessory interest in the searched premises. A defendant must separately establish a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched or thing seized. Whether defendant has a legitimate expectation of privacy is a component of the merits analysis of the suppression motion. The determination whether defendant has met this burden is made upon evaluation of the evidence presented by the Commonwealth and the defendant. Id. (citations omitted). ____________________________________________

as the officers commenced their search. The car doors were closed because Officer Devlin shut the doors and turned the car off. N.T. at 21.

Appellee further attempts to show how the Commonwealth’s rationale is flawed by describing hypothetical situations inapplicable to the present facts. One hypothetical includes a defendant fleeing on foot from a home, and the other hypothetical includes a defendant fleeing to avoid police after exiting a parked car. Appellee’s Br. at 14-15. Here, the car was in motion when police initiated the stop, then crashed, then was abandoned.

-3- J-S16036-24

In Burton, the driver was stopped for a routine traffic violation. When the police asked for identification, they discovered that none of the car’s occupants were the named lessee and none could establish their connection to the car or the named lessee. Our Court held that because the defendant offered no evidence to explain his connection to the vehicle or his connection to the registered owner of the vehicle, he “failed to demonstrate that he had a reasonably cognizable expectation of privacy in a vehicle that he did not own, that was not registered to him, and for which he has not shown authority to operate.” Id. at 436.

Here, Appellee’s girlfriend, Theresa Broderick, owned the car Appellee drove and crashed. N.T. at 35. She testified at the suppression hearing that he had her permission to drive her car on the day in question, attempting to establish that Appellee had a possessory interest in the vehicle. However, Appellee failed to establish the first element of standing—his presence on the premises at the time of the search—since he fled and abandoned the vehicle.

Because Appellee failed to submit to the traffic stop and fled from the premises of where the search occurred, he forfeited his opportunity to establish his possessory interest in the car, namely, that he had a connection to the registered owner and had her permission to use the vehicle. Burton, supra. Further, at the time the officers applied for a search warrant, they knew the arrestee was a male identified as Richard Lyn, and that the vehicle was registered to a female named Theresa Broderick. Commonwealth’s Ex. 1, Search Warrant Affidavit. The officers would have reasonably known that the -4- J-S16036-24

driver was not the registered owner. There is nothing in the affidavit nor was there testimony at the suppression hearing that Appellee explained his connection to the vehicle to the officers, or that he told the officers he had the owner’s permission to drive her car. Thus, Appellee did not demonstrate that he had a reasonably cognizable expectation of privacy in the vehicle that he did not own and from which he fled at the time it was searched, thereby abandoning the vehicle and its contents.

Accordingly, we adopt Judge Covington’s opinion as our own, and reverse the order granting Appellee’s suppression motion.

Order reversed.

Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judge Lane joins the opinion.

Judge Stabile concurs in the result.

Date: 5/31/2024

-5- Circulated 05/23/2024 03:19 PM

0019_Opinion