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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : MIZZON UNIQUE GRANDINETTI : : Appellant : No. 512 WDA 2023 Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 9, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-11-CR-0000135-2021 BEFORE: OLSON, J., KING, J., and LANE, J.

CONCURRING MEMORANDUM BY LANE, J.: FILED: June 18, 2024 I agree with the Majority’s disposition of the issues presented on appeal by Mizzon Unique Grandinetti (“Grandinetti”). In particular, I concur that under the circumstances of this appeal, including the trial court’s review of the sentencing factors under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102.1(a) and Grandinetti’s arguments, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a juvenile life without parole sentence.

Nevertheless, I write separately to recall the United States Supreme Court’s discussion in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), of “the great difficulty[, noted in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), and Graham J-S10009-24

v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010),1] of distinguishing at [an] early age between ‘the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.’” Miller, 567 U.S. at 479-80 (emphasis added). I also emphasize the Court’s reasoning throughout this line of caselaw — that a state “must impose a sentence that provides some meaningful opportunity for release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation,” Graham, 560 U.S. at 75, that “appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty[, of life without the possibility of parole], will be uncommon,” and that a sentencing court must “take into account how children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.” Miller, 567 U.S. at 480 (emphasis added).

I acknowledge that the High Court has since clarified that Miller does not require a trial court to make a finding of fact as to a juvenile’s incorrigibility. See Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307, 1319 (2021). In Commonwealth v. Felder, 269 A.3d 1232 (Pa. 2022), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that “[a]lthough [it] might prefer the more expansive

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1 See Graham, 560 U.S. at 82 (holding the Eighth Amendment prohibits a sentence of life without parole on juvenile offenders for non-homicide offenses); see also Roper, 543 U.S. at 578 (holding the Eighth Amendment forbids imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were under the age of eighteen when their crimes were committed).

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view of Miller as seen through the lens of Montgomery,” it acknowledged that Jones was “controlling as a matter of Eighth Amendment law.” Id. at 1246. The Felder Court thus held Jones abrogated the prior Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in Commonwealth v. Batts, 163 A.3d 410 (Pa. 2017) (“Batts II”), which set forth “procedural safeguards:” “a presumption against sentencing a juvenile to life without the possibility of parole which may only be rebutted beyond a reasonable doubt by proof from the Commonwealth ‘that the juvenile offender is permanently incorrigible and thus is unable to be rehabilitated.” Felder, 269 A.3d at 1234; see also id. at 1244 (stating that the Court was “left with no choice but to dissolve those procedural requirements in Batts II that are not constitutionally required”).

Nevertheless, as we are bound by Jones and Felder, I am constrained to agree that in this particular case, where the trial court considered the relevant sentencing statutes, it did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Grandinetti to a lifetime sentence without parole. See id. at 1245 (holding that “[m]oving forward, the authority of a sentencing court to impose a life-without-parole sentence on a juvenile homicide offender is circumscribed only to the extent set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] §9721(b) and 18 Pa.C.S. §1102.1[A.], and by Miller’s command to ‘consider the mitigating qualities of youth’”).

I agree with the Majority with respect to Grandinetti’s remaining issues.

For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur.

Judge King joins this Concurring Memorandum.

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