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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 EUGENE CARELLI AND ANNIE : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF CARELLI : PENNSYLVANIA : : v. : : : STREAMLINE SOLUTIONS, LLC, : STREAMLINE CONSTRUCTION : No. 2740 EDA 2024 MANAGEMENT, LLC, STREAMLINE : GROUP, LLC, LION CONSTRUCTION, : LLC, LION CONSTRUCTION : MANAGEMENT, LLC, MICHAEL : STILLWELL, AND US CAPITAL : INVESTMENTS 7, LLC : : Appellants : Appeal from the Order Entered September 6, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at No(s): 220501614

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., BECK, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.  MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED JUNE 20, 2025 Six corporate entities—Streamline Solutions, LLC; Streamline Construction Management, LLC; Streamline Group, LLC; Lion Construction, LLC; Lion Construction Management, LLC; and US Capital Investments 7, LLC—and Michael Stillwell (collectively, “Appellants”) appeal from the order principally denying their motion to stay arbitration. We quash.

Briefly, Eugene Carelli and Annie Carelli (“Appellees”) began this action

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 Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

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in 2022. Their complaint alleged a variety of claims stemming from the construction and subsequent repair of their home that was purchased in September 2018. However, the property’s agreement of sale contained an arbitration provision, which required arbitration before the American Arbitration Association “in accordance with its Expedited Procedures of the Commercial Arbitration Rules.” Agreement of Sale, dated 3/2/18, ¶ 11.

Although the matter progressed on a parallel arbitration track for two years, Appellants, sensing that arbitration was imminent, nevertheless filed a motion in the court of common pleas to simultaneously stay the arbitration and/or vacate the arbitrator’s determination that their dispute was arbitrable. In particular, Appellants asserted that Michael Stilwell, as an individual, was not bound by the arbitration provision.

On August 5, 2024, [Appellees] responded to the [m]otion, arguing that the [m]otion was late, given that the [a]rbitration [p]etition had been filed in 2022. Moreover, [Appellees’] written submissions asserted that a coordinate judge had already reviewed the [a]rbitration [a]greement language and determined that Mr. Stillwell was a proper party to the [a]rbitation.

Given that the issues raised before [the trial c]ourt appeared to relate to a convoluted matter already on appeal from a coordinate judge’s [o]rder, [the trial c]ourt listed this matter for a status conference, not argument, on September 5, 2024. Following the conference, [the trial c]ourt read the [o]pinion of the coordinate judge, which similarly involved the [a]rbitration [a]greement used by [Appellants] and set forth that judge’s determination that [(]a) Mr. Stillwell was a proper party to the [a]rbitration and [(]b) that the [a]rbitration [a]ward should be confirmed. Upon review of said [o]pinion and the parties’ submissions in the instant matter, [the trial c]ourt subsequently issued its [o]rder. The [o]rder of September 5, 2024, was based solely on the written submissions of both sides – not the status conference – and relied upon the -2- J-A10031-25

substantive analysis already set forth in the [o]pinion of the coordinate judge.

Trial Court Opinion, 11/18/24, at 1-2 (unpaginated; parentheticals omitted; emphasis in original).

Appellants filed a notice of appeal from the court’s order denying their motion to stay arbitration 1 and further filed a statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b).

On appeal, Appellants present three issues, which, in the aggregate, contest the trial court’s decision to allow the arbitration to proceed against six of the seven corporate entities2 and Michael Stillwell. See Appellants’ Brief, at 4.3 Preliminarily, we must ascertain whether this appeal is properly before this Court. “Generally, an appeal will only be permitted from a final order unless otherwise permitted by statute or rule of court.” Zitney v. Appalachian Timber Products, Inc., 72 A.3d 281, 284-85 (Pa. Super. ____________________________________________

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2013) (quoting Johnston the Florist, Inc. v. TEDCO Constr. Corp., 657 A.2d 511, 514 (Pa. Super. 1995)). “As a matter of general principle, an order is not appealable unless it puts the appellant out of court.” Brennan v. Gen. Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp., Ltd., 453 A.2d 356, 357 (Pa. Super. 1982).

Under 42 Pa.C.S. § 7304(b), a party may request that a trial court enter an order staying “an arbitration proceeding threatened or commenced.” When faced with such a request, the court must then “forthwith and summarily” determine the issue, and, if the court finds for the non-moving party, it shall order the parties to proceed with arbitration. 42 Pa.C.S. § 7304(b).

Although orders “granting an application to stay arbitration made under section 7304(b)” are appealable, 42 Pa.C.S. § 7320(a)(2), the converse of such orders, orders that effectively direct arbitration, carry no such appealability. Indeed, this Court has held, on numerous occasions, that parties are foreclosed from appealing orders that direct arbitrations. See, e.g., Rosy v. Nat’l Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 771 A.2d 60, 61-62 (Pa. Super. 2001); Campbell v. Fitzgerald Motors Inc., 707 A.2d 1167, 1168 (Pa. Super. 1998); Gardner v. Prudential Ins. Co., 481 A.2d 654, 655 (Pa. Super. 1984); Brennan, supra, 453 A.2d at 357.

Notwithstanding the fact that this matter has already proceeded to arbitration, the language of Brennan is particularly apt: Although a party . . . may in some sense be out of court [following an order directing arbitration], that is true only temporarily. The controversy is not concluded, and we see no compelling need for immediate appellate review. If the arbitration is permitted to proceed, the party initially objecting to arbitration may win. The -4- J-A10031-25

party would then no longer be aggrieved[,] and no appeal would be required. At worst, the party will have been required to participate in an unnecessary arbitration, but that is no different than the situation where a party is required to go to trial after a court erroneously refuses to sustain a demurrer to a complaint. 453 A.2d at 358.

Here, while the Appellants properly motioned for a stay of arbitration, which allowed the court to perform oversight of the scope of the parties’ arbitration provision, it declined to grant them relief and ruled that the matter should proceed to arbitration. This determination does not fit within any of the six enumerated orders that may be appealed from in this context. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 7320(a).4 Accordingly, absent a properly appealed-from order, this Court lacks jurisdiction over Appellants’ appeal, resulting in quashal. 5

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(1) A court order denying an application to compel arbitration made under section 7304 (relating to proceedings to compel or stay arbitration).

(2) A court order granting an application to stay arbitration made under section 7304(b).

(3) A court order confirming or denying confirmation of an award.

(4) A court order modifying or correcting an award.

(5) A court order vacating an award without directing a rehearing.

(6) A final judgment or decree of a court entered pursuant to the provisions of this subchapter.

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Appeal quashed.

Date: 6/20/2025

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