Iliuk v. Village of Pennbrook Apts

J-A25003-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 VALENTYNA ILIUK : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : VILLAGE OF PENNBROOK : No. 1011 EDA 2025 APARTMENTS, ABC CORPORATION 1- : 3, JOHN/JANE DOE 1-3, FALLS : TOWNSHIP, PLATINUM PAVING AND : SEALCOATING, VILLAGE OF : PENNBROOK 2, LLC : Appeal from the Judgment Entered July 18, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Civil Division at No(s): 2023-00634

BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., BOWES, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.* MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, P.J.: FILED MARCH 19, 2026 Valentyna Iliuk appeals from the judgment entered upon a directed verdict in favor of Appellee Village of Pennbrook Apartments (Pennbrook) and dismissing Iliuk’s claims.1 After review, we affirm on the basis of the well- written opinion authored by the Honorable Jeffrey R. Sommer. ____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

We adopt the trial court’s factual summary set forth in its opinion, see id. at 1-6, and provide only an abbreviated version here. Iliuk began living at Pennbrook’s eponymous property in 2013 or 2014. See N.T. Trial, 2/10/25, at 45. On February 7, 2021, a snowstorm began in Levittown, Pennsylvania between 6:30-7:00 a.m., starting as a wintry mix before turning into snow and eventually tapering off between 3:30-4:00 p.m. after leaving approximately 3.5 inches of snow accumulation. Id., 2/11/25, at 50-51.

Pennbrook’s maintenance staff began clearing snow and salting the walkways ____________________________________________ order of a court shall be appealable until it has been entered upon the appropriate docket in the trial court.”). Accordingly, this Court issued a directive for Iliuk to enter judgment upon the verdict, which she subsequently did. See id. at (d) (“[T]he clerk of the trial court shall, on praecipe of any party . . ., forthwith prepare, sign, and enter an appropriate order, judgment, or final decree in the docket[.]”). Judgment was entered upon the verdict on July 18, 2025. Because Iliuk’s appeal was filed after the announcement of the trial court’s determination but before the entry of an appealable order, we treat the appeal as if it was filed after such entry and on the day thereof. See Pa.R.A.P. 905(a)(5) (“A notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a determination but before the entry of an appealable order shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof.”).

Furthermore, the underlying action initially included claims against defendants Falls Township, Platinum Paving & Sealcoating LLC, John/Jane Doe 1-3, and ABC Corporation 1-3. The claims against Falls Township and Platinum Paving & Sealcoating LLC were dismissed via stipulation on January 9 th and January 13th, 2025, respectively. The claims against Jane/John Doe 1-3 and ABC Corporation 1-3 were not disposed of by the trial court’s dismissal order.

However, the unidentified defendants were never identified on the docket, never entered an appearance, and were never served. Therefore, even if the trial court’s dismissal order did not dispose of the complaint as to all named defendants, the unidentified defendants never became parties to the action and, accordingly, are not parties to this appeal. See Hill v. Ofalt, 85 A.3d 540, 546 n.5 (Pa. Super. 2014) (defendant that never entered an appearance and was never served with process was not “a party to the action”).

-2- J-A25003-25 around 3:30-4:00 p.m. on the 7 th and were still working at 12:40 a.m. on the morning of the 8th. Id. at 28, 42. Around 12:40 a.m. on the 8th, Iliuk took her dog for a walk. Id., 2/10/25, at 46, 66. While out on the walk, Iliuk slipped and fell and hit her head on the sidewalk. Id. at 47-48.

On February 2, 2023, Iliuk commenced an action against Pennbrook alleging it had been negligent in, inter alia, failing to take appropriate measures to remedy its property after the snowfall, and that such negligence was the direct and proximate cause of Iliuk’s damages. Iliuk sought compensatory damages in excess of $50,000.00, punitive damages, interest, costs, attorneys’ fees, and whatever additional relief the trial court deemed appropriate.

A jury trial was held from February 10 to February 12, 2025. On February 12, 2025, after the close of evidence, Pennbrook’s counsel moved for a directed verdict based upon the evidence presented. Counsel posited that Iliuk had not met her burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence, and that Pennbrook had “acted reasonably at all times and did its job by shoveling the sidewalk and spreading salt and doing everything that it was supposed to under the reasonable [person] standard.” N.T. Trial, 2/12/25, at 11-12. The trial court granted the motion for a directed verdict and dismissed the case.

Iliuk filed a timely notice of appeal and court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. She raises the following issues for our review: -3- J-A25003-25

1. Did the [trial] court commit an error by entering a directed verdict based on the facts elicited at trial and the applicable law?

2. Did the [trial] court commit an error by applying the “hills and ridges” doctrine in the instant matter?

3. Did the [trial] court commit an error by not allowing the jury to determine the reasonableness of the snow remediation performed by [Pennbrook]?

4. Did the [trial] court commit an error by allowing [Pennbrook’s] weather expert Thomas M. Else to testify that he saw “black ice” in a photograph which was outside the scope of his report?

Appellant’s Brief, at 6.

Our well-established standard of review is as follows: A directed verdict may be granted only where the facts are clear and there is no room for doubt. In deciding whether to grant a motion for a directed verdict, the trial court must consider the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and must accept as true all evidence which supports that party’s contention and reject all adverse testimony.

Whittington v. Daniels, 332 A.3d 102, 107 (Pa. Super. 2025) (quoting Keffer v. Bob Nolan’s Auto Service, Inc., 59 A.3d 621, 632 (Pa. Super. 2012)) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

We will reverse a trial court’s grant or denial of a directed verdict . . . only when we find an abuse of discretion or an error of law that controlled the outcome of the case. Further, the standard of review for an appellate court is the same as that for a trial court.

There are two bases upon which a directed verdict . . . can be entered[:] one, the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law and/or two, the evidence is such that no two reasonable minds could disagree that the outcome should have been rendered in favor of the movant. With [a directed verdict], the court reviews the record and concludes that, even with all factual inferences decided adverse to the movant, the law nonetheless requires a verdict in his favor.

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Whittington, 332 A.3d at 107 (quoting Hall v. Episcopal Long Term Care, 54 A.3d 381, 395 (Pa. Super. 2012)) (some brackets and citation omitted).

Iliuk’s first three issues are interrelated and, thus, we address them as one issue.2 The crux of Iliuk’s first three issues is that the trial court erred in granting Pennbrook’s directed verdict where: (1) Iliuk put forth sufficient evidence at trial such that the reasonableness of Pennbrook’s snow removal efforts should have been decided by the jury; and (2) the trial court erred in its application of the hills and ridges doctrine 3 to preclude recovery. See Appellant’s Brief, at 14-25.

In support of the argument that the reasonableness of Pennbrook’s snow removal efforts should have gone to the jury, Iliuk avers that, based upon several evidentiary reasons, she established that Pennbrook’s snow removal efforts were not reasonable. Id. at 17-19. Based on the foregoing, Iliuk contends that the question of whether Pennbrook breached a duty should have gone to the jury. Id. Iliuk next argues that the trial court incorrectly applied the hills and ridges doctrine because there was “clear evidence of ‘human intervention’ in the creation of the localized patch of ice that caused [Iliuk’s] fall.” Id. at 24. ____________________________________________

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This argument relies upon Iliuk’s assertion that “[t]he ice was not formed by a[n] ‘entirely natural phenomenon’ such that the hills and ridges doctrine applies.” Id. Ultimately, Iliuk concludes that because of the “undisputed ‘human intervention[,]’” the hills and ridges doctrine should not have applied, and, even if it were applicable, the testimony presented was sufficient such that “the jury should have decided if [Iliuk] was unable to recover.” Id. at 25.

To prevail in a negligence action, a plaintiff must prove the defendant “owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, that the duty was breached, the breach resulted in the plaintiff’s injury, and the plaintiff suffered an actual loss or damages.” Collins v. Philadelphia Suburban Development Corp., 179 A.3d 69, 73 (Pa. Super. 2018) (quoting Merlini ex rel. Merlini v. Gallitzin Water Authority, 980 A.2d 502, 506 (Pa. 2009)). In the context of an invitee bringing a suit for negligence in the maintenance of property against the landowner, [a] land possessor is subject to liability for physical harm caused to an invitee only if the following conditions are satisfied: [the land possessor] knows of or reasonably should have known of the condition and the condition involves an unreasonable risk of harm, [the possessor] should expect that the invitee will not realize it or will fail to protect [herself] against it, and the [possessor] fails to exercise reasonable care to protect the invitee against the danger.

Estate of Swift v. Northeastern Hosp. of Philadelphia, [] 690 A.2d 719, 722 ([Pa. Super.] 1997) (citation omitted). An invitee must present evidence proving “either the [possessor] of the land had a hand in creating the harmful condition, or he had actual or constructive notice of such condition.” Id. . . .

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The hills and ridges doctrine, “as defined and applied by the courts of Pennsylvania, is a refinement or clarification of the duty owed by a possessor of land and is applicable to a single type of dangerous condition, i.e., ice and snow.” Wentz v. Pennswood Apartments, [] 518 A.2d 314, 316 ([Pa. Super.] 1986). See Williams v. Shultz, [] 240 A.2d 812, 813–14 ([Pa.] 1968) (indicating that the doctrine of hills and ridges applied to preclude liability where “the accident occurred at a time when general slippery conditions prevailed in the community as a result of recent precipitation”) (citations omitted[)].

In order to recover for a fall on an ice[-] or snow[-]covered surface, a plaintiff must show: (1) that snow and ice had accumulated on the sidewalk in ridges or elevations of such size and character as to unreasonably obstruct travel and constitute a danger to pedestrians travelling thereon; (2) that the property owner had notice, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such condition; [and] (3) that it was the dangerous accumulation of snow and ice which caused the plaintiff to fall.

This Court has further opined that “the only duty upon the property owner or tenant is to act within a reasonable time after notice to remove [the snow and ice] when it is in a dangerous condition.”

Biernacki [v. Presque Isle Condominiums Unit Owners Ass’n, Inc.], 828 A.2d [1114,] 1117 [(Pa. Super. 2003)] (quotations omitted).

As this Court has held, “the hills and ridges doctrine may be applied only in cases where the snow and ice complained of are the result of an entirely natural accumulation following a recent snowfall[.]” Harvey v. Rouse Chamberin, Ltd., 901 A.2d 523, 526 (Pa. Super. 2006) (quotation marks, quotation, and emphasis omitted[)]. Further, “the protection afforded by the doctrine is predicated on the assumption that ‘[t]hese formations are [n]atural phenomena incidental to our climate[.]’” Id. (quotation and citation omitted).

Collins, 179 A.3d at 73–74 (emphasis added).

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Here, we agree with the trial court’s analysis and application of the hills and ridges doctrine. See Trial Court Opinion, 4/17/25, 11-15. The trial court correctly concluded that Iliuk failed to provide any evidence that the alleged ice was created by [Pennbrook]’s actions, as opposed to natural accumulation. On the contrary, senior forensic meteorologist Thomas Michael Else explained that the general slippery conditions in the community were a result of temperature fluctuations during and after the storm, a natural phenomenon incidental to our climate, which led to the refreezing of melted snow.

Id. at 11. The record does not indicate that the ice Iliuk slipped on was anything but “the result of an entirely natural accumulation following a recent snowfall.” Harvey, 901 A.2d at 526. Further, based upon the nature of the remedial measures taken and the resulting dangerous condition—the salting and shoveling of a sidewalk as opposed to snowbanks created by plowing the road—we also consider the cases Iliuk relies upon—Bacsick4 and Harvey— distinguishable from the case before us.5 Therefore, the trial court correctly determined that the “human intervention” exception to the hills and ridges doctrine does not apply here.

Further, the trial court correctly held that Iliuk did not put forward sufficient evidence that “an accumulation, whether in the form of ridges or other elevations, was of such size and character to unreasonably obstruct travel and constitute a danger to pedestrians traveling thereon.” Trial Court ____________________________________________

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Opinion, 4/17/25, 11-12 (citing Collins, 179 A.3d at 74). Accordingly, the hills and ridges doctrine applies and precludes Iliuk from recovery here. 6 See Collins, 179 A.3d at 74.

Mindful of the record, the applicable standard of review, the relevant caselaw, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm on the basis of the trial court’s thorough and well-reasoned opinion. See Trial Court Opinion, 4/17/25, at 1- 20. The parties are directed to attach a copy of the trial court’s opinion in the event of further proceedings.

Judgment affirmed.

Ford Elliott, PJE., Joins this Memorandum.

Bowes, J., Files a Dissenting Memorandum.

Date: 3/19/2026

____________________________________________

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J-A25003-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 VALENTYNA ILIUK : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : VILLAGE OF PENNBROOK : No. 1011 EDA 2025 APARTMENTS, ABC CORPORATION 1- : 3, JOHN/JANE DOE 1-3, FALLS : TOWNSHIP, PLATINUM PAVING AND : SEALCOATING, VILLAGE OF : PENNBROOK 2, LLC : Appeal from the Judgment Entered July 18, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Civil Division at No(s): 2023-00634

BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., BOWES, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.* DISSENTING MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED MARCH 19, 2026 The learned Majority affirms the trial court’s decision to grant a directed verdict in favor of Pennbrook. Since I find that the trial court abused its discretion in concluding that the hills and ridges doctrine precluded Iliuk’s negligence action, I respectfully dissent.

Fundamentally, I disagree with how the trial court considered the evidence presented in this case in determining whether Pennbrook was entitled to a directed verdict. To reiterate, the principles governing review of such a motion are as follows:

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

J-A25003-25

A directed verdict may be granted only where the facts are clear and there is no room for doubt. In deciding whether to grant a motion for a directed verdict, the trial court must consider the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and must accept as true all evidence which supports that party’s contention and reject all adverse testimony.

We will reverse a trial court’s grant or denial of a directed verdict only when we find an abuse of discretion or an error of law that controlled the outcome of the case. Further, the standard of review for an appellate court is the same as that for a trial court.

There are two bases upon which a directed verdict can be entered; one, the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law and/or two, the evidence is such that no two reasonable minds could disagree that the outcome should have been rendered in favor of the movant. With a directed verdict, the court reviews the record and concludes that, even with all factual inferences decided adverse to the movant, the law nonetheless requires a verdict in his favor.

Whittington v. Daniels, 332 A.3d 102, 107 (Pa.Super. 2025) (cleaned up, emphasis added), appeal granted on other grounds, 344 A.3d 1059 (Pa. 2025).

Turning to the pertinent doctrine, we have explained: The doctrine of hills and ridges provides that an owner or occupier of land is not liable for general slippery conditions, for to require that one’s walks be always free of ice and snow would be to impose an impossible burden in view of the climatic conditions in this hemisphere. Snow and ice upon a pavement create merely transient danger, and the only duty upon the property owner or tenant is to act within a reasonable time after notice to remove it when it is in a dangerous condition.

The hills and ridges doctrine protects an owner or occupier of land from liability for generally slippery conditions resulting from ice and snow where the owner has not permitted the ice and snow to unreasonably accumulate in ridges or elevations.

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Harvey v. Rouse Chamberlin, Ltd., 901 A.2d 523, 526 (Pa.Super. 2006) (cleaned up). Critically, it “may be applied only in cases where the snow and ice complained of are the result of an entirely natural accumulation, following a recent snowfall, as . . . the protection afforded by the doctrine is predicated on the assumption that these formations are natural phenomena incidental to our climate[.]” Id. (cleaned up, emphasis in original).

With this in mind, I turn to the evidence presented in this case.

Pennbrook acknowledged that it was responsible for clearing the apartment buildings’ sidewalks by shoveling and salting following snowfalls, and that it had on-site maintenance staff to perform that task. See N.T. Jury Trial, 2/10/25, at 93-94. On February 7, 2021, it snowed in the relevant area until about 4:00 p.m. See N.T. Jury Trial, 2/11/25, at 51. Thereafter, the maintenance team began shoveling and salting the sidewalks.

Iliuk, a tenant, took her chihuahua, Rocky, for a walk around midnight.

By that time, the maintenance supervisor believed that the sidewalks had been shoveled and a first pass of salt application had occurred. Moments before her fall at 12:40 a.m., Iliuk encountered a maintenance worker walking towards her and salting the sidewalk she was about to traverse with a salt spreader, purportedly completing his second pass in that regard. Iliuk picked up Rocky and stepped off the sidewalk to allow him to continue salting the sidewalk where she had just been. Id. at 24-25, 33-34; N.T. Jury Trial, 2/10/25, at 46-47.

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Once Iliuk returned to the sidewalk and began walking again, she “just slipped and . . . fell exactly on the back of [her] head.” N.T. Jury Trial, 2/10/25, at 47. After regaining consciousness, she observed that she had fallen “[o]n a patch of ice.” Id. at 48. Iliuk averred that the ice on which she slipped “was bumpy and uneven” and she could not see it before the fall. Id. at 49. Viktor Zavinskyy, who lived in the building adjacent to where Iliuk fell and at the time of trial had become her husband, aided her and took a picture of the relevant portion of sidewalk. He similarly noted that the ice was “bumpy.” Id. at 87. Zavinskyy believed that the ice formation was related to water that would come down a nearby downspout. Id. Pennbrook presented testimony from, inter alia, Thomas Michael Else, a senior forensic meteorologist who reconstructs weather events. He opined that any melted snow or slush from the February 7 snowfall would have refrozen into solid ice in the late evening hours before Iliuk’s fall. See N.T.

Jury Trial, 2/11/25, at 51. Looking at Zavinskyy’s picture of where the fall occurred, Else observed that the sidewalk had been shoveled and he could detect “glare ice,” which he described as similar to black ice and could be seen when light shines on its surface. Id. at 53.

After Iliuk rested, but before Else testified, Pennbrook moved for a compulsory non-suit: A motion for compulsory non-suit allows a defendant to test the sufficiency of a plaintiffs’ evidence and may be entered only in cases where it is clear that the plaintiff has not established a cause of action; in making this determination, the plaintiff must be given the benefit of all reasonable inferences arising from the evidence.

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When so viewed, a non-suit is properly entered if the plaintiff has not introduced sufficient evidence to establish the necessary elements to maintain a cause of action; it is the duty of the trial court to make this determination prior to the submission of the case to the jury.

Hong v. Pelagatti, 765 A.2d 1117, 1121 (Pa.Super. 2000) (cleaned up).

The trial court denied the motion, elucidating as follows: The legal concept of hills and ridges is something that I would have to instruct the jury upon, but based upon some of the testimony, whether they credit the plaintiff herself or her husband, . . . Zavinskyy, about bumpiness and how and where it comes from, that’s a jury question of fact. I can’t put my thumb on the scale. So I’m going to deny your motion at this time.

N.T. Jury Trial, 2/11/25, at 20. However, after Else’s testimony had been presented, Pennbrook moved for a directed verdict, which the court granted.

In doing so, it determined that Pennbrook had acted reasonably by shoveling and salting the sidewalks after the snowfall. See N.T. Jury Trial, 2/12/25, at 15. The court explained that it had “considered all the evidence” and “a variety of cases,” and dismissed Iliuk’s case. Id. at 18-19.

Thereafter, in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court expounded that it granted the motion based upon an application of the hills and ridges doctrine because Iliuk “failed to provide any evidence that the alleged ice was created by [Pennbrook’s] actions, as opposed to natural accumulation.” Trial Court Opinion, 4/17/25, at 11. In so concluding, the court emphasized the meteorologist’s expert testimony and held that despite evidence of Pennbrook salting the sidewalk, Iliuk “introduced no evidence to sustain the claim that

-5- J-A25003-25 she fell on ice traceable to [Pennbrook’s] salting activity, rather than conditions naturally incident to the weather.” Id. At trial, the court cited LaCroix v. Tri-State Props. LLC, 256 A.3d 19, 2021 WL 1886182 (Pa.Super. 2021) (non-precedential decision), in support of its ruling. See N.T. Jury Trial, 2/12/25, at 18. In that case, we affirmed an order granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants based upon the hills and ridges doctrine where the defendants had salted the sidewalk before the plaintiff fell: [T]he [trial] court concluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact that the sidewalk and parking lot . . . were generally slippery as a result of ongoing precipitation at the time of Appellant’s fall. In addition, the court concluded that the evidence indicated that these conditions were prevalent in the community at the time of the fall, and observed that Appellant had not alleged the existence of hills and ridges of snow and ice. Accordingly, the court concluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact in dispute. The record supports this conclusion.

LaCroix, 2021 WL 1886182, at *6.

As a non-precedential decision, this case at most holds persuasive value.

In any event, I find its application inapt. Iliuk averred that the ice on which she fell was bumpy. Furthermore, unlike LaCroix where there was an active freezing rain event creating slippery conditions throughout the community at the time the plaintiff fell, the matter at hand concerned cleanup efforts on a sidewalk roughly eight hours after a snowfall, and the shoveling and salting conducted by Pennbrook altered the naturally occurring conditions such that

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Iliuk’s negligence action would not be precluded by the hills and ridges doctrine.

Critically, by placing more weight on the meteorologist’s testimony and discounting that offered by Iliuk and Zavinskyy, the court failed to consider the evidence in the light most favorable to Iliuk as the non-moving party.

Upon a proper application of the standard for a directed verdict, it is plain to me that there was room for doubt regarding the pertinence of the hills and ridges doctrine given the evidence that Pennbrook’s staff had been shoveling and salting and thereby potentially interfering with the natural accumulation of snow and ice. See Harvey (explaining that “the evidence introduced by Appellants in this case suggests that the condition of the land was influenced by human intervention. In other words, given Watts’[s] interaction with the snow via plowing, the ice in this case could not have been ‘the result of an entirely natural accumulation.’” (emphases in original)).

As noted, Iliuk and Zavinskyy both attested that the ice was bumpy, and Zavinskyy’s testimony suggested that Pennbrook’s downspout impacted the ice formation where Iliuk fell. Accordingly, the jury could have inferred that this patch of sidewalk had accumulated ice in a manner that was not naturally occurring, but created by Pennbrook in some manner. Ultimately, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to Iliuk and rejecting all adverse evidence, as required when reviewing a request for a directed verdict, I find that the trial court abused its discretion by taking away from the jury the question of whether the hills and ridges doctrine applied and, if the jury -7- J-A25003-25 finds it does not apply, whether the snow remediation efforts were reasonable.

Therefore, I would reverse the court’s order directing a verdict in favor of Pennbrook and remand for a new trial.1

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1 As I would remand for a new trial, I would not reach the question of whether the trial court erred in letting Else testify about black ice despite it not being mentioned in his expert report. See Iliuk’s brief at 25-28.

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