Montgomery County v. Barzilayeva, J.

J-A16033-25 2026 PA Super 88 MONTGOMERY COUNTY AND OTAR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF KOSASHVILI : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : JULIETT BARZILAYEVA : : : APPEAL OF: JULIETT BARZILAYEVA : AND EUGENE ZWICK : No. 1592 EDA 2024 Appeal from the Order Entered May 3, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at No(s): 190800558

BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., KUNSELMAN, J., and KING, J.

DISSENTING OPINION BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED APRIL 30, 2026 I. Introduction Nearly three years ago, the Sheriff of Philadelphia County auctioned off the real property of Juliett Barzilayeva and Eugene Zwick (collectively, “the Owners”). The sale arose from a transferred-judgment-execution proceeding that Otar Kosashvili initiated in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. The Majority cancels the sale and concludes that the Philadelphia court lacked jurisdiction over “the unique circumstances” surrounding the transferred judgment. Majority Slip Opinion at 1, ___ A.3d ___, ___. As a court of general jurisdiction, the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County has subject-matter jurisdiction over the class of cases to which this matter belongs: execution proceedings of transferred judgments.

My learned colleagues in the Majority mistake the issue of whether Mr. Kosashvili had standing to transfer and enforce the judgment for the issue of J-A16033-25 subject-matter jurisdiction. I would dismiss the challenge to Mr. Kosashvili’s standing as waived. But even if the Owners had preserved standing for our review, Pennsylvania’s restitution statutes do not prohibit crime victims (like Mr. Kosashvili) from executing civil judgments reduced from restitution orders against their criminal perpetrators (like Barzilayeva). For these reasons and others below, I would affirm; therefore, I respectfully dissent.

II. Factual & Procedural Background On March 26, 2012, Barzilayeva pleaded guilty to embezzling more than $150,000 from Mr. Kosashvili.1 Commonwealth v. Barzilayeva, CP-46-CR- 0009160-2011, Docket Sheets at 2 (C.C.P. Montgomery 2012). The court sentenced her to nine to 23 months of incarceration, followed by five years of probation. See id. In addition, the sentencing court ordered Barzilayeva to pay $773.50 in costs and fees and $154,876.03 in restitution to Mr. Kosashvili.

See id. at 13; see also Prothonotary’s Certified Judgment at 3 (Restitution Order in Barzilayeva, supra). At sentencing, Barzilayeva failed to disclose to the court that she owned property located at 1804 Bainbridge Street in Philadelphia County. See Owners’ Motion to Set Aside Sheriff’s Sale, Ex. 1 (September 5, 2007 Deed from Feinsteins to Barzilayeva and Tsvik, a.k.a. Mr. Zwick).

Beginning on August 9, 2012, Barzilayeva made payments towards her costs, fees, and restitution in amounts ranging from $30 to $393.50 per ____________________________________________

-2- J-A16033-25 month. In October 2013, she ceased making payments for four years. By then, Barzilayeva had paid the $773.50 that she owed to Montgomery County.

See Barzilayeva’s May 31, 2022 Petition to Postpone Sheriff’s Sale, Ex. D at 1. On October 11, 2017, she resumed restitution payments to Mr. Kosashvili at $15 per month. See Barzilayeva, supra, Docket Sheets at 9-12.2 On May 6, 2019, the Prothonotary of Montgomery County entered judgment in favor of the clerk of courts and against Barzilayeva for $153,926.03, i.e., the remaining amount that she owed to Mr. Kosashvili for restitution. See Prothonotary of Montgomery County’s Certified Judgment at (Praecipe and Entry of Judgment in Barzilayeva, supra). Five months later, Mr. Kosashvili filed a certified copy of the Montgomery County judgment with the Office of Judicial Records of Philadelphia County. He praeciped the Office of Judicial Records to enter judgment against Barzilayeva and in favor of Montgomery County and himself.

The following summer, Mr. Kosashvili praeciped for a writ of execution against Barzilayeva and her property at 1804 Bainbridge Street. The Owners failed to respond with preliminary objections. The writ issued, but all sheriff’s sales were on a moratorium due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Around the same time, Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB, which held the mortgage on the Owners’ property, filed a foreclosure action against them. See Kosashvili’s ____________________________________________

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Exceptions to Proposed Schedule of Distribution of Proceeds at 2 (citing Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB v. Barzilayeva, Civil No. 201000844 (C.C.P. Philadelphia 2020)). The court granted Wilmington Savings summary judgment “for the sum of $339,924.44,” and the mortgagee obtained its own writ of execution for the property. Id. Wilmington Savings instituted additional proceedings for a sheriff’s sale.

Next, on July 7, 2022, Mr. Zwick intervened in Mr. Kosashvili’s action and claimed to own 75% of the property. This further delayed the sale.

On July 28, 2023, Mr. Kosashvili praeciped for reissuance of the writ of execution.3 Once again, the Owners neglected to file preliminary objections.

Mr. Kosashvili notified the Owners, Wilmington Savings, Brighton Beach & Son Production, and those parties’ attorneys4 that the property would go to sheriff’s sale “on October 3, 2023, in an online bidding platform at www.bid4assets.com/philadelaphia to enforce the court judgment of $153,926.03 obtained by Otar Kosashvili against Juliett Barzilayeva.” July 28, 2023 Notice of Sheriff’s Sale at 1. The Owners made no further attempts to postpone the sale, and the court did not order a postponement.

On September 27, 2023, the Sheriff’s Office made the following entry on the docket: “Writ return filed. Sale postponed – Writ Number 2206-430.” ____________________________________________

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Docket Sheets at 7 (some capitalization removed). The Sheriff’s Office made seven prior “Sale postponed” entries on the docket. See id. at 4-7.

At the end of September 2023, Mr. Zwick contacted a new attorney, John Martucci, Esq., and hired him to represent the Owners jointly. See N.T., 2/29/24, at 19. After reading the September 27th docket entry, Attorney Martucci decided not to file a motion to postpone the sheriff’s sale. He “looked at the docket and [inferred that] it’s been postponed . . . why file a motion to stay? It would be moot.” N.T., 4/11/24, at 4. His interpretation of the docket entry was incorrect.

The Sheriff of Philadelphia County does not declare upcoming sales postponed by marking “Sale postponed” on the docket. Instead, the sheriff can get notice that a sale is postponed from one of the parties or the court as late as the afternoon of the scheduled sale. See id. at 7. The sheriff does not postpone an upcoming sale by making a notation on the docket. Such entries always come after the date of the sale. See id. In short, the September 27th entry was not an indication that the upcoming sheriff’s sale would be postponed, as Attorney Martucci thought, but a notation that a prior sale had been postponed.

On October 3, 2023, the sheriff put the property up for public auction.

There were 67 bids. Zeon Real Estate LLC, a company that Mr. Kosashvili partially owned, was the highest bidder; it paid $290,000 for the property.

See Sheriff’s Proposed Schedule of Distribution at 1; see also Kosashvili’s Exceptions to Proposed Schedule of Distribution of Proceeds at 3.

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A few weeks later, the Owners moved to have the sheriff’s sale set aside and the proceedings stayed. They raised four grounds to set aside the sale.

First, the Owners claimed Mr. Kosashvili violated Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 3129.1 by failing to provide notice of the sheriff’s sale to an unidentified tenant of the property. Second, they alleged that Mr. Kosashvili violated Pa.R.Civ.P. 3129.2 by not placing handbills on the property 30 days before the sheriff’s sale. Third, the Owners asserted Mr. Kosashvili violated Pa.R.Civ.P. 3129.3 by failing to file a new notice and publication with the Office of Judicial Records at least 15 days before the sale. Fourth, according to the Owners, the sale price of $290,000 was “grossly inadequate . . . [and] no actual funds were tendered making this bid a fictitious bid.” Owners’ Motion to Set Aside the Sheriff’s Sale at 10. The motion did not assert that Mr. Kosashvili lacked standing or improperly transferred the judgment.

Mr. Kosashvili filed a response opposing the motion. He observed that the Owners admitted to having received actual “notice of the sheriff’s sale pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P. 3129.1.” Kosashvili’s Response in Opposition to Motion to Set Aside Sheriff’s Sale at 1 (emphasis removed). He then proceeded to refute the four issues that the Owners presented. See id. at 1- 4.

The Owners filed a reply, which raised a new issue. They claimed that the sheriff’s sale was invalid, because of the sheriff’s September 27, 2023 docket entry that “the sheriff’s sale scheduled for October 3, 2023 on Writ Number 2206-430 was postponed. Despite this postponement notice, the -6- J-A16033-25 sale, amazingly went forward.” Owners’ Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion to Set Aside the Sheriff’s Sale at 3 (some capitalization removed). According to the Owners, the September 27 th entry required Mr. Kosashvili to serve them with new notices of a new sale date. See id. at 4- 7. Again, the Owners made no claim Mr. Kosashvili lacked standing to transfer the judgment from Montgomery County.

On February 14, 2024, the Sheriff’s Office filed a Proposed Schedule of Distribution for the proceeds from the sale. Under the proposed schedule, Mr. Kosashvili would receive $194,689.02, and the Owners would receive “Unused Proceeds” of $64,111.31. See Sheriff’s Proposed Schedule of Distribution at 1. The schedule omitted Wilmington Savings, the first-position lienholder of the mortgage.

That oversight prompted Mr. Kosashvili to file exceptions to the sheriff’s proposed distribution. He indicated that Wilmington Savings had the property listed for a second sheriff’s sale on May 7, 2024 to execute upon its summary judgment in the foreclosure action. Instead of having a second sheriff’s sale, Mr. Kosashvili invoked the court’s equitable powers; he claimed “it would be inequitable to permit [Barzilayeva] to retain the balance of the sale’s unused proceeds, when [she] has defaulted on both the mortgage and has been required to pay restitution to [Mr. Kosashvili] pursuant to a criminal conviction.” Kosashvili’s Exceptions to Proposed Schedule of Distribution of Proceeds at 6. “Accordingly, the Sheriff’s Office should instead distribute the remaining funds to [Wilmington Savings], or alternatively, distribute the -7- J-A16033-25 remaining funds to [Zeon Real Estate LLC,] so that it may satisfy the mortgage still encumbering the property.” Id. On February 29, 2024, the court held a hearing on the Motion to Set Aside the Sheriff’s Sale. The Owners called no witnesses. They entered two exhibits into evidence: (1) the notice of entry of judgment and (2) the original judgment from Montgomery County. Attorney Martucci made several oral arguments regarding the sheriff’s entry of September 27, 2023.

Also, the Owners claimed, for the first time, that Mr. Kosashvili failed to follow the proper procedure to transfer the Montgomery County judgment or to become a collection agent for Montgomery County. See N.T., 2/29/24, at 4-6, 18-19. Notably, the Owners did not argue that the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over this case due to Mr. Kosashvili’s alleged procedural mistake. Instead, the Owners said that he lacked “standing.” Id. at 19.

Mr. Kosashvili’s counsel indicated that the propriety of the judgment’s transfer was not raised in the Motion to Set Aside the Sheriff’s Sale. See id. at 11. He also said, “I don’t believe that you can challenge the validity of a judgment in a sheriff’s sale proceeding . . . The time to have challenged the judgment, if possible, has long since lapsed.” Id. “[T]his isn’t a motion to set aside the judgment. [The Owners’ argument] is a motion to strike a judgment, and you can’t challenge [an underlying] judgment in a sheriff’s sale proceeding.” Id. at 17-18.

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Counsel for the Owners answered, “I am not challenging the judgment.

I’m challenging the party whose name is on the judgment. It is Montgomery County and the Clerk of Courts from [Mr. Kosashvili’s] documents. Not . . .

Otar Kosashvili --” Id. at 18.

The trial court interjected, “But the judgment didn’t put the house in foreclosure. I mean, the judgment is separate [from the sheriff’s sale].” Id. The Owners’ attorney replied: The judgment has Montgomery County. [Mr. Kosashvili] is not added to this judgment. You have to go back to Montgomery County. Montgomery County is the collecting agency for this, for the restitution order . . . the Clerk of Courts and Montgomery County, not the victim, [are] the judgment holder[s]. The judgment was never entered in this party. They don’t have standing to do this.

Id. at 18-19 (emphasis added).

The court took the matter under advisement and reopened the record at a hearing on April 11, 2024. Mr. Kosashvili called Steve Wakefield, Esq., Senior Attorney in the City of Philadelphia’s Tax Litigation & Collections Unit, to testify regarding the “Sale postponed” docket entries. The Owners objected on the grounds that Attorney Wakefield had no knowledge about the docket entries in this case. The court overruled the objection and allowed Attorney Wakefield to testify based on his general knowledge of those types of docket entries. He testified that the “Sale postponed” entries do not indicate that a future sale is postponed. Instead, they are notations about the postponement of previous sales. The court also heard argument on the issues presented in

-9- J-A16033-25 the Motion to Set Aside the Sheriff’s Sale, but the parties did not revisit the question of Mr. Kosashvili’s standing.

Next, they argued Mr. Kosashvili’s Exceptions to the Proposed Schedule of Distribution. An attorney for Wilmington Savings was present. She explained that her client held the superior lien. Wilmington Savings said, “to the extent that there are excess funds [from the October 3, 2023 sheriff’s sale], it would be inequitable to return the funds to the former property Owners, when there is still such an outstanding judgment that we hold.” N.T., 4/11/24, at 15-16. The mortgagee contended that the court should distribute “the excess funds to [it,] the senior, at this point, judgment creditor.” Id. at 16.

Wilmington Savings then moved to reassess the mortgage-foreclosure damages to add interest for delays, attorneys’ fees, and court costs. The new owner, Zeon Real Estate LLC, had no objection to that reassessment. Lastly, if the court overturned the October 3, 2023 sale, Wilmington Savings explained that it would conduct a de novo sheriff’s sale to enforce its judgment against the Owners, and they would lose the property anyway. See id. at 21.

On May 3, 2024, the court entered an order denying the Owners’ Motion to Set Aside the Sheriff’s Sale. It simultaneously granted Wilmington Savings’ motion to reassess the foreclosure damages.

Twelve days later, the court sustained Mr. Kosashvili’s Exceptions to the Proposed Schedule of Distribution. It ordered that $0 from the sheriff’s sale would go to the Owners and $258,809.33 would go to Wilmington Savings to - 10 - J-A16033-25 satisfy its foreclosure judgment. Of the remaining $31,190.67 from the sale, $20,102.32 went to property-transfer taxes; $258.50 went to a recording fee; $9,577.69 went to the Sheriff’s Office; and $1,261.16 satisfied municipal leins on the property. See Sheriff’s Proposed Schedule of Distribution at 1. Hence, nothing from the sale proceeds went to Mr. Kosashvili for restitution.

The Owners timely appealed the May 3, 2024 Orders. Prior to briefing, they withdrew their appeal in Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB v. Barzilayeva, 1593 EDA 2024. This appeal, at 1592 EDA 2024, remains ripe for resolution.

III. Analysis The Owners raise nine claims of error, which I have reordered for ease of discussion as follows: 1. Whether the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over this case, because naming Montgomery County, Pennsylvania a party hereto was fictitious, where counsel for Mr. Kosashvili had no authority nor was engaged by Montgomery County, Pennsylvania to proceed on their behalf and therefore based on this deception all writs, orders and/or actions hereto are void.

2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to set aside the sheriff’s sale, because the relief that the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County provided to Mr. Kosashvili was an order of restitution, and he needed to seek modification of the order of restitution prior to transferring the judgment.

3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to set aside the sheriff’s sale, because that sale was postponed for more than 130 days, new

- 11 - J-A16033-25 notice and publication were required under the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure.

4. Whether Mr. Kosashvili failed to serve the praecipe for the writ of execution, the writ of execution, and the accompanying affidavit on the Owners.

5. Whether the writ of execution failed to comply with Pa.R.Civ.P. 3129.2.

6. Whether Mr. Kosashvili failed to comply with Pa.R.Civ.P. 3129.1(b)(4).

7. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to set aside the sheriff’s sale, because the sale price of the property was grossly inadequate.

8. Whether the Sheriff’s Office violated the Owners’ due- process rights by making the September 27 th “Sale postponed” entry on the docket.

9. Whether the trial court permitting Attorney Wakefield to testify was an abuse of discretion.

See Owners’ Brief at 4-7.

A. Standing Rather than Subject-Matter Jurisdiction I address the Owners’ first two issues together, because the Majority seemingly conflates them in its analysis. See Majority Slip Opinion at 3-4, ___ A.3d ___, ___ (listing the issue of whether Mr. Kosashvili “needed to pursue modification of the ordered statutory relief with the [Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County] prior to seeking other remedies” first and the Owners’ issue claiming that the trial court “lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over this case because naming Montgomery County, Pennsylvania a party hereto was fictitious” seventh). The Majority extrapolates from other cases involving a sentencing court’s ongoing jurisdiction over orders of restitution

- 12 - J-A16033-25 that the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the civil judgment that Mr. Kosashvili transferred to it. In reaching that conclusion, the Majority rejects Mr. Kosashvili’s assertion that the Owners are making a standing argument, masquerading as a challenge to subject-matter jurisdiction. See Id. at 5 n.2, ___ A.3d at ___ n.2; see also Kosashvili’s Brief at 31-33.

In the trial court, the Owners said they were challenging Mr. Kosashvili’s standing to commence this proceeding. They never said “jurisdiction” in their repeated filings and arguments to postpone or set aside the sheriff’s sale.

Rather, they argued that, because Mr. Kosashvili was not named on the judgment filed with the Prothonotary of Montgomery County, he did not “have standing to do this.” N.T., 4/11/14, at 19 (emphasis added).

Now, on appeal, likely realizing that they waived the issue of standing by not raising it below at the first opportunity, the Owners resort to the informal fallacy of equivocation. They recast their standing argument as an attack on the Philadelphia court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. This rhetorical sleight-of-hand is impermissible under the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. Raising new issues and legal theories for the first time on appeal results in waiver.

“The issue of waiver presents a question of law, and, as such, our standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary.” Trigg v. Children’s Hosp. of Pittsburgh of UPMC, 229 A.3d 260, 269 (Pa. Super. 2020).

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“Issues not raised in the trial court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). This stems from the fact that “issue preservation is foundational to proper appellate review.” Trigg, 229 A.3d at 269 (quoting In re F.C. III, 2 A.3d 1201, 1211 (Pa. 2010)).

“Requiring issues to be properly raised first in the trial court ensures that trial judges have the opportunity to consider a potential appellate issue and correct any error at the first available opportunity.” Id. Here, the Owners did not afford the trial court an opportunity to consider whether, under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9728 and precedents applying it, Mr. Kosashvili needed to seek any further relief or a modification of the restitution order in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County. The Owners did not include the statute or precedents applying it in their multiple filings before the Philadelphia court, because they never raised standing in those filings. See Owners’ Motion to Set Aside the Sheriff’s Sale; see also Owners’ Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion to Set Aside the Sheriff’s Sale.

They only challenged Mr. Kosashvili’s standing once, at the February 2024 hearing on the Motion to Set Aside the Sheriff’s Sale. Even then, the Owners offered no statute or case law for the trial court to consider. See N.T., 2/29/24 at 4-9, 18. Attorney Martucci relied solely on his past experience in criminal cases. “You have to go back to Montgomery County. Montgomery County is the collecting agency for this, for the restitution order,” he said. Id. at 18. “I am just going through procedure, and having done enough criminal

- 14 - J-A16033-25 cases that the county enters judgment, so they can collect.” Id. That was the full extent of his argument below on this issue.

Surely, the Civil Division of the Philadelphia court was not supposed to accept Attorney Martucci’s legal conclusion at face value. Nor was that court required to locate 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9728 on its own, find precedents applying it, and craft a legal argument on the Owners’ behalf. Rule of Appellate Procedure 302(a) required the Owners to present their arguments on 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9728 to the trial court in the first instance. Thus, any appellate arguments they make based on Section 9728 and its precedents are waived. See Owners’ Brief at 35-36.

Furthermore, “standing is an issue that halts justiciability of an action on its merits; [thus, it] must be raised at the soonest possible opportunity and may be waived if not promptly raised.” In re the Interest of K.N.L., 284 A.3d 121, 151 n.22 (Pa. 2022). In civil proceedings, the issue of standing is waived unless specifically raised in a preliminary objection. See, e.g., Erie Indem. Co. v. Coal Operators Cas. Co., 272 A.2d 465, 467 (Pa. 1971).

A proceeding to execute a judgment “shall be commenced by filing a praecipe for a writ of execution with the prothonotary of any county in which the judgment has been entered.” Pa.R.Civ.P. 3103(a). Like any commensurate filing, defendants may preliminarily object to the praecipe under Pa.R.Civ.P. 3142. “All preliminary objections shall be raised at one time.” Pa.R.Civ.P. 3142(b). Alternatively, the Owners could have filed a motion to stay the writ of execution by alleging a defect in the writ, i.e., that - 15 - J-A16033-25

Mr. Kosashvili lacked standing, prior to the sheriff’s sale. See Pa.R.Civ.P. 3121(b). Again, “all objections by the defendant shall be raised at one time.”

Pa.R.Civ.P. 3121(e). In any event, the time to challenge Mr. Kosashvili’s standing was well before the sheriff’s sale occurred.

The Owners filed no preliminary objections to Mr. Kosashvili’s praecipe for a writ of execution or his praecipe to reissue the writ. They also filed no motion to stay the writ, based on an allegation of a lack of standing. Hence, they waived any claim that Mr. Kosashvili lacked standing to transfer the judgment from Montgomery County on this basis as well. See Erie Indemnity, supra. I would dismiss their challenge to standing on that basis alone.

Because they did not preserve the standing issue or any argument based on 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9728 for appellate review, the Owners try to reframe their standing issue as jurisdictional. See Owners’ Brief at 34-36.5 The Owners do ____________________________________________

In fact, the word “authority” regarding the Philadelphia court does not appear anywhere in the Owners’ appellate brief. Every reference the Owners make to “authority” contends that Mr. Kosashvili had no “authority” to file this proceeding. See Owners’ Brief at 17-18, 34, 36. That is clearly an argument against Mr. Kosashvili’s standing, not the authority or the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County “to make the judgment for restitution attach to the property . . . .” Majority Slip Opinion at 6 n.2, ___ A.3d at ___ n.2. As (Footnote Continued Next Page)

- 16 - J-A16033-25 so, because “subject-matter jurisdiction of a court is nonwaivable . . . .” In re J.M.Y., 218 A.3d 404, 415 (Pa. 2019).

However, neither the Owners’ attack on opposing counsel’s “authority” nor their contention that Mr. Kosashvili failed to follow criminal procedure in Montgomery County implicates the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County’s subject-matter jurisdiction. Owners’ Brief at 6. Those contentions implicate whether Mr. Kosashvili had “standing” to transfer the judgment to Philadelphia County and commence this enforcement proceeding. N.T., 4/11/24, at 19. Regrettably, the Majority allows the Owners to confuse standing for subject-matter jurisdiction, and the Majority further confuses the issue as one of court authority. See Footnote 5, supra. The definitional distinction “between standing, personal jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction, and judicial power is sometimes subtle; however, it is important.” Grimm v. Grimm, 149 A.3d 77, 83 (Pa. Super. 2016), overruled on other grounds by Marion v. Bryn Mawr Tr. Co., 288 A.3d 76 (Pa. 2023). Subject-matter jurisdiction “inquires into the competency of the court to determine controversies of the general class to which the case presented for consideration belongs.” Domus, Inc. v. Signature Bldg. Sys. of PA, LLC, 252 A.3d 628, 636 (Pa. 2021). By contrast, standing is a “party’s right to make a legal claim or seek judicial enforcement of a duty or right ____________________________________________ noted above, the Owners framed the issue as “standing” below, and they now frame it as “jurisdiction” on appeal. Unlike the Majority, I therefore would dismiss any challenge to the Philadelphia court’s “authority” as waived.

- 17 - J-A16033-25 based on the party’s having a sufficient interest in a justiciable controversy.”

Standing, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024) (emphasis added).

In Domus, a general contractor transferred a judgment to the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County, and the subcontractor moved to strike the judgment. The trial court refused to strike the transferred judgment, and the subcontractor appealed. This Court reversed, because it concluded that the transferring party’s failure to follow certain statutory procedures in the original court to authenticate the judgment deprived the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County of subject-matter jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania granted review and reversed. It held “that the failure to authenticate a [transferred,] foreign judgment . . . does not implicate the subject-matter jurisdiction of the court of common pleas.” Domus, 252 A.3d at 636. The High Court explained, “The pertinent consideration is whether the court could enter upon the inquiry, not whether it might ultimately decide that it was unable to grant the relief sought in the particular case.” Id. (emphasis added). “Subject-matter jurisdiction is not synonymous with a tribunal’s power to act, although the terms are often used interchangeably by judges and litigants alike.” Id. (some punctuation omitted).

The Domus Court said, “the absence of proper authentication under [the transfer statute] does not render the court of common pleas incompetent to determine controversies in the general class to which this case belongs, i.e., actions to enforce foreign judgments.” Id. After reviewing the statute - 18 - J-A16033-25 that this Court interpreted as depriving the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction, the Supreme Court found no statutory language on jurisdiction.

“Given the statute’s silence on [jurisdiction], we conclude [it] presents no bar to the virtually unlimited subject-matter jurisdiction of the courts of common pleas, including jurisdiction of foreign-judgment-enforcement actions.” Id. at 637 (emphasis added). “Where the language of a statute makes no reference to a decrease in the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, such a diminution cannot simply be inferred.” Id. The same logic applies to the transferred judgment in this action. Under the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the jurisdictional statutes, “the courts of common pleas have unlimited original jurisdiction of all actions, except where otherwise provided by law.” Id. (citing Pa. Const. art. V, § 56 and 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 931(a)).

Neither the Owners nor the Majority cite any law stating, in plain language, that the legislature stripped the courts of common pleas of their competency to hear proceedings to enforce transferred judgments. “The object of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly.” 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(a).

“The plain language of the statute is the best indicator of the legislature’s intent.” Commonwealth v. Chesapeake Energy Corp., 247 A.3d 934, 942 (Pa. 2021). Critically, “statutes purporting to limit a court’s jurisdiction must ____________________________________________

- 19 - J-A16033-25 be strictly construed” against curtailing jurisdiction. Domus, 252 A.3d at 637 (some punctuation omitted).

Like the statute in Domus, the statute that the Owners and the Majority rely upon to divest the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County of its inherent, constitutional jurisdiction is silent on jurisdiction. See 42 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 9728. The word “jurisdiction” does not appear in the statute. Indeed, the General Assembly did not address Section 9728 to the courts of common pleas. Rather, the statute is a command to county probation offices. “[A]ll restitution, reparation, fees, costs, fines and penalties shall be collected by the county probation department or other agent designated by the county commissioners . . . with the approval of the president judge of the county . . . .” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9728(a)(1).

Section 9728 in no way circumscribes the jurisdiction of common pleas courts to decide proceedings to enforce transferred judgments. The General Assembly codified the at-issue provision in the chapter of the Judicial Code on sentencing, rather than the chapter on jurisdiction. Simply stated, nothing in Section 9728 reduces the legislature’s broad grant of general jurisdiction to courts of common pleas found elsewhere in the Judicial Code – “the courts of common pleas shall have unlimited original jurisdiction of all actions and proceedings, including all actions and proceedings heretofore cognizable by law or usage in the courts of common pleas.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 931(a) (emphasis added).

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An action to enforce a transferred judgment is a proceeding “cognizable by law or usage in the courts of common pleas.” Id. Because the courts of common pleas have “unlimited original jurisdiction,” there is no doubt that this action belongs to a class of cases over which the courts of common pleas have subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. Thus, I would hold that any failure by Mr. Kosashvili to seek modification of the restitution order in Montgomery County prior to transferring the judgment to Philadelphia County “does not deprive the court of common pleas of subject-matter jurisdiction” over that class of cases. Domus, 252 A.3d at 641. A claim that the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over proceedings to enforce transferred judgments is meritless.

In fact, all of the Owners’ contentions that the trial court lacked subject- matter jurisdiction are really standing arguments in disguise. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has held that the unauthorized practice of law does not negate subject-matter jurisdiction. See Bisher v. Lehigh Valley Health Network, Inc., 265 A.3d 383, 405 (Pa. 2021). Thus, even if Mr. Kosashvili’s attorney deceived the trial court by intimating that he represented Montgomery County, as the Owners suggest, that alleged deception does not deprive the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction. 7 Moreover, Pennsylvania “jurisprudence does not view standing as a jurisdictional issue . . . .” Id. ____________________________________________

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In this Commonwealth, “the doctrine of standing . . . is a prudential, judicially created principle designed to winnow out litigants who have no direct interest in a judicial matter.” Commonwealth, Office of the Governor v. Donahue, 98 A.3d 1223, 1229 (Pa. 2014). “For standing to exist, the underlying controversy must be real and concrete, such that the party initiating the legal action has, in fact, been aggrieved.” Id. (emphasis added). “A party is aggrieved for purposes of establishing standing when the party has a substantial, direct, and immediate interest in the outcome of litigation.” Id. at 1229.

When this Court has barred crime victims from appearing as parties in criminal matters, we have done so on the basis that victims lack standing. In the 1970s (i.e., 20 years before the General Assembly adopted the statutes requiring restitution on behalf of victims), this Court said the “victim . . . has no legitimate interest [in a criminal case], other than as a member of the general public in seeing a violator of the laws brought to justice by the Commonwealth and punished for his misdeeds.” In re Petition of Piscanio, 344 A.2d 658, 661 (Pa. Super. 1975). “If a [victim] feels individually harmed, his remedy is a civil suit for damages.” Id.

____________________________________________ trial court found that the Owners had “no proof to support their claims that [Mr. Kosashvili’s] attorney was acting in an unauthorized manner. No Montgomery County representative ever appeared to argue this issue or have the county removed from the case. In fact, the record shows that Montgomery County ‘authorized a collection of this judgment to seize this property and sell it.’” Trial Court Opinion, 10/28/24, at 13 (quoting N.T., 2/29/24, at 9).

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Based on this rationale, we subsequently opined, “the state, represented by the District Attorney, is the party plaintiff in a criminal prosecution; the victim/complainant is not considered a party to the proceeding. The victim acts only as a prosecuting witness.” Commonwealth v. Malloy, 450 A.2d 689, 693 (Pa. Super. 1982). See also Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619, (1973) (stating, a “private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or non-prosecution of another.”).

For example, in Malloy, a victim attempted to appeal a pre-trial order dismissing the charges against defendants accused of stealing from the victim.

Based on the distinct roles of a district attorney and a victim, we held that the “appellant, as victim or witness, lacks ‘party’ status in this criminal prosecution, [hence,] he has no standing to appeal . . . .” Malloy, 450 A.2d at 694 (emphasis added).

Here, the crux of the Owners’ purported subject-matter-jurisdiction claim is that Mr. Kosashvili was the wrong party to initiate this transferred- judgment-enforcement action in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. The Majority agrees and takes the position that Mr. Kosashvili needed to seek modification of the restitution order in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County before commencing this proceeding to enforce the transferred judgment. Thus, although my learned colleagues hold that the Philadelphia court lacked jurisdiction, they actually decide that Mr. Kosashvili lacked standing to transfer and enforce the judgment based on his status as Barzilayeva’s victim. Hence, the Majority insists that he return to Montgomery - 23 - J-A16033-25

County to enlist the aid of the district attorney, the party whom the Majority believes is the proper one to authorize or initiate this proceeding.

Presumably, if the Clerk of Courts or District Attorney of Montgomery County had transferred and enforced the judgment in Philadelphia County, neither the Owners nor the Majority would question the subject-matter jurisdiction of the transferee court. Hence, they may not properly question that jurisdiction, simply because Mr. Kosashvili was the party who transferred and enforced the judgment. Whether Mr. Kosashvili had the right or the authority to transfer the judgment from Montgomery County is a question of his standing, not the transferee court’s jurisdiction.

“Unlike the federal courts, where standing is a non-waivable, jurisdictional issue, the courts of this Commonwealth view the issue of standing as non-jurisdictional and waivable.” In re Condemnation by Urban Redevelopment Auth. of Pittsburgh, 913 A.2d 178, 181 n.6 (Pa. 2006). For the foregoing reasons, I would dismiss the Owners’ challenge to Mr. Kosashvili’s standing to initiate this transferred-judgment-enforcement proceeding as waived.

B. Mr. Kosashvili Has Standing Alternatively, even if the Owners preserved the issue of standing for review, I would reject the claim. I do not think that 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9728 required Mr. Kosashvili to take further steps in Montgomery County and add his name as plaintiff to that county’s judgment before he could commence this action to enforce that judgment against Barzilayeva. Because Mr. Kosashvili - 24 - J-A16033-25 commenced a civil action in a court, he did not engage in the “self-help” that the Owners and the Majority believe he undertook. By definition, commencing a proceeding in a court cannot be “self-help,” because “self-help” is an action done “without judicial process,” such as “a ‘self-help eviction’ [i.e.] a landlord removing the tenant’s property from an apartment and locking the door against the tenant.” Self-Help, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at 1202 (5th ed. 1979).

The Majority requires Mr. Kosashvili to acquire standing by taking further steps of criminal procedure and enlisting the aid of the District Attorney of Montgomery County. The Majority’s analysis trivializes that Mr. Kosashvili is the victim of Barzilayeva’s theft. See Majority Slip Opinion at 11-15, ___ A.3d at ___ (reducing the Crime Victims Act, 18 P.S. §§ 11.101-11.5102, and the retention-of-victim’s-rights clause in the restitution statute, 18 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 1106(g), to mere footnotes). This application of the restitution statutes elevates form over substance, while diminishing Mr. Kosashvili’s ancient right to be repaired for the harm of Barzilayeva’s crime (and her simultaneous civil trespass) against him. Because Mr. Kosashvili was the victim and has standing to bring this civil proceeding against Barzilayeva, the Majority’s requirement is unnecessary and contrary to the legislative reforms involving restitution.

Pennsylvania’s statutory scheme on restitution, enacted in the mid- 1990s, emerged from a national, pro-victim reform movement to value, protect, and enforce the rights of crime victims. The General Assembly enacted restitution statutes to help victims recover from crimes, not to add - 25 - J-A16033-25 bureaucratic hoops for them to jump through. In fact, our legislature plainly expressed its intent in the restitution statute itself: i.e., “to provide the victim with the fullest compensation for the loss.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1106(c)(1)(i) (emphasis added).

Hence, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9728 is a remedial statute. “A remedial statute . . . should receive a liberal interpretation in advancement of the remedy contemplated.” Quinn v. Fid. Beneficial Ass’n, 100 Pa. 382, 385 (1882); see also 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1928(c). Our courts should liberally interpret Section 9728 in favor of securing crime victims’ rights and compensation over obstructive tactics of convicted criminals.

Restitution is one of the law’s oldest remedies. During ancient times, “the community or tribe set the amount of compensation owed a victim by his criminal; the aim of that primitive legal process was primarily to make the victim whole and secondarily to minimize private revenge.” Richard E. Laster, Criminal Restitution: A Survey of Its Past History and An Analysis of Its Present Usefulness, 5 U. Rich. L. Rev. 71, 75 (1970). In the Torah, Moses wrote, “When someone steals an ox or a sheep, and slaughters it or sells it, the thief shall pay five oxen for an ox, and four sheep for a sheep. The thief shall make restitution, but if unable to do so, shall be sold for the theft.”

Exodus 22:1, THE ACCESS BIBLE, NRSV (O’Day & Peterson eds., 1999). Similar rules appear in the Code of Hammurabi. See THE CODE OF HAMMURABI KING OF BABYLON 13 (Harper trans., 2d. ed. 1904).

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The system of restitution continued through Ancient Rome and into the early common-law courts of England. Upon a jury conviction for larceny, the judge could issue a writ of restitution to the victim for the value of the property that the criminal stole, because the “law prefers the right of the owner.” 4 BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND at 362-63 (St. George Tucker ed., 1803). However, with the strengthening of feudalism and the centralization of government in the Crown, restitution for victims began to wane. By the Late Middle Ages, the criminal owed a payment (known as the “bot”) to the victim, and a fine (known as the “wite”) paid to the king or lord.

Stephen Schafer, THE VICTIM & HIS CRIMINAL at 18 (1968). The victims or their families privately brought prosecution to recover the bot, i.e., restitution, rather than to punish the criminal. See id. Over time, the Crown became more concerned with collecting the wite for itself than recovering the bot for the victim. 8 Moving from restorative justice for victims to retribution on the criminal was “a contributing factor in separating the law into its present civil and criminal components.” Laster, supra. As the centuries passed, the Crown would come “to take the entire ____________________________________________

- 27 - J-A16033-25 compensative payment and thus effectively . . . raise punishment to the level of satisfaction.” Id. at 76. Courts rationalized the change by holding “that violent acts breached the king’s peace; therefore, the king was as much an injured party as the victim and entitled to a share of the victim’s compensation.” Id. at 79.

“Once the state replaced the victim as the recipient of the criminal’s compensative payment, it was a logical next step for the state to replace the victim as the prosecuting party.” Id. Eventually, “the idea of payments between individuals became associated with tort or civil law, the state completely took over the administration of criminal law, and restitution became mostly divorced from the arena of state punishment.” Brian Kleinhaus, Serving Two Masters: Evaluating the Criminal or Civil Nature of the VWPA and MVRA through the Lens of the Ex Post Facto Clause, the Abatement Doctrine, and the Sixth Amendment, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 2711, 2718 (2005). These focal changes in criminal law “reduced the economic lot of the victim, shifted the aim of the law away from any constructive policy of restitution, and reinforced the concept of harm to society to justify the criminalization of certain ‘harmful’ acts to individuals.” Laster at 80.

Throughout most of the 1900s, restitution was basically an afterthought in criminal cases. “Federal judges, acting pursuant to the Federal Probation Act of 1925, could impose restitution on offenders only as a condition of probation.” Kleinhaus at 2719. By the 1930s, a measly “11 states had legislation permitting judges to order restitution as a condition of probation.”

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R. Barry Ruback, RESTITUTION IN PENNSYLVANIA: A MULTIMETHOD INVESTIGATION at 15 (2002). In response, a national victims’ rights movement among scholars, victims’ advocates, and other stakeholders emerged in the 1970s and 80s. The movement “criticized the criminal-justice system as being too focused on protecting the rights of the offenders at the expense of victims.”

David Peters, Unsettled: Victim Discretion in the Administration and Enforcement of Criminal Restitution Orders, 166 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1293, 1297 (2018). Along with other reforms, they championed the restoration of restitution to criminal law. See id. “The concept of personal accountability for the consequences of one’s conduct, and the allied notion that the person who caused the damage should bear the cost, are at the heart of the civil law.

It should be no less true in criminal law.” U.S. Dept. of Justice, P RESIDENT REAGAN’S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME at 79 (1982).

Congress and the state legislatures responded. In 1995, our General Assembly, “as part of a comprehensive change in criminal statutes,” adopted Pa.C.S.A. § 1106(1) mandating that courts impose restitution in criminal cases. See Ruback at 25-26. In doing so, the legislature emphasized that “No judgment or order of restitution shall debar the victim, by appropriate action, to recover from the offender as otherwise provided by law . . . .” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1106(g). Following the introduction of mandatory restitution to Pennsylvania law, “rates of restitution increased substantially.” Ruback at 42.

Of course, winning restitution as a victim and collecting it are separate things.

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“For the law to be effective, offenders ordered to pay restitution must do so in a consistent and timely fashion.” Id. To aid victims in collecting restitution, in 1998, the General Assembly “made the county probation department the agency responsible for collecting restitution [and] ordered that 50% of money collected had to go to paying restitution, with the remainder going towards costs, fines, and fees . . . .” Id. at 26. The legislature also authorized the garnishing of convicted criminals’ wages, permitted counties to use private collection agencies, and directed the Department of Corrections to deduct funds from inmates’ personal accounts to help with the collection of restitution for crime victims. See id. Most importantly to this appeal, the General Assembly directed clerks of courts to “transmit to the prothonotary certified copies of all judgments for restitution . . . which, in the aggregate, exceed $1,000, and it shall be the duty of each prothonotary to enter and docket the same of record in his office and to index the same as judgments are indexed . . . .” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9728(b)(1). “The total amount for which the person is liable pursuant to this section may be entered as a judgment upon the person or the property of the person . . . .” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9728(b)(4).

This new filing was not simply a part of the judgment of sentence. If it were, the legislature would have had no need to direct that the clerk of courts file it with the prothonotary, the recorder of civil judgments. The clerks of courts could have simply entered it in their criminal dockets. Instead, this new filing, under Section 9728(b), became “automatically entered as a civil - 30 - J-A16033-25 judgment . . . .” Alice Beck Dubow, J.; Judith Florence Olson, J.; Jack A.

Panella, P.J.E.; and Victor P. Stabile, J., PENNSYLVANIA RESTITUTION BENCHBOOK at 14 (2020) (emphasis added).

Once reduced to civil judgments, entered in the judgment indices of the prothonotaries against convicted criminals, restitution may be enforced under the Rules of Civil Procedure like any other judgment so indexed. The question then becomes whether the victim of the underlying crime would have civil standing to enforce a civil judgment for the wrong that the convicted criminal has, beyond reasonable doubt, committed against the victim. In other words, is the victim aggrieved by the criminal’s underlying crime, a crime that is also a civil tort? “For standing to exist, the underlying controversy must be real and concrete, such that the party initiating the legal action has, in fact, been aggrieved.” Office of the Governor, 98 A.3d at 1229. “A party is aggrieved for purposes of establishing standing when the party has a substantial, direct, and immediate interest in the outcome of litigation.” Id. at 1229.

As the real party in interest, against whom the criminal committed the underlying crime, clearly the victim has “a substantial, direct, and immediate interest in the outcome of litigation” to recover the victim’s portion of the restitution. Id. After all, it’s the victim’s money, and the “law prefers the right of the owner.” Blackstone, supra at 362-63. Being the very person to whom the restitution is owed, the victim is the aggrieved party when a crime is committed, even more so than the Commonwealth, whose esoteric “peace and dignity” the criminal has breached.

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I believe that victims of crimes, in whose favor the General Assembly commanded the courts to impose restitution, have standing to do exactly what Mr. Kosashvili did here. As the real party in interest under the order of restitution and the person aggrieved by Barzilayeva’s crime, he had the right to transfer the judgment from Montgomery County to Philadelphia County for enforcement against the property that she owned there.

The Majority decision, requiring Mr. Kosashvili to seek approval of the District Attorney of Montgomery County to add his name to the civil judgment, is redundant and a hollow gesture. At best, this requirement will only serve to delay Mr. Kosashvili’s recovery. At worst, it will burden the probation office and district attorney with transferring the civil judgment to Philadelphia County and enforcing it there.

Furthermore, it is a waste of both county’s finite personnel resources and tax dollars to repeat the sheriff’s sale, when all parties agree that Mr. Kosashvili is the victim of Barzilayeva’s embezzlement. Undoubtedly, he has standing to commence a civil action against her for conversion, and, just as undoubtedly, Barzilayeva’s 2012 guilty plea collaterally estops her from denying the conversion. See Shaffer v. Smith, 673 A.2d 872 (Pa. 1996); Folino v. Young, 568 A.2d 171 (Pa. 1990); In re Kravitz Estate, 211 A.2d 443 (Pa. 1965); and Hurtt v. Stirone, 206 A.2d 624 (Pa. 1965), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 925 (1965). Hence, it is a foregone conclusion that Mr. Kosashvili is entitled to a civil judgment against Barzilayeva for the $152,671.03 that she still owes him. See Barzilayeva, supra, Docket Sheets at 13.

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Then why wouldn’t Mr. Kosashvili have standing to enforce the judgment for the $152,671.03 in restitution that she owes him for that very act of conversion? The Majority’s decision elevates procedure over the rights of the victim and the legislature’s clear intent to compensate victims fully for harms they suffered at the hands of criminals. Thus, I disagree with the Majority’s application of the restitution statutes as a basis to set aside the sheriff’s sale.

This Court’s holding only frustrates Mr. Kosashvili’s efforts to be made whole.

Therefore, I believe the contention that Mr. Kosashvili lacked standing to transfer and enforce the civil judgment against Barzilayeva is meritless.

C. Notice of Sheriff’s Sale For their third through sixth issues, the Owners claim Mr. Kosashvili failed to comply with Pa.R.Civ.P. 3129.1(b)(4), because he did not notify an alleged tenant of the property. See Owners’ Brief at 20. They also claim that Mr. Kosashvili failed to notify “all those known to [him] to have an interest of record and those with an unrecorded interest . . . .” Id. Additionally, the Owners assert that Mr. Kosashvili failed to notify Mr. Zwick of the sheriff’s sale. See id. They cite various rules and cases regarding the requirement of “new notices,” but then provide no analysis of the facts of this case. See id. at 21- 22. They summarily “assert [that] strict compliance of notice did not occur and as such the sheriff’s sale on Writ #2206-430 should be set aside.” Id. at 22. The Owners also contend Mr. Kosashvili failed to place handbills upon the property at least 30 days before the sheriff’s sale and that new notices and - 33 - J-A16033-25 publications were required, because the sale “was postponed more than 130 days . . . .” Id. at 25.

Mr. Kosashvili argues that most of those arguments are underdeveloped and, therefore, waived. See Kosashvili’s Brief at 10-15. I agree.9 Our Rules of Appellate Procedure require appellants to present cogent, well-developed arguments in their briefs to this Court. The argument section of the brief “shall be divided into as many parts as there are questions to be argued; and shall have . . . such discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent.” Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). Furthermore, where “reference is made to . . . any other matter appearing in the record, the argument must set forth . . . a reference to the place in the record where the matter referred to appears.” Pa.R.A.P. 2119(c). Ignoring those Rules results in the waiver of the issues being argued. See, e.g., Giant Food Stores, LLC v. THF Silver Spring Dev., L.P., 959 A.2d 438, 444 (Pa. Super. 2008). “This Court will not consider the merits of an argument which fails to cite relevant case or statutory authority.” In re Estate of Whitley, 50 A.3d 203, 209 (Pa. Super. 2012), appeal denied, 69 A.3d 603 (Pa. 2013).

Here, the Owners did not claim, in the trial court, that Mr. Kosashvili failed to provide notice of the sheriff’s sale to Mr. Zwick. See Owners’ Motion to Set Aside Sheriff’s Sale at 6. Their motion objected to the sheriff’s sale based on the alleged failure of Mr. Kosashvili to notify an unknown, ____________________________________________

- 34 - J-A16033-25 unidentified tenant. Thus, the Owners waived the claim that Mr. Zwick did not receive proper notice of the sheriff’s sale. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).

Further, the Owners cite no facts of record to support their assertion that “strict compliance of notice did not occur.” Owners’ Brief at 22. With no citation to any factual basis in the record for that claim, I would dismiss it as waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(c).

Regarding the claim that Mr. Kosashvili failed to notify the tenant who allegedly leased the property, the Owners again cite to no fact of record that this unknown, unidentified tenant actually leased the property. Hence, for purposes of this appeal, there was no tenant. Having failed to offer any evidence of a tenant, the Owners failed to prove the factual basis for their appellate argument. In addition, they cite no law for the proposition that Mr. Kosashvili needed to notify a tenant, who would not be a record owner with any interest for the sheriff’s sale to affect. In the absence of any law to support their claim of lack of notice to the unproven tenant, I would dismiss this argument as waived, as well. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a).

As for the Owners’ allegation that Mr. Kosashvili did not place handbills on the property 30 days before the sheriff’s sale, they cite nothing in the record to support their factual assertion. See Owners’ Brief at 23. Therefore, like the unproven claim of a tenant, they have waived this issue under Pa.R.A.P. 2119(c), as well.

At a hearing to “set aside a sheriff’s sale . . . [t]he burden of proof rests upon the proponent of the petition to show by clear and convincing evidence - 35 - J-A16033-25 that the circumstances warrant relief.” M & T Mortg. Corp. v. Keesler, 826 A.2d 877, 879 (Pa. Super. 2003). The Owners never attempted to meet that burden. They called no witnesses and offered no evidence showing that Mr. Kosashvili neglected to handbill the property. Thus, they have no record support to establish their claim of error. It is waived and facially meritless.

Next, the Owners argue that new notices and publication of the sheriff’s sale were required, because the sale was postponed for more than 130 days.

Here too, the Owners’ argument assumes facts that are not in evidence.

As the learned Judge Seirra Thomas Street, writing for the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, explained in her Rule 1925(a) Opinion: [Pa.R.Civ.P.] 3129.3(a) provides . . . for postponements irrespective of timing, which requires new notice that complies with rule 3129.2 when a sale is stayed, continued, postponed or adjourned. [The Owners] filed a new praecipe to issue a writ of execution on July 28, 2023. Following the reissuance of the writ, [Mr. Kosashvili] sent a new notice of the upcoming October 3rd scheduled sale date to [the Owners, their then-attorneys], and other interested parties – all parties named in the Rule 3129.1 affidavit. The notice itself was dated July 28, 2023, which was more than 30 days before the scheduled sale date of October 3rd. According to the docket, [Mr. Kosashvili] filed a certificate of service on September 12, 2023, affirming that he sent notice that the property would be for sale on October 3 rd, specifically pursuant to Rule 3129.2. Therefore, [he] complied with the relevant section of rule 3129.3, and there is no defect in notice.

Trial Court Opinion,10/28/24, at 9-10. The record confirms the trial court’s finding that Mr. Kosashvili notified all known, interested parties of the sheriff’s

- 36 - J-A16033-25 sale, and the Owners in particular. Thus, I adopt its opinion and find no defect in the notice.

The Owners have mostly waived the four issues concerning notice of the sheriff’s sale. Their claim that Mr. Kosashvili did not provide them with notice of the sale has no support in the record. Thus, I would dismiss that issue as meritless.

D. The Adequacy of the Sale Price Seventh, the Owners maintain that the sales price for the property was grossly inadequate. See Owners’ Brief at 26-27. However, they offer no legal argument to support that claim.

Instead, they observe that the purchaser of the property, Zeon Real Estate LLC, “was acting on behalf of” Mr. Kosashvili. Id. at 27. Based on that fact, the Owners infer that Mr. Kosashvili “cannot aver the purchase price in this case was the highest and best as proper publication did not occur in this matter prior to the scheduled sale.” Id. at 27. “More importantly, the docket maintained by the office of judicial records . . . noted the October 3rd, 2023 sheriff’s sale had been postponed. Thus, it cannot be presumed that the price received was the highest and best obtainable.” Id. This is not a legal argument, so much as it is factual speculation by the Owners. The law “presume[s] that the price received at a duly advertised public sale is the highest and best obtainable.” Bank of America, N.A. v. Estate of Hood, 47 A.3d 1208, 1211 (Pa. Super. 2012).

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The Owners reason that, because the Sheriff’s Office marked on the docket that a prior sale had been postponed, the public must have looked up the docket in this case, saw the entry, and decided not to attend the online auction. There is nothing of record to support the Owners’ speculation. No member of the public testified that they (a) looked at the court docket and (b) decided not to participate in the online sale as a result. Thus, the Owners’ appellate argument lacks any factual basis in the record. By failing to develop the record below, the Owners have not carried their burden of showing that the sheriff’s sale should be set aside based on “clear and convincing evidence that the circumstances warrant relief.” M & T Mortg., 826 A.2d at 879.

I would dismiss this issue as warranting no appellate relief.

E. The September 27th Docket Entry and Due Process The Owners’ eighth issue suggests that the September 27, 2023 entry by the Sheriff’s Office of “Sale postponed” deprived them of due process. They claim that that docket entry referred to the upcoming October 3, 2023 sale, rather than a prior sale, as Attorney Wakefield testified. See Owners’ Brief at 28-30. The Owners essentially believe that the docket entry canceled the October 3, 2023 sheriff’s sale.

Their belief is mistaken. Moreover, they cite to no law indicating that the Sheriff’s Office has the legal authority to postpone a sale by unilaterally making a docket entry.

Mr. Kosashvili correctly responded to the Owners’ argument on this issue as follows: - 38 - J-A16033-25

At the first of the two hearings before the trial court on this matter, [the Owners’] counsel stated, “When Mr. Zwick had contacted me regarding this, I looked up the docket, which that’s the official docket that shows that it was postponed. I said, ‘No, we don’t need to file an emergency motion, it’s postponed. It would be moot if I filed an action.’” N.T. 2/29/24 7: 7-12. The [Owners’] counsel went on to say, “So, here Mr. Zwick doesn’t do anything, because he looks at the official docket. I look at the docket, and I say, ‘It’s postponed. We’ll take it from there.’” N.T. 2/29/24 8:25 – 9:3.

At the second hearing, [the Owners] reiterated that the September 27, 2023 docket entry was misleading and that they thought it meant that the upcoming October 3, 2023 sale was postponed. Trial Ct. Op. at 8-9; citing to N.T.

04/11/24 3:19-5:17. This allegedly led [the Owners] to think that filing a Motion to Postpone the sale would be redundant. Id. at 9. As both critically and correctly noted by the trial court, similar entries were made previously on the docket after the scheduled sheriff’s sale of the property – “in fact the September 27 entry was the eighth identical entry” and “these entries only appeared after a sale that was scheduled for earlier in that month.” Id. (emphasis added).

Insofar as [the Owners] attempt to argue that the administrative docketing entry by the Sheriff’s Office led [the Owners’] counsel to believe that the October 3, 2023 sheriff’s sale was postponed, [the Owners] offered no evidence or testimony to support their argument that they were deprived of their due process rights at the aforementioned hearings. Insofar as [the Owners’] current counsel argued that he had checked the docket, [the Owners’] current counsel did not enter his appearance in the matter until October 23, 2023 (Docket at 16). Prior to then, they were each represented by different attorneys. [The Owners] did not present any testimony or evidence to support any reliance or confusion as to the pending sale.

Accordingly, the trial court correctly concluded that [the Owners] failed to demonstrate any deprivation of due process when: (i) [the Owners] had notice of the October 3rd sale two months in advance (Trial Ct. Op. at 9); (ii) [the Owners] were represented by counsel at the time who had filed multiple motions to postpone the sale in the past; and - 39 - J-A16033-25

(iii) [the Owners] could have taken action to postpone the sale at any time during those two months, but chose not to do so. Id. In GMAC Mortg. Corp. v. Buchanan, 929 A.2d 1164 (Pa. Super. 2007), this Court affirmed a trial court’s denial of a motion to set aside sheriff sale where, after appellant’s counsel filed multiple motions over a period of months with the intended effect of staying the sheriff’s sale, the defendant argued that they believed that the subject property . . . would be removed from the sheriff’s-sale list based on a mistaken belief that they were entitled to another stay . . . There, this Court affirmed the trial court’s holding that no deprivation of due process occurred, because the appellant was fully apprised of the debt; was afforded both actual and legal notice of the sheriff’s sale months before the scheduled date; had ample time to cure the default or request emergency relief prior to the sheriff’s sale and did not do so; and never appeared at the sale to verify that the property was removed from the list. Id. This Court further concluded, “Under these circumstances, we cannot agree that appellant was deprived of his due process rights. We see no basis on which we could conclude that the trial court committed an abuse of discretion in refusing to grant the petition to set aside the sheriff’s sale.” Id. The trial court’s decision to deny the motion to set aside sheriff’s sale, in part, relies on nearly the same logic and rationale as applied in GMAC Mortg. Corp. Like the circumstances in GMAC Mortg. Corp., (i) [the Owners] had months of actual notice prior to the scheduled sheriff’s sale, (ii) [their] counsel filed multiple motions intended to postpone the sale, and (iii) [the Owners] had months to take action to further postpone the sale but did not do so. Trial Ct. Op. at 9. Additionally, as was the case in GMAC Mortg.

Corp., [the Owners] did not provide any case law, statutory provision, or statewide procedural rule to support their due process argument. As such, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant [their] petition on due process grounds.

Kosashvili’s Brief at 24-27 (some punctuation omitted).

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I adopt the above, well-reasoned argument as my analysis for this issue, and I would dismiss the Owners’ eighth appellate issue as meritless.

F. Attorney Wakefield’s Testimony Lastly, the Owners claim that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing Attorney Wakefield to testify regarding his knowledge of the “Sale postponed” docket entries. See Owners’ Brief at 31-34.

The trial court did not rely upon Attorney Wakefield’s testimony when it denied the Owners’ Motion to Set Aside the Sheriff’s Sale. The court explained that Attorney Wakefield “spoke to the specific type of docket entry in question, of which he did have knowledge, because it is common and required in certain situations after a sheriff’s sale does not result in a sale of property.” Trial Court Opinion, 10/28/24, at 10 (citing Pa.R.Civ.P. 3139, “The sheriff shall make a return . . . upon the completion or abandonment of the execution proceedings . . . ”). The trial court “appreciated” Attorney Wakefield’s testimony, but his “explanation was not the primary basis for the court’s decision.” Trial Court Opinion, 10/28/24, at 10.

Thus, whether the trial court abused its discretion by entertaining the testimony of Attorney Wakefield is either moot or, at best, harmless error. I would dismiss it as such.

IV. Conclusion The Majority has erred by misconstruing the Owners’ argument that Mr. Kosashvili lacks standing for an argument that the trial court lacks subject- matter jurisdiction over transferred-judgment-enforcement proceedings. The - 41 - J-A16033-25

Owners failed to preserve any standing argument, because they did not raise it by filing preliminary objections to the praecipe for the writ of execution.

Moreover, the assertion that Mr. Kosashvili may not enforce the civil judgment that he transferred from Montgomery County to Philadelphia, simply because the General Assembly ordered the Probation Office of Montgomery County to collect and pay Mr. Kosashvili the restitution that Barzilayeva owes him is meritless. Once the restitution order from Montgomery County was reduced to a civil judgment, Mr. Kosashvili, as the real party in interest to the theft and conversion of his $154,876.03, had standing to bring this civil proceeding to enforce the civil judgment against Barzilayeva. If I am mistaken in that interpretation, then I hope that the General Assembly will amend our restitution statutes to permit victim-enforcement proceedings, like the one Mr. Kosashvili initiated in the Philadelphia court.10 ____________________________________________

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In my view, the Owners have no basis for appellate relief. Therefore, I would affirm the order refusing to set aside the sheriff’s sale. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

____________________________________________ nor expressly grant crime victims the right to enforce civil judgments entered following an order of restitution. See id. - 43 -

J-A16033-25 2026 PA Super 88 MONTGOMERY COUNTY AND OTAR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF KOSASHVILI : PENNSYLVANIA : : v. : : : JULIETT BARZILAYEVA : : No. 1592 EDA 2024 : APPEAL OF: JULIETT BARZILAYEVA : AND EUGENE ZWICK : Appeal from the Order Entered May 3, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at No(s): 190800558

BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., KUNSELMAN, J., and KING, J.

OPINION BY KING, J.: FILED APRIL 30, 2026 Appellants, Juliett Barzilayeva and Eugene Zwick, appeal from the order entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, which denied their petition to set aside a sheriff’s sale. Due to the unique circumstances of this appeal, we reverse the order denying Appellants’ petition.

The trial court opinion set forth the relevant facts and procedural history of this case as follows: The action arises from a judgment that was transferred from Montgomery County to Philadelphia County in August 2019.

In Montgomery County, Appellant Barzilayeva was convicted of felony theft in 2012,[1] and part of the sentence required payment of restitution to the victim, Otar Kosashvili (“Appellee”). Appellant Barzilayeva was ordered to pay Appellee [$154,876.03]. According to Appellee, ____________________________________________

1 Montgomery County docketed Appellant Barzilayeva’s criminal case at CP- 46-CR-0009160-2011.

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Appellant concealed that she had an ownership interest in the property at issue, 1804 Bainbridge Street [in Philadelphia], during the sentencing in 2012. Upon learning about the property, Appellee reduced the restitution order to a civil judgment, transferred the judgment to Philadelphia County, and sought to execute and collect on the judgment through Sheriff’s Sale of the property. From the first entry of the judgment in Philadelphia courts, Montgomery County and Appellee have been listed as co-plaintiffs.

Appellee filed three Praecipes to Issue Writ of Execution between July 2020 and August 2021. In September 2021, Appellee filed a Motion to Proceed with Sale, which was denied as moot due to the COVID-19 Moratorium on Sheriff’s Sales that was set to end in December 2021. After the moratorium was lifted, Appellee filed a new Praecipe for Writ of Execution in February 2022.

After a Motion to Postpone Sheriff’s Sale was granted, the property was set for sale on July 12, 2022. On July 7, 2022, Appellant Zwick filed an Emergency Petition to Intervene claiming that he has a seventy-five percent (75%) ownership interest in the property, along with a Motion to Postpone. The following day, the Petition to Intervene was granted and the sale was postponed to August 2022.

Appellant Zwick filed another Motion to Postpone Sheriff’s Sale regarding the August sale date and a Motion to Strike the Writ of Execution. The Motion to Postpone was granted on August 1, 2022, and set the next sale date to October 4, 2022. On September 7, 2022, the Motion to Strike the Writ of Execution was dismissed as procedurally improper and moot. The September 7 Order dismissing the Motion mentioned that the Writ of Execution expired before the Motion was submitted and was never executed.

On July 28, 2023, Appellee filed a Praecipe to Reissue the Writ of Execution on the property. Appellants contend that the resulting writ contained an error by not including that only 25% of the property would be sold due to Appellant Zwick’s claimed 75% ownership. Appellants have since clarified that they (Ms. Barzilayeva and Mr. Zwick) are joint tenants with a right of survivorship. The Parties disagree as to whether notice of the new Writ of Execution was properly -2- J-A16033-25 effectuated at the time of issuance. The property was put up for bidding and sold on the scheduled October 3, 202[3], sale date for $290,000.

* * * On October 23, 2023, Appellants filed a Motion to Set Aside Sheriff’s Sale and Stay All Proceedings. Appellants alleged that Appellee failed to comply with multiple rules about the notice required before the sale could proceed and that the proceeds from the sale were “grossly inadequate.” Hearings were held on February 29 and April 11, 2024. On May 3, 2024, [the trial c]ourt denied the Motion. (Trial Court Opinion, filed 10/28/24, at 1-3) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).

Appellants timely filed a notice of appeal on Monday, June 3, 2024. On June 5, 2024, the court ordered Appellants to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. Appellants timely filed their Rule 1925(b) statement on June 26, 2024.

Appellants now present nine (9) issues for this Court’s review: [The trial court erred i]n not setting aside the sheriff’s sale because … Appellee needed to pursue modification of the ordered statutory relief with the [Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas] prior to seeking other remedies.

The trial court abused its discretion and erred as a matter of law … [i]n that the sheriff’s sale on writ #2206-430 was postponed for more than 130 days, new notice and publication were required under the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, and: (1) no notice of the date of continued sheriff’s sale was filed with the prothonotary at least fifteen days before the continued sale date pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 3129.3(b)(2)(i)(A) and (2) there is no evidence a certificate of filing with the sheriff confirming the filing of the notice of the date of continued sheriff’s sale with the prothonotary occurred pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 3129.3(b)(2)(i)(B) and -3- J-A16033-25 thereby the due process of those with a record interest and those with an unrecorded interest were violated along with the rights of the general public.

Was the actual sale price of the subject property … grossly inadequate and as such should have been set aside?

Did writ #2206-430 fail to comply with Pa.R.C.P. 3129.2?

Did [Appellee] fail to comply with Pa.R.C.P. 3129.1(b)(4)?

Were the due process rights of Appellants violated when the sheriff’s sale moved forward when the docket maintained by the Office of Judicial Records gave notice to Appellants and general public the October 3, 2023 sheriff’s sale had been postponed?

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in allowing testimonial evidence into the record from a witness that is an attorney for the City of Philadelphia (not a party or representing any party hereto) concerning docket entries related to sheriff’s sales when this witness admittedly lacked knowledge of the docket entries in this case?

The [trial] court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this case because naming Montgomery County, Pennsylvania a party hereto was fictitious where counsel for Appellee … had no authority nor was engaged by Montgomery County, Pennsylvania to proceed on their behalf and therefore based on this deception all writs, orders and/or actions hereto are void?

In that service of the praecipe for writ of execution and writ of execution with accompanying affidavit was not perfected (see Pa.R.C.P. 3129.1) and thus a strict condition precedent prior to deprivation of one’s property rights did not occur whereby set aside was required. (Appellants’ Brief at 4-7) (reordered for purposes of disposition).

We first address Appellants’ claim regarding the underlying restitution order from Montgomery County. Appellants acknowledge that Montgomery

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County issued the restitution order in a criminal case against Appellant Barzilayeva, which named Appellee as the victim of a theft. Appellants insist, however, that Appellee “had no authority to add his name … to the certified judgment without seeking leave of court to amend the restitution order, which he could have done.” (Appellants’ Brief at 36-37). Appellants cite 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9728, governing the collection of restitution, for the proposition that Montgomery County was the only entity that could place a lien on the real property. Because Appellee did not file a motion to modify the restitution order in Montgomery County, Appellants argue that Appellee violated the statutes governing restitution. On this basis, Appellants conclude that we must reverse the order denying the motion to set aside the sheriff’s sale. 2 ____________________________________________

2 In response, Appellee claims that Appellants are attempting to challenge standing by arguing that Appellee’s name should not have appeared on the judgment. Appellee maintains that this argument is waived because Appellants “failed to raise the same at the earliest opportunity[.]” (Appellee’s Brief at 33). We disagree. “A party seeking judicial resolution of a controversy in this Commonwealth must, as a prerequisite, establish that he has standing to maintain the action.” Foxfield at Naaman’s Creek Homeowner’s Association v. Eventoff, 329 A.3d 1271, 1275 (Pa.Super. 2024), appeal denied, ___ Pa. ___, 343 A.3d 183 (2025). “A party has standing if he is aggrieved, i.e., he can show a substantial, direct, and immediate interest in the outcome of the litigation.” Id. “Unlike standing, which relates to a party’s right to make a legal claim or seek judicial enforcement, subject matter jurisdiction concerns the court’s authority to consider cases of a given nature and grant the type of relief requested.” In re Adoption of Z.S.H.G., 34 A.3d 1283, 1289 (Pa.Super. 2011). Here, rather than raising a challenge to standing, Appellants have repeatedly questioned the propriety of the transfer of the judgment for restitution to Philadelphia for the purpose of liquidating Appellant Barzilayeva’s real property there. For example, at the first hearing on the motion to set aside sheriff’s sale, Appellants’ counsel noted: (Footnote Continued Next Page)

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Considering recent case law explaining a sentencing court’s continuing jurisdiction over restitution orders, we agree.

To dispose of Appellants’ claim, we must interpret the statutory scheme governing restitution.

The objective of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the legislative intent behind the statute. When the plain language of a statute is clear and free from all ambiguity, it is the best indication of legislative intent.

When, however, the words of a statute are ambiguous, a number of factors are used in determining legislative intent, including the purpose of the statute and the consequences of a particular interpretation. Furthermore, it is axiomatic that in determining legislative intent, all sections of a statute must be read together and in conjunction with each other, and construed with reference to the entire statute. Lastly, we presume that the legislature did not intend an unreasonable or absurd result.

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The [Clerk of Court] is allowed to collect the [restitution] money based upon the order of the judge. If the judge says: You have to pay X amount of dollars each month, I don’t know where they have the authority to go in and file a sheriff’s sale, and I don’t know that Montgomery County contacted [Appellee’s counsel] to go and seize a property that was also owned by another person. (N.T. Hearing, 2/29/24, at 6). Appellants’ arguments on appeal continue to question whether the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas possessed authority to make the judgment for restitution “attach to property” owned by Appellant Barzilayeva. (Appellants’ Brief at 37). Thus, we decline to Appellee’s invitation to deem this claim waived. See Keller v. Bank of New York Mellon, 212 A.3d 52, 57 (Pa.Super. 2019), appeal denied, 656 Pa. 86, 219 A.3d 1104 (2019) (stating: “After the delivery of the sheriff’s deed to the purchaser, the only possible attacks are those based on fraud or lack of authority to make the sale”).

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A.M.D. on Behalf of A.D. v. T.A.B., 178 A.3d 889, 892-93 (Pa.Super. 2018) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

The Supreme Court has held restitution provisions to be penal in nature. Accordingly, we must construe restitution provisions strictly, interpreting any ambiguity in favor of the defendant. Additionally, when statutes or parts of statutes relate to the same persons or things or to the same class of persons or things, we must construe them together, if possible, as one statute.

Commonwealth v. Wright, 2025 PA Super 226, 2025 WL 2813496, at *3 (Pa.Super. October 3, 2025) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Section 1106 of the Crimes Code generally governs the imposition of restitution for injuries to person or property.

Section 1106(a) provides that a court shall include restitution as part of the sentence for cases where “property has been stolen, converted or otherwise unlawfully obtained … as a direct result of the crime.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 1106(a).

Alternatively, the court may impose restitution as a condition of probation under the Sentencing Code. See Clark v. Peugh, 257 A.3d 1260, 1268 (Pa.Super. 2021) (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 9763(b)(10)). Moreover, … when a court orders restitution as part of the sentence, the court may require compliance with the restitution as “a condition of such probation[.]” 18 Pa.C.S. § 1106(b).

[I]n Section 1106(c)(3), the General Assembly established “an independent cause of action for a defendant to seek a modification of an existing restitution order” from the trial court even after the expiration of the time for modifying or appealing the original sentence. Commonwealth v. Gentry, 101 A.3d 813, 816 (Pa.Super. 2014). Specifically, Section 1106(c)(3) provides as follows: The court may, at any time [or upon the recommendation of the district attorney that is based on information received from the victim and the probation section of the county or other -7- J-A16033-25 agent designated by the county commissioners of the county with the approval of the president judge to collect restitution,] alter or amend any order of restitution …, provided, however, that the court states its reasons and conclusions as a matter of record for any change or amendment to any previous order.

18 Pa.C.S. § 1106(c)(3) (emphasis added).

Id. at *3-*4.

As previously mentioned, Appellee’s conduct implicated the procedures for the collection of restitution, “including 42 Pa.C.S. § 9728, which provides for restitution to be treated as a ‘judgment.’” Id. at *4. Initially, Section 9728 indicates that restitution is part of the criminal action and shall not be deemed a debt: § 9728. Collection of restitution, reparation, fees, costs, fines and penalties (a) General rule.— (1) Except as provided in subsection (b)(5), all restitution, reparation, fees, costs, fines and penalties shall be collected by the county probation department or other agent designated by the county commissioners of the county with the approval of the president judge of the county for that purpose in any manner provided by law.

However, such restitution, reparation, fees, costs, fines and penalties are part of a criminal action or proceeding and shall not be deemed debts. A sentence, pretrial disposition order or order entered under section 6352 (relating to disposition of delinquent child) for restitution, reparation, fees, costs, fines or penalties shall, together with interest and any additional costs that may accrue, be a judgment in favor of the probation department upon the person or the property of the person sentenced or subject to the order.

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42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9728(a)(1) (emphasis added).

Section 9728(b) explains the procedure for docketing these judgments for restitution: (b) Procedure.— (1) The county clerk of courts shall, upon sentencing, pretrial disposition or other order, transmit to the prothonotary certified copies of all judgments for restitution, reparation, fees, costs, fines and penalties which, in the aggregate, exceed $1,000, and it shall be the duty of each prothonotary to enter and docket the same of record in his office and to index the same as judgments are indexed, without requiring the payment of costs as a condition precedent to the entry thereof.

(2) The clerk of courts, in consultation with other appropriate governmental agencies, may transmit to the prothonotary of the respective county certified copies of all judgments for restitution, reparation, fees, costs, fines and penalties which, in the aggregate, do not exceed $1,000, and, if so transmitted, it shall be the duty of each prothonotary to enter and docket the same of record in his office and to index the same as judgments are indexed, without requiring the payment of costs as a condition precedent to the entry thereof.

(3) The county clerk of courts shall, upon sentencing, pretrial disposition or other order, transmit to the Department of Probation of the respective county or other agent designated by the county commissioners of the county with the approval of the president judge of the county and to the county correctional facility to which the offender has been sentenced or to the Department of Corrections, whichever is appropriate, copies of all orders for restitution and amendments or alterations thereto, reparation, fees, costs, fines and penalties. This paragraph also applies in the case of costs imposed under section 9721(c.1) (relating to sentencing generally).

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42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9728(b)(1)-(3). “The total amount for which the person is liable pursuant to this section may be entered as a judgment upon the person or the property of the person sentenced or ordered[.]” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9728(b)(4).

Notably, in providing that restitution shall be a judgment, the General Assembly did not revoke its prior express statement that restitution was part of a criminal action or state that the judgment undermined the sentencing court’s continued jurisdiction over the restitution portion of the sentence. Wright, supra at *4.

We also observe that Appellee wanted to use Appellant Barzilayeva’s real property to satisfy the restitution obligation. “Where the defendant owns assets in an amount sufficient to make restitution, he or she may be called upon to sell or borrow on the security of those assets and use the proceeds to make restitution.” Commonwealth v. Madron, 488 A.2d 331, 332 (Pa.Super. 1985). “The rights of a victim to be made whole will not be made subservient to the criminal’s desire to retain an unencumbered title to capital assets.” Id. Nevertheless, the statutory scheme governing restitution does not expressly permit the type of self-help Appellee undertook in this case.

Rather, Section 9728(e), which contemplates the need to preserve a defendant’s assets for payment of restitution, authorizes the Commonwealth to act on a victim’s behalf: Upon application of the Commonwealth, the court may enter a restraining order or injunction, require the execution of a satisfactory performance bond or take any other action - 10 - J-A16033-25 to preserve the availability of property which may be necessary to satisfy an anticipated restitution order under this section: (1) upon the filing of a criminal complaint, information or indictment charging a criminal violation or a petition alleging delinquency for which restitution may be ordered and alleging that the property with respect to which the order is sought appears to be necessary to satisfy such restitution order and judgment; and (2) if, after notice to persons appearing to have an interest in the property and an opportunity for a hearing, the court determines that: (i) there is a substantial probability that: (A) the Commonwealth will prevail on the underlying criminal charges or allegation of delinquency; (B) restitution will be ordered exceeding $10,000 in value; (C) the property appears to be necessary to satisfy such restitution order; and (D) failure to enter the order will result in the property being destroyed, removed from the jurisdiction of the court or otherwise made unavailable for payment of the anticipated restitution order; and (ii) the need to preserve the availability of the property through the entry of the requested order outweighs the hardship on any party against whom the order is to be entered.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9728(e) (emphasis added).

Appellee’s actions highlight the tension between the criminal and civil elements involved in the imposition and payment of restitution. Regardless of the entry of a judgment, however, other statutes evince the continuing

- 11 - J-A16033-25 criminal nature of restitution proceedings.

For example, Section 9730(b), addressing the payment of court costs, restitution, and fines, directs that when a defendant defaults on payment of these amounts, the issuing authority, ... may conduct a hearing to determine whether the defendant is financially able to pay and to determine the appropriate next steps. Similarly, a judge of the court of common pleas having jurisdiction over the defendant has the authority to order private collection agencies to cease collection efforts. Moreover, the statutes task each county’s probation department, rather than a civil entity, with tracking the restitution payments.

Thus, while the statutes do not expressly address whether a criminal or civil court has jurisdiction over “a judgment” of restitution, we glean from the detailed statutory procedure that the General Assembly intended for the sentencing court to maintain jurisdiction over the restitution to perform the statutorily mandated oversight of the collection process. Indeed, this court previously explained the benefit of providing the original sentencing court with modification authority as a proceeding in the sentencing court allows the defendant to appear before the court that originally imposed the restitution and is familiar with the facts of the case and the relevant statutory framework. Wright, supra at *5 (emphasis added) (internal citations, footnote, and quotation marks omitted).

Additional case law emphasizes the criminal nature of restitution. “The primary purpose of restitution is not to compensate the victim but to rehabilitate the offender.” Commonwealth v. Corbin, 317 A.3d 648, 653 (Pa.Super. 2024).

[T]he primary purpose of restitution is to rehabilitate the offender by impressing on [her] the fact that [her] actions damaged the victim. In the end, restitution is not simply an award of damages, but, rather, a sentence. The amount of - 12 - J-A16033-25 restitution set by the court is related to the amount of damage sustained by the victim, but restitution is not itself a civil damage award. It is true that restitution helps the victim, but this fact is secondary to the reality that restitution is an aspect of sentencing imposed by the court on an offender in order to facilitate the administration of criminal justice. Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Brown, 956 A.2d 992, 996 (Pa.Super. 2008)) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Various characteristics of restitution further illustrate that its true nature is that of a criminal sanction. For example, while a crime victim certainly may ask the district attorney to seek restitution, it is the district attorney who has the authority to present that request to the court.[3] Moreover, an order of restitution does not create a creditor-debtor relationship between the victim and the offender. … [R]estitution can only be enforced by the criminal court, just as penalties of incarceration or probation are within the court’s exclusive purview.

Commonwealth v. Pleger, 934 A.2d 715, 720 (Pa.Super. 2007) (internal citations omitted).

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3 We acknowledge the panoply of rights that our legislature has bestowed upon victims of crime through the Crime Victims Act, 18 P.S. §§ 11.101- 11.5102. Relevant to restitution, however, the Act merely provides that victims have the right [t]o be restored, to the extent possible, to the precrime economic status through the provision of restitution, compensation and the expeditious return of property which is seized as evidence in the case when in the judgment of the prosecutor the evidence is no longer needed for prosecution of the case.

18 P.S. §§ 11.201(6). As we will discuss infra, we do not read this provision so broadly as to allow victims to engage in the type of self-help at issue in this case.

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Instantly, Appellant Barzilayeva entered a guilty plea to theft by unlawful taking in Montgomery County. A Montgomery County jurist imposed a judgment of sentence in 2012. As a condition of her sentence, the court ordered Appellant Barzilayeva to pay restitution. The restitution order specifically identified Appellee as the victim, and it provided a restitution amount of $154,876.03.

Years later, Appellee learned about Appellant Barzilayeva’s ownership interest in the Philadelphia property. Believing this property could satisfy Appellant Barzilayeva’s restitution obligation, Appellee took steps to attach the property to the restitution judgment. Initially, a praecipe to enter judgment was filed in Montgomery County on April 30, 2019. 4 The praecipe requested that the Prothonotary “[e]nter judgment in favor of Plaintiff, Clerk of Court, against Defendant Juliett Barzilayeva” in the amount of $153,926.03. (Praecipe, filed 4/30/19). The praecipe also included a notation, signed by the Prothonotary, indicating the entry of judgment against Appellant Barzilayeva on May 6, 2019. On August 7, 2019, Appellee filed the certified judgment, as well as a praecipe to enter judgment, in Philadelphia County.5

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4 Although the praecipe listed the docket number associated with Appellant Barzilayeva’s criminal case, the praecipe modified the caption to “Clerk of Court v. Juliett Barzilayeva.” (Praecipe, dated 4/30/19).

5 The certified judgment listed Montgomery County as the plaintiff with no reference to Appellee. Nevertheless, the civil cover sheet filed with the certified judgment listed both Montgomery County and Appellee as plaintiffs.

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Thereafter, Appellee engaged in his repeated attempts to collect on the judgment through the forced sale of Appellant Barzilayeva’s real property.

Here, Appellee acted sua sponte where the 2012 restitution order remained unsatisfied. Rather than taking matters into his own hands, however, Appellee needed to recognize that the sentencing court for Appellant Barzilayeva’s criminal case retained the express authority to alter or amend the restitution order. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1106(c)(3). We believe that Appellee’s actions—formalizing entry of the civil judgment, transferring the civil judgment to another county, adding his name to the judgment, and targeting Appellant Barzilayeva’s real property—amounted to a request to alter or amend the restitution order. We now hold that Appellee could not request such an amendment. Instead, Appellee should have asked the district attorney to take any necessary actions on his behalf. 6 See 18 Pa.C.S. § 1106(c)(3); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9728(e).

Regarding Appellee’s August 7, 2019 filing of the praecipe to enter judgment in Philadelphia County, Section 9728(b)(1) makes clear that the clerk of courts is the only entity permitted to transmit certified copies of all

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6 Although we characterize Appellee’s actions as an attempt at an amendment of the restitution order, we acknowledge that Section 1106(g) preserves a victim’s right to pursue private remedies. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1106(g) (stating: “No judgment or order of restitution shall debar the victim, by appropriate action, to recover from the offender as otherwise provided by law, provided that any civil award shall be reduced by the amount paid under the criminal judgment”).

- 15 - J-A16033-25 judgments for restitution exceeding $1,000 to the prothonotary. Because the clerk of courts already filed a praecipe to enter judgment in Montgomery County, we believe that Appellee lacked authority to repeat this process in Philadelphia. Therefore, the judgment entered in Philadelphia was void ab initio, and we must strike it. See Oswald v. WB Public Square Associates, LLC, 80 A.3d 790, 797 (Pa.Super. 2013) (stating: “judgments which are void ab initio are those which the prothonotary was without authority to enter in the first place,” and judgment that is void ab initio must be stricken without regard to passage of time).

We reiterate that the General Assembly intended for the sentencing court to maintain jurisdiction over the restitution order to perform the statutorily mandated oversight of the collection process. See Wright, supra. As such, we refuse to endorse the procedure Appellee employed here, which attempted to end-run the statutes governing the imposition and collection of restitution. Because the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas maintained jurisdiction over the restitution matter, we must grant relief by reversing the Philadelphia County order denying Appellants’ petition to set aside the sheriff’s sale.7 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1106(c)(3); Wright, supra. We also strike the judgment entered in Philadelphia County as void ab initio. See Oswald, supra.

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7 Based on our disposition, we decline to address Appellants’ remaining issues.

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Order reversed. Judgment stricken. Jurisdiction is relinquished.

President Judge Lazarus joins this Opinion.

Judge Kunselman files a Dissenting Opinion.

Date: 4/30/2026

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