Pizzo v. Zoning Hearing Board
Opinion of the Court
This opinion is written pursuant to an appeal by Anthony and Patti Pizzo from the December 17,1992 decision of the Richland Township Zoning Hearing Board denying their application for a variance from sections 404 and 405 of the Quakertown Area Zoning Ordinance.
The record from the zoning board hearing of December 10, 1992, reveals the following facts. The property in question is tax parcel 36-38-19 located at 1147 Rich Hill Road, Quakertown, Pennsylvania. The property consists of approximately 41 acres and is currently the site of one single-family residence and a 60' x 40' concrete block building. The property is accessed by a driveway approximately 700 feet in length. The area is zoned rural agricultural under the local ordinance.
Prior to purchase by the Pizzos, the property was owned by William C. Hamilton who acquired it in 1976. In August of 1976, Mr. Hamilton applied for and obtained a building permit allowing him to construct the 60' x 40' concrete block building on the premises. The building has two bays accessed by overhead doors which are 12 feet wide and 14 feet high. One side of the building has a grease pit that runs the full depth of the building. The other side of the building has an equipment lift. The ceiling is 16 feet high. The building also contains an overhead crane that is used to remove engines. (N.T. 12-10-92, pp. 11-12, 23-24.) Evidence indicates that Mr. Hamilton used the building for the repair and storage of tractor-trailers. The use designated on the building permit issued to Mr. Hamilton from Richland Township was for the maintenance and storage of farm implements and acces
The Pizzos are the owners and operators of two businesses, Pizzo Tree Experts and Pizzo Land Clearing. When the Pizzos purchased the property in 1989, they intended to use the concrete block building for the maintenance and repair of the land-clearing equipment utilized in the businesses. There was also a need for some occasional storage of equipment. On January 12, 1990, the Pizzos were cited by Richland Township for operating a contracting business and truck terminal on the premises. On September 24, 1992, the Pizzos applied for a hearing in front of the zoning board on their application for a variance to allow for the occasional repair and storage of land-clearing equipment. The application was amended prior to the hearing to include the following issues: (1) a request for an interpretation that the use of the property for the maintenance and storage of equipment is a continuing nonconforming use; (2) an interpretation that the Pizzos had obtained a vested right in the use of the property for maintenance and storage of equipment; (3) an application for a variance to use the property for maintenance and storage of equipment based upon unique hardship; (4) an application for a variance by estoppel to use the property for maintenance and storage of equipment; and (5) a request for relief from the zoning ordinance’s requirement that lane lots may only be used for single-family dwellings.
Ahearing was held on December 10,1992. The Pizzos presented the affidavit of the previous owner, Mr. Hamilton, which indicated that he used the building to service and maintain his personal cars, tractor, backhoe and
Intervenor, John Light, also testified at the hearing. Mr. Light is an adjacent property owner to the Pizzos’ property and opposed any grant of a variance. There were also several members of the neighborhood present at the hearing, some of whom testified as to disturbances created by the Pizzos’ use of the property.
The matter was taken under advisement and on December 17, 1992, the board voted to deny the Pizzos’ request for a variance. A written opinion was issued by the board on January 12, 1993. The board’s crucial findings were that: (a) the Pizzos did not present any evidence which would indicate that the parcel in question could not be used for any permitted use within a rural agricultural zoning district; (b) that the township never acquiesced in the illegal use of the property; (c) that the board was unconvinced that any hardship existed; and (d) that the requested relief would be injurious to the public welfare. The instant appeal followed.
Initially, we note that in cases where no additional evidence is produced on appeal, our scope of review is limited to a determination of whether the board abused its discretion, committed an error of law or made findings of fact not supported by substantial evidence in the record. Vanguard Cellular System Inc. v. Zoning
In the instant matter, appellants, the Pizzos, have addressed several different errors allegedly committed by the zoning board. We find merit in appellants’ argument that the board committed an error of law by failing to determine that the Pizzos were entitled to a variance by estoppel.
In reviewing whether a party is entitled to a variance by estoppel, the relevant factors to consider include:
“(1) the municipality’s failure to enforce the ordinance for a long period of time;
“(2) that the municipality knew, or should have known, of the illegal use and ‘actively acquiesced’ in the illegal use;
“(3) reliance by the owner on the appearance of regularity that the municipality’s inaction has created;
“(4) hardship created by [the] cessation of the illegal use; and
“(5) that the variance will not be a threat to the health, safety or morals of the community.” Colelli v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of the City of Pittsburgh, 131 Pa. Commw. 615, 618, 571 A.2d 533, 535 (1990).
In concluding that the Pizzos failed to satisfy these requirements, the board specifically found that the Pizzos did not present any evidence of the township’s acquiescence in the illegal use of the property other
Appellants presented the sworn affidavit of William C. Hamilton in support of their application for a variance. (Exhibit A-35.)
“It is my belief and opinion that Mr. Rothrock (the zoning officer) understood perfectly that my intended use of the property, and for which he approved the zoning application, was to service and maintain equip*45 ment and vehicles, personal and business as described above.” (Exhibit A-35, affidavit of William C. Hamilton.)
Mr. Hamilton also believed that he had all the proper permits for his desired use of the building.
Contrary to the board’s conclusions, these facts indicate that the township was informed of the intended illegal use of the building but chose to issue the permits and ignore the illegal use for 13 years. Not only were the statements contained in the affidavit uncontradicted, they were actually supported by the testimony of the intervenor, Mr. Light, and of some of the neighbors in the community. Mr. Light stated that he observed tractor-trailers parked at the concrete block building and learned that Mr. Hamilton was performing maintenance work on tractor-trailers for his refrigerated trucking business. (N.T. 12-10-92, pp. 180-81,192-94.) Mr. Light also testified that he never saw the building being used by Mr. Hamilton for any agricultural or farming purposes. (N.T. 12-10-92, pp. 196-97.) Ms. Janice Filk, a member of the neighborhood, stated that she observed Mr. Hamilton performing work on tractor-trailers and that two or three trucks a day went in and out of the property. (N.T. 12-10-92, pp. 222-23.)
The board’s failure to address the statements contained in the Hamilton affidavit constitutes a manifest abuse of discretion. The permit application, the building permit, the affidavit and the testimony of the witnesses at the hearing all provide sufficient grounds to satisfy the first prong of the test for a variance by estoppel. Having been made aware of the intended use as far back as August 1976, prior to the construction of the
The case of Township of Haverford v. Spica, 16 Pa. Commw. 326, 328 A.2d 878 (1974) lends persuasive support for our conclusion. There the court held that the landowners had a vested right to continue a commercial use in an area zoned for residential use only. The court based its decision on the facts that the township had granted a building permit in 1938 allowing the landowner to construct a real estate office on the property, despite the fact that it was a commercial use; that the township had actively acquiesced for 36 years and that the violation was of an obvious nature.
Thus, we find that the board’s determination was not supported by substantial evidence in the record and that the capricious disregard of the Pizzos’ evidence constituted an abuse of the board’s discretion.
The third requirement for a variance by estoppel, reliance by the owner on the appearance of regularity, was never addressed by the zoning board in its decision. Our review of the record reveals ample evidence of
Moreover, appellants’ innocent reliance is evidenced by their substantial expenditures in connection with the property. The Pizzos bought the property because they would be able to do repairs on their land-clearing equipment in the garage. They spent considerable amounts in preparing and modifying the driveway area with additional stone so the broken equipment could be transported to the garage. (N.T. 12-10-92, pp. 88-89.) The Pizzos also regraded a portion of the area around the garage to minimize water accumulation. (N.T. 12-10-92, pp. 88, 110-11, 115-16.) Thus, we find that the Pizzos’ improvements to the building and grounds indicate that they purchased the property in the good faith belief that their desired use of the property was lawful.
The board’s determination that no hardship would result from the cessation of the illegal use is, likewise, unsupported by the evidence. The Pizzos will have nowhere to repair the land-clearing equipment if they are not permitted to use the garage. They will have a building located on their property which cannot be used for any purpose defined in the rural agricultural district regulations. (N.T. 12-10-92, pp. 26-27.) The evidence indicates that the surrounding property is unfit for farming, so the building cannot be used for the storage and repair of farm equipment. (N.T. 12-10-92, pp. 60-
The board’s finding of fact no. 17 is erroneous. There is nothing in the record which indicates that the premises was used in any kind of agricultural capacity after 1976, when Mr. Hamilton bought the property. The board offered no basis for its findings and in light of substantial amount of testimony to the contrary, we find that a hardship will result if the Pizzos are prevented from using the building to repair their equipment.
Lastly, the board concluded that the requested relief would be injurious to the public welfare. (Decision of the Zoning Hearing Board of Richland Township, p. 9.) As with much of the decision, the board offers this conclusion without factual support. The board cites
“The truck that you bring on the property and that you would run in on the road, are they as large — are they as large as the log hauling trucks from the sawmill that is almost adjacent to your property?
“THE WITNESS: Yes.
“MR. RUDOLPH: Are they as often as the sawmill trucks?
“THE WITNESS: No.
“MR. RUDOLPH: Do they run at all times of the day similar to the sawmill trucks?
“THE WITNESS: No, not as often, only to bring something in to the facility.
“MR. RUDOLPH: When you said earlier that the properties all around were residential, the sawmill is adjacent to your property?
“THE WITNESS: No, it’s down the end of Rich Hill Road on 309.
“MR. RUDOLPH: But it’s within a stone’s throw or whatever?
“THE WITNESS: Half a mile.” (N.T. 12-10-92, pp. 103-104.)
Ms. Pizzo also testified that the equipment was only brought to the property when it was broken down and could not be repaired at the work site. (N.T. 12-10-92,
Based upon our review of the record, we find that the board abused its discretion by determining that there was a danger to the public welfare, when no evidence of any type of injurious conduct, other than what was already occurring in the area from other sources, was presented at the hearing. Given that Mr. Hamilton drove at least three tractor-trailers in and out of the facility on a regular basis for 13 years and no one in the area complained, we do not believe that the occasional unpleasantness derived from a truck on Rich Hill Road given the already existing truck traffic is substantial enough or reasonable enough for the board to characterize it as a detriment to the public welfare.
In light of the board’s capricious disregard of the evidence offered by the Pizzos at the zoning board hearing of December 10, 1992 in making its findings of fact, and the error of law resulting from the board’s rejection of the Pizzos’ request for a variance by estoppel, we render the following:
ORDER
And now, June 19, 1995, upon consideration of the appeal of Anthony and Patti Pizzo from the decision of the Zoning Hearing Board of Richland Township dated December 17, 1992, denying their request for a variance from the requirements of the Quakertown Area Zoning Ordinance, it is hereby ordered and decreed that the appeal is granted and the decision of the zoning
. Counsel for the Pizzos stated on the record that the Pizzos received approval from the solicitor, prior to the hearing, to use the affidavit format for Mr. Hamilton’s testimony. Mr. Hamilton was unavailable to testily at the hearing. (N.T. 12-10-92, p. 163.)
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.