Commonwealth v. Chappell
Opinion of the Court
Defendant was indicted under section 854 of The Penal Code of June
“Whoever, with intent to defraud, makes, . . . any check . . . upon any bank . . . knowing, at the time of such making, . . . that the maker . . . has not sufficient funds in, or credit with such bank, . . . for the payment of such check, although no express representation is made in reference thereto, is guilty of a misdemeanor. . . .
“In any prosecution under this section, the making ... of a check, . . . payment of which is refused by the drawee because of lack of funds or credit, shall be prima facie evidence of intent to defraud and of knowledge of insufficient funds in, or credit with, such bank, . . . unless such maker or drawer shall have paid the drawee thereof the amount due thereon, together with interest and protest fees, within ten (10) days after receiving notice that such check . . . has not been paid to the drawee.”
Defendant was tried and convicted under the above act by reason of a check drawn by her to Leo E. O’Leary on December 13, 1954, in the sum of $2,100.04. Prior to December 2, 1954, defendant had purchased several truck loads of chickens from O’Leary and his employer, Yahner, and at the time of each sale defendant, or her employe, gave O’Leary a written statement as to the weights of the chickens which were then taken by defendant or her employe to Sky Brothers in Altoona where they were sold and, upon receipt of Sky Brothers’ check, defendant mailed a check for the truck load of chickens to O’Leary.
On December 2, 1954, a similar occurrence took place. Mrs. Chappell’s daughter called at the O’Leary farm with defendant’s truck, picked up a truck load of chickens and gave O’Leary a weigh slip setting forth the number of pounds and the price to be paid per pound. On December 13, 1954, defendant received a
At the trial defendant demurred to the evidence and now moves for the discharge of defendant.
There is not sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction.
The act under which defendant was indicted and tried requires the Commonwealth to establish the following elements in order to constitute the offense:
1. An intent to defraud.
2. A making.
3. Knowledge at the time of the making that the maker had insufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank.
There is no doubt but that defendant made the check in question on December 13, 1954. The other elements we believe are lacking. Under the provisions of the second section of the act, the Commonwealth established a prima facie case of intent to defraud and of knowledge of insufficient funds by showing that defendant did not pay the amount of the check within 10 days after receiving the required notice. The Com
We believe that this testimony thoroughly negatives any intent to defraud and also negatives any knowledge that at the time of the making of the check defendant knew that she had insufficient funds in the bank to pay the check when presented. It is true that at the time of the trial in June 1955, defendant admitted that she then had between $18,000 and $20,000 worth of outstanding checks which were unpaid, but this is not a circumstance from which the jury could find that she knew on December 13, 1954, at the time she drew the check to the order of O’Leary, that she had insufficient funds in the bank to pay the same.
Whether a prosecution may successfully be maintained under the provisions of section 854 of The Penal Code of June 24, 1939, in any case where a check is given for the payment of a preexisting debt need not here be determined for the reasons above given. It may be that if a check were given for a preexisting debt, but for the purpose of obtaining new
We are satisfied that the Commonwealth’s prima facie case, which was made out by showing that defendant’s check was not paid within 10 days after notice, has been conclusively negatived by the undisputed testimony and that, as a result, there was insufficient evidence to sustain the conviction.
We therefore, enter the following
Decree
And now, September 24, 1955, after argument, and' upon due consideration, it is hereby ordered and decreed that defendant’s motion in arrest of judgment be sustained, that defendant be discharged and that the costs be placed upon the county.
Exception
To all' of which counsel for Commonwealth excepts and prays that an exception be noted and bill sealecl; all of which is, the day and year aforesaid, accordingly doné.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.