Shenandoah Mobile Co. v. Cumberland County Board of Assessment Appeals
Opinion of the Court
— In these six cases, which have been consolidated by agreement of counsel because of a common question of law, plaintiffs are appealing from real estate tax assessments by defendant of plaintiffs’ telecommunication tower facilities.
The procedural history of the cases may be summarized as follows. On September 18, 2003, plaintiffs Shenandoah Mobile Company and Shenandoah Personal Communications Company filed a petition for appeal from defendant’s tax assessment of their telecommunication towers.
On April 13, 2004, plaintiff Spectrasite Communications filed a motion to consolidate the six cases pending against defendant.
A pre-hearing conference was held on June 9,2004,
For the reasons stated in this opinion, defendant’s treatment of plaintiffs’ telecommunication towers as realty for purposes of the county’s tax on real property will be sustained.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiffs are Shenandoah Mobile Company, Shenandoah Personal Communications Company, Spectrasite Communications, and SB A Towers Inc.
For the sake of clarity, the word “tower” will be used when referencing the actual telecommunication towers, and the term “tower facility” will be used when referencing the tower, fence, concrete foundation and equipment building on each site. With respect to the types of towers, a monopole tower will be defined as a self-supporting, tubular tower which ranges 50-200 feet in height.
These cases involve six telecommunication towers located in Cumberland County (identified as towers “AF”).
Tower “B,” parcel number 43-06-0031-012 LL, is owned by Spectrasite Communications.
Tower “C,” parcel number 39-12-0324-004 LL, is owned by Spectrasite Communications.
Tower “D,” parcel number 40-10-0632-016 LL, is owned by Spectrasite Communications.
Tower “E,” parcel number 09-22-0533-001 LL, is owned by SB A Towers.
Tower “F,” parcel number 41-11-0304-019 LL, is owned by SBA Towers.
Cumberland County is a fourth class county.
Much of the testimony at the hearing focused on the question of whether plaintiffs’ towers were, or were at least intended to be, permanent fixtures at the tower facilities. This testimony included explanations about the erection and disassembly of telecommunication towers, reasons for removing or replacing towers, and general trends in the tower industry pertaining to the erection and removal of towers.
The process of erecting a tower begins with the submission of bids.
During the hearing, Mr. Doyle also gave extensive testimony on the disassembly process for telecommunication towers as he narrated a videotape showing the dis-assembly of a tower in West Virginia.
Once these preliminary matters had been addressed, riggers ascended the tower and securely attached the strapping from the crane to the top section of the tower.
Once a tower has been disassembled, only the cement foundation, equipment building, and fence are left at the site.
During the hearing, the witnesses testified to a number of reasons that towers might be disassembled and moved to another location. The major reason cited for tower removal was a change in business circumstances.
Notwithstanding the availability of technology to disassemble a tower, the process is highly laborious, expensive, and demanding in terms of expertise, courage, and equipment. Furthermore, notwithstanding the theoretical reasons recounted above for taking down or moving towers, the practice in the telecommunication tower industry is that these towers are not being taken down or moved on a frequent basis.
Mr. Greisz testified that, during the almost 10 years in which he has worked for Shenandoah, he could not remember a tower that was built where the lease was terminated and the tower was taken down.
DISCUSSION
Statement of Law
Assessability of real estate. Section 201 of the Fourth to Eighth Class County Assessment Law provides for the assessment of all real estate in the county:
“The following subjects and property shall as hereinafter provided be valued and assessed and subject to taxation for all county, borough, town, township, school, (except in cities), poor and county institution district purposes, at the annual rate,
“(a) All real estate to wit: houses, house trailers and mobile homes permanently attached to land or connected with water, gas, electric or sewage facilities, buildings, lands, lots of ground and ground rents, trailer parks and parking lots, mills and manufactories of all kinds, all office type construction of whatever kind, that portion of a steel, lead, aluminum or like melting and continuous casting stractures which enclose, provide shelter or protection from the elements for the various machinery,*546 tools, appliances, equipment, materials or products involved in the mill, mine manufactory or industrial process, and all other real estate not exempt by law from taxation. . . .” Act of May 21, 1943, P.L. 571, §201, as amended, 72 P.S. §5453.201.
Assessment of chattels as real property for real estate taxation. As a general proposition in real property law, there are three classifications for chattels that are used in connection with real estate:
“First, those which are manifestly furniture, as distinguished from improvements, and not peculiarly fitted to the property with which they are used; these always remain personalty____Second, those which are so annexed to the property that they cannot be removed without material injury to the real estate or to themselves; these are realty, even in the face of an expressed intention that they should be considered personalty .... Third, those which, although physically connected with the real estate, are so affixed as to be removable without destroying or materially injuring the chattels themselves, or the property to which they are annexed; these become part of the realty or remain personalty, depending upon the intention of the parties at the time of the annexation; in this class fall such chattels as boilers and machinery affixed for the use of an owner or tenant but readily removable.” Clayton v. Lienhard, 312 Pa. 433, 436-37, 167 A. 321, 322 (1933). (citations omitted)
The court in In re Sheetz Inc., 657 A.2d 1011 (Pa. Commw. 1995), elaborated on the third classification of chattels, setting out a test for determining whether a chattel has become a fixture of real property for purposes of real estate taxation. Id. at 1013. The considerations which
In Sheetz, the Commonwealth Court held that canopies which cover gas pumps at gas stations are fixtures of real property, and hence are taxable as such similar facilities. Id. The court held that the canopies were affixed to a poured concrete foundation by bolts, which were then covered by concrete. Id. Next, the court held that the canopies were essential to the permanent use of the gas pumps because stations with canopies had a higher sales volume. Id. Additionally, the canopies’ essential nature was demonstrated through Sheetz’ seeking variances of zoning requirements in a number of cases to allow for the erection of canopies at their stations. Id. These facts led the court to conclude that Sheetz intended the canopies to be a permanent fixture of its gas stations which would remain until they were worn out, or Sheetz no longer occupied the premises. Id.
Application of Law to Facts
In the court’s view, plaintiffs’ telecommunication towers are properly classified as realty for purposes of Pennsylvania’s real property taxation scheme. An analysis of the considerations set forth in Sheetz leads to this conclusion.
First, the towers are firmly affixed to the ground, and, although their removal is not a practical impossibility, the process involves a high degree of expense, manpower, equipment, and skill. Second, the towers are essential to the use of the rest of the facility, which is clearly real estate.
Third, and perhaps most important, the intent of the parties that the towers be features of the real estate as opposed to transient items of personalty is manifest in the extended terms of the leases and the practice of the industry, whereby dismantling of towers is almost exclusively a theoretical matter.
And now, September 15,2004, after careful consideration of the tax assessment appeals filed herein, following a hearing, and for the reasons stated in the accompanying opinion, it is ordered as follows:
With respect to parcel number 25-25-0006-351 LL:
The market value as of January 1, 2004 (and for succeeding years until revised), for the parcel owned by Shenandoah Mobile Company, situated in New Cumberland Borough, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, is fixed at $95,000.
The pertinent common level ratio for Cumberland County has been stipulated to be 95.4 percent. The predetermined ratio is 100 percent.
There being a difference of less than 15 percent between the common level ratio and predetermined ratio, as a result of which assessments are to be determined by application of the predetermined ratio, the assessment with respect to the aforesaid parcel is fixed at $95,000 as of January 1,2004, for county and municipal taxes, and July 1,2004, for school real estate taxes.
With respect to parcel number 43-06-0031-012 LL:
The market value as of January 1, 2004 (and for succeeding years until revised), for the parcel owned by Spectrasite Communications, situated in Upper Frank-ford Township, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, is fixed at $142,000.
The pertinent common level ratio for Cumberland County has been stipulated to be 95.4 percent. The predetermined ratio is 100 percent.
With respect to parcel number 39-12-0324-004 LL:
The market value as of January 1, 2004 (and for succeeding years until revised), for the parcel owned by Spectrasite Communications, situated in Southampton Township, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, is fixed at $136,530.
The pertinent common level ratio for Cumberland County has been stipulated to be 95.4 percent. The predetermined ratio is 100 percent.
There being a difference of less than 15 percent between the common level ratio and predetermined ratio, as a result of which assessments are to be determined by application of the predetermined ratio, the assessment with respect to the aforesaid parcel is fixed at $136,530 as of January 1, 2004, for county and municipal taxes, and July 1, 2004, for school real estate taxes.
With respect to parcel number 40-10-0632-016 LL:
The market value as of January 1, 2004 (and for succeeding years until revised), for the parcel owned by Spectrasite Communications, situated in South Middleton Township, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, is fixed at $136,530.
The pertinent common level ratio for Cumberland County has been stipulated to be 95.4 percent. The predetermined ratio is 100 percent.
With respect to parcel number 09-22-0533-001 LL:
The market value as of January 1, 2004 (and for succeeding years until revised), for the parcel owned by SBA Towers Inc., situated in East Pennsboro Township, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, is fixed at $70,000.
The pertinent common level ratio for Cumberland County has been stipulated to be 95.4 percent. The predetermined ratio is 100 percent.
There being a difference of less than 15 percent between the common level ratio and predetermined ratio, as a result of which assessments are to be determined by application of the predetermined ratio, the assessment with respect to the aforesaid parcel is fixed at $70,000 as of January 1, 2004, for county and municipal taxes, and July 1, 2004, for school real estate taxes.
With respect to parcel number 41-11-0304-019 LL:
The market value as of January 1, 2004 (and for succeeding years until revised), for the parcel owned by SBA Towers Inc., situated in South Newton Township, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, is fixed at $100,000.
The pertinent common level ratio for Cumberland County has been stipulated to be 95.4 percent. The predetermined ratio is 100 percent.
There being a difference of less than 15 percent between the common level ratio and predetermined ratio,
. The following cases have been consolidated at number 03-4921 civil term: numbers 03-4921 civil term, 04-920 civil term, 04-921 civil term, 04-922 civil term, 04-949 civil term, and 04-950 civil term. See order of court, April 16, 2004.
. See pet. of appeal from determination of real estate tax assessment, filed September 18, 2003 (Shenandoah’s pet. of appeal); pet. for appeal, filed March 4, 2004 (Spectrasite/South Middleton Township pet. for appeal): pet. for appeal, filed March 4,2004 (Spectrasite/ Upper Frankford Township pet. lor appeal); pet. for appeal, filed March 4, 2004 (Spectrasite/Southampden Township pet. for appeal); pet. for appeal, filed March 5, 2004 (SBA Towers/South Newton Township pet. for appeal); pet. for appeal, filed March 5, 2004 (SBA Towers/ East Pennsboro Township pet. for appeal).
. Shenandoah’s pet. of appeal.
. Answer, filed October 2, 2003 (def.’s answer to Shenandoah’s pet.).
. Praecipe for listing case for trial, filed January 7, 2004.
. See Spectrasite/South Middleton Township pet. for appeal (listing Cumberland County, South Middleton Township and South Middleton School District as interested parties); Spectrasile/Upper Frank ford Township pet. for appeal (listing Cumberland County, Upper Frankford Township, and Big Spring School District as interested parties); Spectrasile/Soulhampden Township pet. for appeal (listing Cumberland County, Southampden Township, and Shippensburg Area School District as interested parties).
. See SBA Towers/South Newton Township pet. for appeal (listing Cumberland County, South Newton Township, and Big Spring School District as interested parties); SBA Towers/Easl Pennsboro Township pet. for appeal (listing Cumberland County, East Pennsboro Township, and East Pennsboro School District as interested parties).
. Mot. to consolidate, filed April 13, 2004 (Spectrasite’s mot. to consolidate).
. Order of court, April 16, 2004.
. In re pre-hearing conference, June 9,2004.
. Notes of testimony 2, hr’g., June 24, 2004, and June 28, 2004 (N.T._).
. N.T. 1-2.
. Stipulations of fact ¶2. pis.’ exhibit 13, hr’g., June 24, 2004, and June 28, 2004 (Stipulations of fac^_).
. Stipulations of fact ¶3.
. N.T. 1-2.
. N.T. 1-2.
. Stipulations of fact ¶4.
. Stipulations of fact ¶4.
. Stipulations of fact ¶4.
. Stipulations of fact ¶10.
. Stipulations of fact ¶12.
. Stipulations of fact ¶¶5, 7.
. Stipulations of fact ¶7.
. Stipulations of fact ¶7.
. Stipulations offactfll.
. Stipulations of fact ¶13.
. Stipulations of fact ¶7.
. Stipulations of fact ¶7.
. Stipulations of fact ¶ 11.
. Stipulations of fact ¶13.
. Stipulations of fact ¶7.
. Stipulations of fact ¶7.
. Stipulations of fact ¶11.
. Stipulations of factfl3.
. Stipulations of fact ¶7.
. Stipulations of factf7.
. Stipulations of fact ¶11.
. Stipulations offacl^[13.
. Stipulations of factf7.
. Stipulations of fact ¶7.
. Stipulations of fact ¶11.
. Stipulations of fact ¶ 13.
. Stipulations of fact ¶7.
. Stipulations of fact ¶7.
. Stipulations of fact ¶ 11.
. Stipulations of factfl3.
. See Act of August 9,1955,P.L. 323. §210, as amended, 16P.S. §210.
. Stipulations of factfl5.
. Stipulations of factfl5.
. Stipulations of fact'll 5.
. N.T. 146.
. See pis.’ exhibit 3, hr’g., June 24,2004 and June 28,2004 (pis.7 def.’s exhibit_); pis.’ exhibit 5; pis.’ exhibit 6.
. N.T. 145-48; pis.’ exhibit 3; pis.’ exhibit 5; pis.’ exhibit 6.
. N.T. 146-47.
. N.T. 147.
. N.T. 140.
. N.T. 27-28, 99.
. N.T. 204-205, 221.
. N.T. 48.
. N.T. 48.
. N.T. 140.
. N.T. 140.
. N.T. 213.
. N.T. 213.
. See N.T. 213.
. N.T. 140-41.
. N.T. 140.
. N.T. 42, 141.
. N.T. 42, 141-42.
. Sec N.T. 42-43, 114; see also, def.’s exhibit 1.
. See N.T. 147, 156-57.
. N.T. 110, 114; pis.’ exhibit 35.
. N.T. 114-15.
. N.T. 156-57.
. See N.T. 157-58.
. N.T. 116-17.
. N.T. 117-18.
. N.T. 118-19.
. N.T. 119.
. N.T. 119.
. N.T. 131.
. N.T. 131-35.
. See N.T. 126, 135.
. N.T. 126-27.
. N.T. 150-51, 170-71.
. N.T. 150-51, 170-71.
. N.T. 55.
. See N.T. 55, 144-45, 207. The lack of any damage to parts of the tower facility during disassembly is evidenced by the tower industry’s occasional “drop and swap” practice, in which one tower is taken down at a site, only to be replaced at the site by another — usually taller- — tower. N.T. 144-45.
. N.T. 55.
. N.T. 139.
. N.T. 138.
. N.T. 120, 156.
. N.T. 120, 139.
. N.T. 60-62, 196.
. N.T. 64.
. N.T. 144.
. N.T. 144-45.
. N.T. 159.
. N.T. 196-97.
. See N.T. 27-28, 74, 103, 109-10, 215, 226.
. N.T. 27-28, 74.
. N.T. 103, 109-10.
. N.T. 215.
. N.T. 226.
. N.T. 230.
. N.T. 234-35; pis.’ exhibit 9.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.