MEMORANDUM

This case involves the constitutionality of Pennsylvania’s ballot access laws for senato­rial and gubernatorial candidates of major political parties, as well as peripheral chal­lenges to other aspects of the election scheme. Plaintiff Jack Trinsey (“Trinsey”), appearing pro se, 1 challenges the constitu­tionality of certain signature requirements of the Pennsylvania Election Code (“Election Code”). Additionally, Trinsey asks this court for an order rescheduling Pennsylvania’s pri­mary election for a later date, and for a monetary judgment against the Republican State Committee of Pennsylvania (“RSC”). *169 Jurisdiction in this matter exists pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Before the court is a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss plaintiffs complaint. For the rea­sons discussed below, the court will grant defendants’ motion to dismiss.

1. Legal Standard

The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) mo­tion is to test the legal sufficiency of a com­plaint. Sturm v. Clark, 835 F.2d 1009, 1111 (3d Cir. 1987). A complaint may not be dis­missed under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be grant­ed unless “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which could entitle him to relief.” Perry v. Grant, 775 F.Supp. 821, 824 (M.D.Pa. 1991) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to 12(b)(6), the court must “accept as true all the allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, and view them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Rocks v. Philadelphia, 868 F.2d 644, 645 (3d Cir. 1989). Dismissal is not appropriate un­less it clearly appears that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Robb v. Philadel­phia, 733 F.2d 286, 290 (3d Cir. 1984).

II.Background

On February 14, 1994, Trinsey, a self-­described “rank and file member of the Re­publican Party” (Compl. at 3, ¶7a), who is “relentlessly litigating for more fair and equi­table voter rights not only in this Honorable Court but in every State in the Union” (Compl. at 3, ¶ 7b), filed a three-count com­plaint seeking the following relief:

(1) a declaratory judgment that sections of the Election Code, which require that per­sons seeking the nomination of a major political party file a nomination petition bearing a requisite number of signatures in an allotted time frame, pose an unconsti­tutional burden on candidates. See 25 P.S. §§ 2868, 2872.1 and 2873.

(2) an order rescheduling the primary election.

(3) a monetary judgment against the Re­publican State Committee of Pennsylvania “in an amount equal to [Trinsey’s] fair share of 1994 Republican Primary Cam­paign Funds.” (Compl. at 8, ¶ 15).

Each argument will be dealt with seriatim. 2

III.Discussion

A. Constitutionality of Election Code Provisions

Trinsey challenges the constitutionality of that portion of the Election Code which re­quires a prospective senatorial or gubernato­rial candidate to obtain two thousand signa­tures of registered and enrolled members of the proper party within a total of 22 days. 3 Trinsey claims that the requirement that he gather 2,000 signatures within the short time period allotted violates his constitutional rights. 4

Trinsey’s argument is meritless. It is beyond dispute that states may impose rea­sonable restrictions to limit access to the ballot. Perry, 775 F.Supp. at 825. The Su­preme Court has consistently held that states have an “undoubted right to require candi­dates to make a preliminary showing of sub­ *170 stantial support in order to qualify for a place on the ballot....” Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 194, 107 S.Ct. 533, 537, 93 L.Ed.2d 499 (1986) (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788-­789 n. 9, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 1569-1570 n. 9, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983)). See also American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 783, 94 S.Ct. 1296, 1307, 39 L.Ed.2d 744 (1974); Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442, 91 S.Ct. 1970, 1976, 29 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971). As the Court said in Anderson, supra:

We have recognized that, “as a practical matter, there must be a substantial regula­tion of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes.” To achieve these necessary objectives, States have enacted compre­hensive and sometimes complex election codes_ [T]he State’s important regula­tory interests are generally sufficient to justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory re­strictions.

Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788, 103 S.Ct. at 1569-­1570 (citation omitted).

The signature requirements chal­lenged by Trinsey in this case do not pose an unreasonable burden on candidates of major political parties. 5 As Judge Shapiro said in Consumer Party, supra, in passing reference to the statute at issue here: “With regard to the major parties, the [signature] require­ment [of § 2872.1] imposes a de minimus burden.” Consumer Party, 633 F.Supp. at 888. In fact, signature requirements more burdensome than those at issue here have withstood constitutional scrutiny. See, e.g., Storer, 415 U.S. at 740, 94 S.Ct. at 1284 (noting that gathering 325,000 signatures in 24 days not per se unconstitutional); Valenti v. Mitchell, 962 F.2d 288, 299-300 (3d Cir. 1992) (noting that eight to nine day period to collect 1,000 signatures not per se unconstitu­tional); Perry, 775 F.Supp. at 826-27 (up­holding as constitutional requirement to col­lect 41,305 signatures within 149 days); Black v. Cook County Officers Electoral Bd., 750 F.Supp. 901, 908 (N.D.Ill. 1990) (granting defendants’ motion to dismiss and holding that requirement to gather 25,000 signatures not unconstitutional); Williams v. Tucker, 382 F.Supp. 381, 386 (M.D.Pa. 1974) (holding requirement to gather 2,452 signatures with­in 21 days constitutional). In light of the above precedent, this court finds Trinsey’s suggestion that collecting 2,000 signatures within 22 days violates the Constitution is quite simply without merit. 6

B. Changing the Primary Date

Trinsey sets forth no basis for why this court should change the date of Pennsyl­vania’s primary election. Rather, Trinsey simply states: “The 1994 Spring Primary must be moved to September 13, 1994.” (Compl. at 8, ¶ 13) This suggestion is pat­ently frivolous. Article I, Section 4 of the *171 United States Constitution provides that “[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof_” Pennsylvania has designated by statute that “[t]here shall be a General primary preceding each general election which shall be held on the- third Tuesday of May in all even-numbered years_” 25 P.S. § 2753. As the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has noted, “[t]he state’s interest in a timely and orderly election is strong” as is “[t]he strong state interest in holding its primary as sched­uled ” Valenti 962 F.2d at 301. This court finds no basis whatsoever to reschedule Pennsylvania’s primary.

C. Right to Funds from, Republican State Committee

Trinsey’s final allegation fares no better than his others. Trinsey suggests that as a “rank and file” member of the Republican Party who is attempting to be elected, he is entitled to “an equal right, fair share of the GOP funds available for the 1994 Republican primary.” (Compl. at • 8, ¶ 15) There is no constitutional basis or other theo­ry to support this argument. The RSC has a First Amendment right to support whichever candidate it chooses in the primary. See generally Eu v. San Francisco Democratic Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 224, 109 S.Ct. 1013, 1020, 103 L.Ed.2d 271 (1989) (holding that political organizations have the right to sup­port candidate of their choice).

IV. Conclusion

The court recognizes Trinsey’s continuing efforts in the election and voter rights arena. However, as the Supreme Court has continu­ally recognized, states have an interest in “preserving the integrity of the electoral pro­cess and in regulating the, number of candi­dates on the ballot_” Munro, 479 U.S. at 194, 107 S.Ct. at 537. Based on the forego­ing analysis, Trinsey’s complaint will be dis­missed. An appropriate order follows.

ORDER

.AND NOW, this 17th day of March, 1994, upon consideration of defendants’ motion to dismiss, and plaintiff’s response thereto, it is hereby ORDERED that the defendants’ mo­ *172 tion is GRANTED. The within case is here­by dismissed and the clerk of courts is or­dered to close the case for statistical pur­poses.

ORDER

AND NOW, this 28 day of March, 1994, upon consideration of plaintiffs motions, it is hereby ORDERED that the following mo­tions are DENIED 1 :

(1) Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration.

(2) Plaintiffs Motion for Protective Order.

(3) Plaintiffs Motion to Add Twenty-Sev­en Persons as Additional Defendants.