Weiss v. County of Chester
Weiss v. County of Chester
Opinion of the Court
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel in this civil rights action. Plaintiffs seek discovery of “any and all records relating to a ‘Peer Review
I. Background
On January 7, 2002, North Coventry Township Police arrested Weiss at his home on allegations of domestic violence. The same day, Weiss was transferred to the CCP to await his preliminary hearing and trial on the charge of domestic violence. During Weiss’s incarceration at CCP, his mental health deteriorated. On numerous occasions, Weiss met with, or attempted to meet with, mental health professionals at the prison.
After Weiss’ suicide, PrimeCare convened a mortality review committee to conduct an internal investigation into his death.
In relevant part, the Act provides:
The proceedings and records of a review committee shall be held in confidence and shall not be subject to discovery or introduction into evidence in any civil action against a professional health care provider*204 arising out of the matters which are the subject of evaluation and review by such committee and no person who was in attendance at a meeting of such committee shall be permitted or required to testify in any such civil action as to any evidence or other matters produced or presented during the proceedings of such committee or as to any findings, recommendations, evaluations, opinions or other actions of such committee or any members thereof____6
Plaintiffs argue in their Motion to Compel that the Act’s protection does not extend to the Mortality Review report because (1) Ziegler, as “an unlicensed psychotherapist,” is not a “professional health care provider”
Pursuant to Court Order,
II. Discussion
Defendants argue that Pennsylvania’s peer review privilege “protects the confidentiality of the mortality review produced by Prime-Care, and does not permit the mortality review to be the subject of discovery ... in this matter.”
A. Standard for Applying Privileges in Federal Court
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) frames the contours of permissible discovery in federal courts, providing: “Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party ...”
[T]he privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with state law.14
Thus, Federal Rule of Evidence 501 requires application of federal privilege law to each element of a claim except those where state law “supplies the rule of decision.”
The ease at bar, however, “presents the complexity of having both federal and state law claims in the same action.”
B. Application of the Federal Standard
Privileges can be created by statute or by common law.
Federal Rule of Evidence 501 instructs courts to develop federal common law privileges according to “the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted ...
C. Recognition of State Law
Federal courts, however, should not ignore the “wisdom of state lawmakers”
United States, not that of any state.”
It is against this backdrop that the Court must assess whether to recognize Pennsylvania’s peer review privilege as a matter of federal common law in this case. The Peer Review Act was enacted “to serve the legitimate purpose of maintaining high professional standards in the medical practice for the protection of patients and the general public.”
The Act represents a determination by the legislature that, because of the expertise and level of skill required in the practice of medicine, the medical profession itself is in the best position to police its own activities. The need for confidentiality in the peer review process stems from the need for comprehensive, honest, and sometimes critical evaluations of medical providers by their peers in the profession.
Although the interests reflected in the state privilege are important, they are insufficient to outweigh the need for probative evidence in this case. At issue in Plaintiffs’ action are questions integral to the development of federal policy concerning the civil rights of inmates suffering from mental health problems. And to preclude discovery of the Mortality Review report here would be
D. Congressional Treatment of the Issue
This Court declines to recognize a privilege where Congress “has considered the relevant competing concerns but has not provided the privilege itself.”
Finally, the Court notes that it is unnecessary to decide the earlier raised issue of whether or not PrimeCare is a licensed health care provider for purposes of the Peer Review Act. Whereas that determination is necessary to apply Pennsylvania law, it is unnecessary here — where the issue is governed by federal law. Therefore, the Court declines to address PrimeCare’s status as a health care provider under the Peer Review Act.
III. Conclusion
Because the records sought by Plaintiffs are not protected by any privilege, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel is granted.
An appropriate Order follows.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 5th day of October 2005, upon consideration of Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel [Document # 41], Defendants’ opposition thereto, and each parties’ memoranda of law, it is hereby ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel is GRANTED. Subject to an appropriate confidentiality order to be submitted to the Court within seven days of the date of this Order, Defendant Prime-Care Medical, Inc. shall produce the Mortality Review report that its peer review committee generated after the death of Plaintiffs’ decedent.
It is so ORDERED.
. PI. Mot. to Compel 1.
. The mental health professionals at CCP, including Defendant Ziegler, function under the aegis of PrimeCare's Inmate Health Care Services Agreement with CCP. See Def. Ex. C.
. Def. Ex. A at 71-75.
. PI. Mot. to Compel 1 (internal quotations omitted).
. 63 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 425.1 et seq. (1996).
. 63 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 425.4 (1996).
. Section 425.2 of the Act defines "professional healthcare provider[s]” as "individuals or organizations who are approved, licensed or otherwise regulated to practice or operate in the health care field under the laws of the Commonwealth ....” 63 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 425.2.
. PI. Mot. To Compel 4-5.
. Order of July 18, 2005 [Document # 48].
. See id.
. Def. Opp’n to Mot. to Compel 2.
. Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1).
. Pearson v. Miller, 211 F.3d 57, 65 (3d Cir. 2000).
. F.R.E. 501.
. Id.
. Pearson, 211 F.3d at 66. Courts addressing if and when it is proper to apply state privilege law in cases arising under federal law rely on Federal Rule of Evidence 501 to conclude that application of a state's privilege law to a federal case brought on the basis of a federal question is improper. See, e.g., Univ. of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 188-89, 110 S.Ct. 577, 107 L.Ed.2d 571 (noting that Federal Rule of Evidence 501 controls whether or not a federal court will recognize a privilege in a federal question case); Holland v. Muscatine Gen. Hosp., 971 F.Supp. 385, 388 (S.D.Iowa 1997) (same); Johnson v. Nyack Hosp., 169 F.R.D. 550, 557 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (same); LeMasters v. Christ Hosp., 791 F.Supp. 188, 189 (S.D.Ohio 1991) (same); Tucker v. United States, 143 F.Supp.2d 619, 621-22 (S.D.W.Va. 2001) (same); Adeduntan v. Hosp. Auth. of Clarke County, No. 3:04-cv-65, 2005 WL 2074248, slip op. at 11 (M.D.Ga. Aug. 25, 2005) (same); Burrows v. Redbud Comm. Hosp. Dist., 187 F.R.D. 606, 610-11 (N.D.Cal. 1998) (same). Cf. Hill v. Sandhu, 129 F.R.D. 548, 548 (D.Kan. 1990) (applying state peer review privilege where " fflederal jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship and amount in issue.' ”).
. Pearson, 211 F.3d at 66.
. Id. (quoting Wm. T. Thompson Co. v. Gen. Nutrition Corp., 671 F.2d 100, 104 (3d Cir. 1982)).
. Discussing the federal court's preference for federal privilege law, the D.C. Circuit Court held that "[wjhere [information] is relevant to both federal and state claims but the federal and state privilege rules are inconsistent, the application of an inconsistent state rule in either direction could undermine the federal evidentiary interest — either by barring disclosure of [information] that federal law permits a party to see, or by requiring the disclosure of [information] that federal law protects from prying eyes.” In re Sealed Case (Medical Records), 381 F.3d 1205, 1212 (D.C.Cir. 2004). This rule applies in numerous federal circuits, see Virmani v. Novant Health Incorp., 259 F.3d 284, 287 (4th Cir. 2001); Hancock v. Dodson, 958 F.2d 1367, 1373 (6th Cir. 1992); Hancock v. Hobbs, 967 F.2d 462, 466 (11th Cir. 1992); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Wollersheim, 971 F.2d 364, 367 (9th Cir. 1992); von Bulow v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 141 (2d Cir. 1987); Memorial Hosp. v. Shadur, 664 F.2d 1058, 1061 (7th Cir. 1981); but see Motley v. Marathon Oil Co., 71 F.3d 1547, 1551 (10th Cir. 1995) (applying state privilege law to state cause of action even though the matter involved federal law claims).
. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The New Wig-more: A Treatise on Evidence — Evidentiary Privileges, 144 (Richard D. Friedman ed., Aspen Law & Business 2002).
. The best argument that congressional enactment provides a medical peer review privilege points to the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 ("HCQIA”). Congress enacted the HCQIA on the understanding that "[t]here is an overriding national need to provide incentive and protection for physicians engaging in effective professional peer review.” 42 U.S.C. § 11101(5) (2000). The HCQIA provides qualified immunity to professionals who participate in peer reviews that meet the law’s standards. 42 U.S.C. § 11111(a) (2000). That argument fails, however. Courts consistently have held that the HCQIA does not create a statutory medical peer review privilege. E.g., Agster v. Maricopa County, 406 F.3d 1091, 1094 ("The [HCQIA] granted immunity to participants in medical peer reviews ... but did not privilege the report resulting from the process.”); Robertson v. Neuromedical Center, 169 F.R.D. 80, 83-84 (M.D.La. 1996) ("There is no historical or statutory basis for a peer review materials privilege”); Teasdale v. Marin Gen. Hosp., 138 F.R.D. 691, 694 (N.D.Cal. 1991) ("Congress spoke loudly with its silence in not including a privilege against discovery of peer review materials in the HCQIA.”); Johnson, 169 F.R.D. at 560 (noting that the HCQIA does not establish a privilege for peer reviewed materials).
. F.R.E. 501.
. Pearson, 211 F.3d at 67.
. Id. at 189, 110 S.Ct. 577 (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51, 100 S.Ct. 906, 63 L.Ed.2d 186 (1980)).
. In re Grand Jury, 103 F.3d 1140, 1149 (3d Cir. 1997).
. Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 189, 110 S.Ct. 577, 107 L.Ed.2d 571 (1990).
. Johnson v. Nyack Hosp., 169 F.R.D. 550, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 12-13, 116 S.Ct. 1923, 135 L.Ed.2d 337 (1996).
. Pa. Protection & Advocacy, Inc. v. Houstoun, 1999 WL 1045152 (E.D.Pa. 1999), aff'd, 228 F.3d 423 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. King, 73 F.R.D. 103, 105 (E.D.N.Y. 1976)).
. Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708, 715 (3d Cir. 1979).
. Pearson, 211 F.3d at 68; see also ACLU v. Finch, 638 F.2d 1336, 1344 (5th Cir. 1981) ("[T]here is a special danger in permitting state governments to define the scope of their own privilege when the misconduct of their agents is alleged.”).
. Joe v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 782 A.2d 24, 32 (Pa.Commw.Ct. 2001).
. Id. (citing Young v. Western Pa. Hosp., 722 A.2d 153 (Pa.Super. 1998))
. Univ. of Pa., 493 U.S. at 189, 110 S.Ct. 577.
Reference
- Full Case Name
- Donald WEISS, Sr., as Co-Executor of the ESTATE OF Donald WEISS, Jr. v. COUNTY OF CHESTER
- Cited By
- 9 cases
- Status
- Published