Bell v. Lindsay
Bell v. Lindsay
Opinion of the Court
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff filed suit alleging two distinct sets of claims. First, he has sued a police officer with regard to actions taken in effecting Plaintiffs arrest. ■ Second, he has sued various' Defendants associated with the George W. Hill Correctional Facility (the “prison”), raising claims relating to the conditions of his confinement.
I. CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANT HARTSHORN
Plaintiff alleges that an unidentified “John Doe” officer and an “Officer Harding” (neither of whom was named as a Defendant), used excessive force when arresting him and exacerbated previously-existing injuries. The allegations of force against these officers are themselves quite vague, repeating the phrase “excessive force” but with little detail. The Amended Complaint does not allege that Defendant Hartshorn, identified as a police officer, used excessive force. Instead, Plaintiff alleges that the other officers were under the “active supervision” of Defendant Hartshorn.
Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Hartshorn and Officer Doe repeatedly ignored his request for medical treatment once they arrived at the Chester Township Police Department and Plaintiff was placed in a holding cell,
II. CLAIMS AGAINST THE PRISON DEFENDANTS
Plaintiff also raises claims that after he was incarcerated at the prison on July 12, 2012, he was forced to sleep on the floor in an intake area without a toilet or a sink, and that despite notifying officials of his serious spinal-related injuries and pain, he was not seen by a medical professional until August 4, 2012.
A First Amendment Claims
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Asante and Smith deprived him of what he asserts is a First Amendment right to fair and impartial resolution of his grievances and that alleged failure to handle the grievances properly denied him access to the courts by preventing him from properly exhausting his administrative remedies. However, Plaintiff has been able to file this lawsuit, and if exhaustion is raised as a defense, Plaintiff will have the opportunity to show that he was unable to exhaust his claims. Plaintiffs allegations do not state an independent cause of action, and it is well-established that inmates do not have a due process right to a grievance procedure and therefore “any allegations of improprieties in the handling of [a] grievance do not state a cognizable claim under § 1983.”
B. Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment Deliberate Indifference Claims
Plaintiff alleges deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in the
A violation of the Eighth Amendment, actionable through a § 1983 claim, occurs when a prison official acts with “deliberate indifference” to an inmate’s “serious medical needs,”
C. Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment Overcrowding Claims
Plaintiff alleges that on July 12, 2012, he was incarcerated at the prison and placed into a holding room with 25-30 inmates without a toilet or sink and forced to sleep on the floor. Plaintiff does not allege that he was in this holding room for any substantial period of time, and these allegations do not state a cause of action.
' Housing multiple inmates in a cell does not alone establish a constitutional violation. Instead, in assessing whether a prisoner’s conditions of confinement violate the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment, a court should consider the totality of the circumstances. At most, plaintiff asserts that he was confined with multiple' inmates in areas and/or cells of indeterminate size for a relatively short period of time. Without more, his sparse allegations fail to state a claim because they do not plausibly establish that the conditions of confinement at the George W. Hill Correctional Facility amounted to punishment or deprived plaintiff of .any basic human need such as food, medical care, .sanitation, or security.25
In addition, Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that the named Defendants were personally involved in any of the alleged violations of Plaintiffs rights.
D. Claims of a Policy or Custom
Plaintiffs allegations against Defendants Lindsay and Byrne are that they created a policy, custom, or rule that infringed and abridged Plaintiffs constitutional rights, and that they failed to take action after being notified of the alleged deprivations.
Generally throughout his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the actions taken by Defendants violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Title II of the ADA, which applies to prisons,
III. AMENDMENT
Although Plaintiff has not requested leave to again amend, in civil rights cases, “district courts must offer amendment— irrespective of whether it was requested— when dismissing a case for failure to state a claim unless doing so would be inequitable or futile.”
ORDER
AND NOW, this 23rd day of July 2015, upon consideration of the pending motions and any responses thereto, it is hereby ORDERED that:
1. Plaintiffs Motion to Proceed in For-ma Pauperis [Doc. No. 33] is DISMISSED AS MOOT. The Court granted Plaintiffs earlier motion to proceed in forma pau-peris by Order dated July 9,2014.
2. Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint [Doc. Nos. 29 and 30], are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as follows:
a. The Motion to Dismiss as to Defendant Hartshorn is GRANTED and the claims against this Defendant are DISMISSED.
b. The Motion to Dismiss as to Defendant Asante is GRANTED and the claims against this Defendant are DISMISSED.
c. The Motion to Dismiss as to Defendants Lindsay and Byrne is GRANTED and the claims against these Defendants are DISMISSED.
d. Plaintiffs claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act are DISMISSED.
e. Plaintiffs claims under the First Amendment (Access to Courts) and the Sixth Amendment are DISMISSED.
*519 f. Plaintiffs claims under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments relating to prison overcrowding are DISMISSED.
g. The Motion to Dismiss is DENIED as to the deliberate indifference claims under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments as to Defendants Smith and Phillips.
3. Defendants Smith and Phillips are directed to ANSWER the Amended Complaint within 21 days of the date of this order.
It is so ORDERED.
. Plaintiff has not named a municipality or any entity charged with management of the prison as Defendants.
, By Order dated July 10, 2014, the Court directed the Clerk of the Court to refer the case to the Prisoners’ Civil Rights Panel, to determine whether an attorney was willing to represent Plaintiff. To date, the Court has not been notified that any counsel will represent Plaintiff. The Court will not vacate the July 10, 2014 Order at this time, but the Court has determined that enough time has passed that Plaintiff will have to litigate the Case himself while the case remains available for counsel to consider representing Plaintiff, The Court therefore will rule upon the pending motions.
. Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675-80, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)).
. Am. Compl, ¶ 5.
. Santiago, 629 F.3d at 129 (quoting A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cnty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004)) (footnote omitted; ellipses in Santiago )
. Santiago, 629 F.3d at 130 n. 8 (raising the possibility that supervisory liability claims are no longer viable).
. As the Third Circuit has held, in the wake of Iqbal, "plaintiffs may face challenges in drafting claims despite an information asymmetry between plaintiffs and defendants, Given that reality, reasonable minds may take issue with Iqbal and urge a different balance between ensuring, on the one hand, access to the courts so that victims are able to obtain recompense and, on the other, ensuring that municipalities and police officers are not unnecessarily .subjected to the burdens of litigation. The Supreme Court has struck the balance, however, and we abide by it.” Santiago, 629 F.3d at 134 n. 10 (internal citation omitted).
. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 9-10.
. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 12-13,
. Am. Compl. ¶ 14.
. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 19-22.
. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 27-29.
. Plaintiff also mentions the Sixth Amendment, but none of the allegations relate to any possible Sixth-Amendment violation.
. Williams v. Armstrong, 566 Fed.Appx. 106, 109 (3d Cir. 2014).
. From a fair reading of the Amended Complaint, these are the only potential claims against Defendant Asante.
. It appears that Plaintiff was a detainee awaiting trial, rather than a convicted prisoner. The Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is inapplicable to pretrial detainees, who are instead protected by the due process rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment. See City of
. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 43-44.
. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976).
. Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987) (internal quotations omitted).
. Schieber v. City of Philadelphia, 320 F.3d 409, 421 (3d Cir. 2003) (internal quotations omitted).
. See Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999). The Court does not understand Plaintiff to assert a separate claim for injury resulting from the fall from his bunk.
. Am. Compl. ¶ 14. See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 235-236 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that a back condition that required significant and continuous medication and that caused extreme pain could qualify as a serious medical need).
.Am, Compl. ¶ 29.
. Although the allegations do not appear to be in the Amended Complaint; Plaintiff asserts in his opposition to the motions to dismiss that he also was "triple-celled” at some time and required to sleep in a plastic "boat.” Doc. No. 31 at 1.
. Houston v. George W. Hill Corr. Facility, No. 14-2735, 2014 WL 2112127 (E.D.Pa. May 18, 2014) (citing Hubbard v. Taylor (Hubbard II), 538 F.3d 229, 236 & n. 6 (3d Cir. 2008) (pretrial detainees do not have a right "to be free from triple-celling or from sleeping on a mattress placed on the floor.”); North v. White, 152 Fed.Appx. 111, 113 (3d Cir. 2005) (per curiam) ("Double or triple-bunking of cells, alone, is not per se unconstitutional.”) (other citations omitted)).
. Id. (citing Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 210 (3d Cir. 2007)).
. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 16-18.
. McTernan v. City of York, PA, 564 F.3d 636, 658 (3d Cir. 2009).
. See Wood v. Williams, 568 Fed.Appx. 100, 104 (3d Cir. 2014) (holding that allegations .that simply paraphrase § 1983 or make con-clusory and general claims are insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss).
. United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 161, 126 S.Ct. 877, 163 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006).
. 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
. Matthews v. Pa. Dep't of Corrections, No. 14-1330, 613 Fed.Appx. 163, 166, 2015 WL 3452848, at *3 (3d Cir. June 1, 2015) (citation omitted).
. Brown v. Deparlos, 492 Fed.Appx. 211, 215-16 (3d Cir. 2012).
. Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2007).
Reference
- Full Case Name
- Nathaniel BELL v. Cameron LINDSAY
- Cited By
- 1 case
- Status
- Published