Boyle v. City of Philadelphia
Boyle v. City of Philadelphia
Opinion of the Court
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff, a Philadelphia Fire Captain, has filed suit against the City of Philadelphia and the former fire commissioner, alleging that he was discriminated against on the basis of race, gender, and age in his efforts to obtain a promotion, and denied equal protection under the law. Defendants have moved to dismiss, arguing that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and that he has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. For the following reasons, the motion will be granted.
I. BACKGROUND
The Amended Complaint concerns the application process for a promotion to Fire Battalion Chief.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is appropriate where a plaintiffs “plain statement” lacks enough substance to show that he is entitled to relief.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Timeliness and Exhaustion
“[W]hen Title VII remedies are available, they must be exhausted before a plaintiff may file suit.”
In this case, Plaintiff alleges that he had an intake interview with the EEOC on November 14, 2013, and the charge was marked filed on December 9, 2013.
In addition to being untimely, only Plaintiffs race-discrimination claim was within the scope of the charge. In determining whether a plaintiff has exhausted administrative remedies, the Court must look to “whether the acts alleged in the subsequent Title VII suit are fairly within the scope of the prior EEOC [charge], or the investigation arising therefrom.”
B. Failure to State a Claim
Even if the claims had been properly exhausted and timely,
In civil rights cases, “district courts must offer amendment — irrespective of whether it was requested — when dismissing a case for failure to state a claim unless doing so would be inequitable or futile.”
. Am. Compl. ¶ 8.
. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 12-13.
. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 18-19
. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 20-21.
. Am. Compl. ¶ 26.
. Am. Compl. ¶ 15.
. Am. Compl. ¶ 32.
. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007).
. ALA, Inc. v. CCAIR, Inc., 29 F.3d 855, 859 (3d Cir. 1994); Fay v. Muhlenberg Coll., No. 07-4516, 2008 WL 205227, at *2 (E.D.Pa. Jan. 24, 2008).
. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 564, 127 S.Ct. 1955.
. Id. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955.
. Id. at 562, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (quoting Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
. PBGC. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993).
. Bethel v. Jendoco Constr. Corp., 570 F.2d 1168, 1174 (3d Cir. 1978).
. Spence v. Straw, 54 F.3d 196, 200 (3d Cir. 1995).
. Money v. Provident Mut. Life. Ins. Co., 189 Fed.Appx. 114, 117 (3d Cir. 2006). The ADEA is the governing statute for the age-discrimination claims for "a state or local government employee” such as Plaintiff. Hildebrand v. Allegheny Cty., 757 F.3d 99, 102 (3d Cir. 2014).
. Williams v. East Orange Community Charter School, 396 Fed.Appx. 895, 897 (3d Cir. 2010).
. See Burgh v. Borough Council of Borough of Montrose, 251 F.3d 465, 472 (3d Cir. 2001).
. See, e.g., Webb v. City of Phila., 562 F.3d 256, 262-63 (3d Cir. 2009).
. The parties’ briefing evinces some confusion with regard to the charge at issue. The Amended Complaint attaches a right-to-sue letter referencing EEOC Charge Number 530-2014-00224 (the “224 charge”), and an unsigned narrative of events. Defendants attach to the Motion to dismiss EEOC Charge 530-2014-00260 (the “226 charge”), which was signed by Plaintiff on December 11,2013, and stamped as received on December 12, 2013. However, in the response to the motion, .Plaintiff unambiguously relies upon the 224 charge only, and submits a full copy thereof [Doc. No. 15 at 61]. This charge was signed and dated by Plaintiff on December 6, 2013, and stamped as received on December 9, 2013. The Court accepts Plaintiff’s representation that the 224 charge is the operative administrative complaint, and has not considered the 226 charge.
. See Pizio v. HTMT Global Solutions, 555 Fed.Appx. 169, 174-75 (3d Cir. 2014).
. Am. Compl. ¶ 26 (referring to an email); ¶¶ 15-16 (alleging that the email in question was received on September 18, 2012).
. Am. Compl. ¶ 33.
. Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1386 (3d Cir. 1994).
. Wastak v. Lehigh Valley Health Network, 342 F.3d 281, 287 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that the plaintiffs claim of age discrimination accrued when his employment was terminated, and thus knew of his injury despite the fact that he did not realize he was the victim of age discrimination until he learned of his younger replacement did not toll the limitations period).
. Oshiver, 38 F.3d at 1387.
. Id.
. Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 751 (3d Cir. 2005).
. See Clarkson v. SEPTA, No. 14-2510, 2014 WL 5483546, at *3-4 (E.D.Pa. Oct. 30, 2014).
. Weems v. Kehe Food Distributors, Inc., 804 F.Supp.2d 339, 342 (E.D.Pa. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Antol, 82 F.3d at 1295). See also Flora v. Wyndcroft Sch., No. 12-6455, 2013 WL 664194, at *4 (E.D.Pa. Feb. 25, 2013) (citing Burgh v. Borough Council of Montrose, 251 F.3d 465, 469-70 (3d Cir. 2000)) (holding that a plaintiff cannot bring claims that were not included in the EEOC charge).
. Lowenstein v. Catholic Health East, 820 F.Supp.2d 639, 645 (E.D.Pa. 2011) (quoting Anjelino v. N.Y. Times Co., 200 F.3d 73, 94 (3d Cir. 1999)).
. Schouten v. CSX Transp., Inc., 58 F.Supp.2d 614, 616 (E.D.Pa. 1999).
. Hicks v. ABT Assocs., Inc., 572 F.2d 960, 965 (3d Cir. 1978).
. Schouten, 58 F.Supp.2d at 616.
. Butterbaugh v. Chertoff, 479 F.Supp.2d 485, 500 (W.D.Pa. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Flora, 2013 WL 664194, at *4 (holding “[t]he most important consideration in determining whether the
. The Section 1983 claims, which are subject to Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations, Garvin v. City of Philadelphia, 354 F.3d 215, 220 (3d Cir. 2003), are also untimely. The statute of limitations is not tolled during the pendency of the administrative charges with the EEOC. See Chatterjee v. Philadelphia Fed'n of Teachers, 214 Fed.Appx. 201, 206 (3d Cir. 2007). Plaintiff did not file suit until January 15, 2015, more than two years after the discriminatory acts that occurred in September 2012.
. McDonnell Douglas Corp v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). To state a claim for age discrimination under the ADEA, a plaintiff must allege that (1) he is over forty, (2) he is qualified for the position in question, (3) he suffered from an adverse employment decision, and (4) others sufficiently younger were treated more favorably so as to permit a reasonable inference of age discrimination. See, e.g., Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 247 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal citation omitted). Plaintiff does not allege that anyone “sufficiently younger” than he was treated more favorably.
. Am. Compl. ¶ 32.
. See Doc. No. 15 at Ex. B(l-7). Although Plaintiff's Amended Complaint mentions only one applicant, of different race and gender, see Amended Complaint ¶ 33, the 224 charge, which Plaintiff references and relies upon in his Amended Complaint, and which was signed under penalty of perjury, expands upon the pool of assisted applicants and can be considered by the Court.
. Plff's Opp. to Mot. to Dismiss at 9 [Doc. No. 15].
. Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2007).
Reference
- Full Case Name
- Lawrence BOYLE v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA
- Cited By
- 4 cases
- Status
- Published