*786MEMORANDUM OPINION

In this contract and wage dispute, the parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the sole issue remaining in this case: whether Plaintiff, Rita DiMartino, was entitled to receive from Defendant De Lage Landen Financial Services, Inc. (“DLL”), a long-term incentive payment of $182,927.88 in 2013 based on performance in 2012. Although the parties agree as to many of the facts, they disagree as to the meaning of the relevant agreements.

I. FACTS

The parties have stipulated to the following facts. Ms. DiMartino became employed with DLL as its Chief Operating Officer pursuant to a written offer dated August 19, 2002, and served in that capacity from February 3, 2003 until December 2006. In July 2007, the parties entered into a written employment agreement memorializing Ms. DiMartino’s promotion to Deputy Chief Operating Officer (Global) on January 1, 2007, a role she held until June 2010, when Ms. DiMartino became Chief Innovation Officer. In all of these roles, Ms. DiMartino reported to DLL’s Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”), Ronald Slaats.

Through 2011, Ms. DiMartino was eligible to receive an annual short-term incentive (“STI”)1 of up to 100% of her base salary, and pursuant to a Long Term Incentive Plan (“LTIP”), up to 35% of her base salary. In 2011, new European regulations required DLL to make changes to its executive compensation program. DLL created a new executive remuneration policy (the “ERP”) on April 1, 2012, effective as of January 1, 2012. Ms. DiMartino was notified that “[t]he Long Term Incentive Policy is as of January 2012 integrated in the new incentive plan for Executives and has become an integral part of the [ERP].”2 As a result, Ms. DiMartino was eligible for a total incentive of 100% of her base salary, with 64% as a short-term incentive and 36% as a long-term incentive. Because the potential bonus was reduced, executive salaries increased, and Ms. DiMartino’s base salary rose from $412,000 to $508,133, effective January 1, 2012.3 To align Plaintiffs compensation with the new program, the parties entered into an amendment to the 2007 agreement. The amendment (“Amendment No. 1”) also took effect as of January 1, 2012, although it was executed in April 2012.4

Anticipating a change in Plaintiffs role with DLL, the parties then entered into a *787second amendment to the 2007 agreement, effective October 15, 2012 (“Amendment No. 2”). Amendment No. 2 provided that effective January 1, 2013, Ms. DiMartino would become an internal consultant under the direction of Mr. Slaats. Ms. DiMarti-no’s title became Global Chief Information Officer. Paragraph 5 of Amendment No. 2, which forms the crux of the parties’ dispute, provides that “[e]ffective January 1, 2013, [Ms. DiMartino] shall no longer be eligible for any new long term incentive grants or awards.”5 On March 14, 2013, Dick Hendriks, Senior Vice President of Global Compensation & Benefits, sent Ms. DiMartino an email, copied to Mr. Slaats, with the subject “bonus 2012,” setting forth a schedule for payments of both short-term and long-term incentive payout for performance years 2012 and for the previously-awarded 2011.6 On March 15, 2013, DLL paid Ms. DiMartino $124,924.50 in short-term incentive compensation. On March 27, 2013, Rob Pierik, Executive Vice President for Human Resources, sent Ms. DiMartino a letter, stating that Plaintiffs short-term incentive for performance year 2012 was determined at 49.17% of her base salary, or $249,849. The letter stated that “[y]ou are informed about the LTI 2010-2012 in a separate letter,” and directing questions to Mr. Hendriks.7

*788About this same time, the parties amended the 2007 agreement once more (“Amendment No. 3”). Amendment No. 3, which was effective April 2013, provided that on June 30, 2013, Plaintiff would become a global strategic adviser at DLL, still reporting to Mr. Slaats.8 On September 13, 2013, DLL announced Mr. Slaats’s resignation as CEO. Jan Kusters then became Ms. DiMartino’s supervisor, and he directed her to stop performing any work for DLL but to remain available in accordance with her agreement.

On November 12, 2013, Mr. Hendriks sent an email to Ms. DiMartino with the subject “deferral of incentve [sic]” stating that “something has gone wrong with deferral of your incentive 2012 in relationship with the LTIP 2013 grant.”9 DLL recalculated Ms. DiMartino’s 2012 bonus to consist of an STI pay-out only, in the amount of $249,849. This was followed months la,ter by a letter from Mr. Hendriks to Ms. DiMartino dated May 2, 2014, which stated DLL’s position (which Plaintiff disputes in this litigation) that under Amendment No. *7892, Ms. DiMartino was ineligible for long-term incentive compensation linked to the 2012 performance year and therefore some of her short-term incentive compensation would need to be deferred.10 Ms. DiMarti-no’s employment with DLL ended on July 31, 2014.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A court will award summary judgment on a claim or part of a claim where there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”11 A fact is “material” if resolving the dispute over the fact “might' affect the outcome of the suit under the governing [substantive] law.”12 A dispute is “genuine” if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”13

In evaluating a summary judgment motion, a court “must view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,” and make every reasonable inference in that party’s favor.14 Further, a court may not weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations.15 Nevertheless, the party opposing summary judgment must support each essential element of the opposition with concrete evidence in the record.16 “If the evidence is merely color-able, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.”17 This requirement upholds the “underlying purpose of summary judgment [which] is to avoid a pointless trial in cases where it is unnecessary and would only cause delay and expense.”18 Therefore, if, after making all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, the court determines that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, summary judgment is appropriate.19

The rule is no different where there are cross-motions for summary judgment.20 As stated by the Third Circuit, “[c]ross-motions are no more than a claim by each side that it alone is entitled to summary judgment, and the making of such inherently contradictory claims does not constitute an agreement that if one is rejected the other is necessarily justified or that the losing party waives judicial consideration and determination whether genuine issues of material fact exist.”21

*790III. DISCUSSION

A. Breach of Contract Claim

Under Pennsylvania law, which the parties agree governs here, a cause of action for breach of contract requires “(1) the existence of a contract, including its essential terms, (2) a breach of a duty imposed by the contract and (3) resultant damages.”22 “Issues of contractual interpretation are questions of law.”23 Contracts are to be interpreted according to the parties’ intent, and where “a written contract is clear and unambiguous, the parties’ intent is contained in the writing itself.”24 “Unless otherwise specified, a contract’s language shall be given its plain and ordinary meaning.”25 “To determine whether ambiguity exists in a contract, the court may consider ‘the words of the contract, the alternative meaning suggested by counsel, and the nature of the objective evidence to be offered in support of that meaning.’ ”26 “A court must then ‘decide whether there are objective indications that the terms of the contract are subject to differing meanings.’ ”27 When an ambiguity exists, “parol evidence is admissible to explain or clarify or resolve the ambiguity, irrespective of whether the ambiguity is patent, created by the language of the instrument, or latent, created by extrinsic or collateral circumstances.”28

In ruling on the motions for summary judgment, the Court is guided by the following points:

(1) mere disagreement between the parties over the meaning of a term is insufficient to establish that term as ambiguous: (2) each party’s proffered interpretation must be reasonable, in that there must be evidence in the contract to support the interpretation beyond the party’s mere claim of ambiguity; and (3) the proffered interpretation cannot contradict the common understanding of the disputed term or phrase when there is another term that the parties could easily have used to convey this contradictory meaning.29

Defendant argues that Paragraph 5 of Amendment No. 2, which provides that “[e]ffective January 1, 2013, [Ms. DiMarti-no] shall no longer be eligible for any new long term incentive grants or awards” means that Plaintiff waived her eligibility to receive long-term incentive compensation for her performance in 2012. To support this interpretation, Defendant points to Paragraph 8 of Amendment No. 2, which refers to 2010 and 2011 long-term incentive grants, but is silent as to 2012, and Paragraph 4 of Amendment No. 3, which provides that Ms. DiMartino “shall no longer be eligible for any long term *791incentive programs as of the effective date hereof [April 2018], but.. .shall be eligible to receive any 2011 LTIP awards paid out prior to December 31, 2014,” and which also sets out all of the compensation Plaintiff was due upon the end of her employment on July 31, 2014, without mentioning a long-term incentive grant in 2013 for performance in 2012. Defendant also argues that Plaintiff was not entitled to any long-term incentive grants unless the Executive Board so directed, and that the Executive Board never awarded Ms. DiMartino a long-term incentive grant in 2013 for performance in 2012. DLL argues that Mr. Hendriks’s March 2013 communication was an error that was later corrected.

Plaintiff argues that Paragraph 4 of Amendment No. 1 explicitly provided that she would “be eligible for incentive (short term incentive plus long term incentive) of 100% of Base Compensation at target. The annual pay-out of incentive shall be set each year by the CEO.”30 Plaintiff contends that neither Amendment No. 2 nor Amendment No. 3 explicitly changed the bonus eligibility for 2012. Instead, Amendment No. 2 stated that Plaintiffs separation as CIO would be treated as a redundancy for purposes of determining the 2012 bonus and that effective January 1, 2013, Plaintiff would be entitled to a pro rata payment of her 2012 target incentive based on the number of days employed. Similarly, Plaintiff argues that Amendment No. 3 provided that her separation from her then-current position no later than June.30, 2013, would constitute a redundancy for the purposes of determining the 2012 bonus treatment under the ERP, and that she would be paid a prorated 2013 bonus of 50% of her base salary. Plaintiff argues that her interpretation is consistent with Defendant’s conduct in providing her with the bonus calculation and the initial payment in March 2013— five months after entering into Amendment No. 2. In addition, Plaintiff contends that Mr. Slaats, as CEO, was a member of the Executive Board and could authorize the bonus, and that only after Mr. Slaats’s departure did DLL decide that Plaintiff was not entitled to a long-term incéntive payment for 2012 performance.

Everyone involved in this case is a sophisticated business person, and Ms. DiMartino and DLL were represented by separate counsel in connection with the amendments to the employment agreement. After careful consideration of the record, the Court concludes that the Plaintiffs interpretation accords with the contractual language as a whole. Amendment No. 2 concerned the effects of Ms. DiMar-tino’s change of position in 2013, which would affect bonus treatment going forward; it did not alter Plaintiffs eligibility for a bonus for work performed in 2012. When the parties intended to refer to the 2012 incentive payments they did so explicitly, for example in Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Amendment No. 2. In addition, “[a] court always may consider the course of performance as evidence of the intent of the parties,” and Plaintiffs interpretation— that “new” long-term incentives referred to performance year 2013 and beyond—is consistent with the parties’ conduct.31

“The actual performance of the parties under a contract tends to ‘make definite that which was previously un-*792clear.’ ”32 If the language were ambiguous, the parties’ course of conduct resolves any ambiguity in Plaintiffs favor. Ms. DiMarti-no received detailed information about a 2012 incentive payment with both long-term and short-term components, and received initial payment, in the period between the execution of Amendment No. 2 and Amendment No. 3. In this regard, it is noteworthy that Amendment No. 2 and Amendment No. 3 contain similar language concerning the effect of Ms. DiMar-tino’s new positions on her 2012 bonus. Mr. Hendriks sent the March 14, 2013 email to Ms. DiMartino, copied Mr. Ronald Slaats, and stated that he provided the bonus calculation “[a]t request of Ronald.” It would strain credulity to conclude that the .parties intended to exclude Ms. DiMarti-no’s eligibility for a 2012 long-term incentive in Amendment No. 2, and yet somehow, even though Ms. DiMartino and Mr. Slaats were informed that she had received the long-term incentive, including detailed calculations of the payment schedule, and she had received initial payment, the parties nevertheless moved forward with Amendment No. 3 without any discussion of the issue.

Certainly, the parties could have made explicit in Amendment No. 3 (and in Amendment No. 2 instead of using the word “new”) that there was no 2012 long-term incentive payment. Instead, Defendants failed to raise this issue for nearly eight months after Plaintiff received the bonus calculations, and only did so shortly after the resignation of Mr. Slaats, to whom Plaintiff had reported. According to Defendant, Mr. Pierik executed Amendment No. 2 on behalf of DLL, yet even though he was Mr. Hendriks’s superior,33 Mr. Hendriks was not aware until November 2013 that Ms. DiMartino was not eligible for a 2012 long-term incentive award under Amendment 2.

It is also notable that Defendant’s contention that the Executive Board did not authorize the bonus was not raised in either Mr. Hendriks’s November 13, 2013 email or his May 2, 2014 letter, and DLL does not dispute Plaintiffs contention that Mr. Slaats had the authority to grant incentive pay; nor does it offer any explanation of why the CEO requested that Mr. Hendriks send the 2012 bonus calculations (long-term and short-term) to Ms. DiMar-tino if the bonuses were not authorized.34 *793Nor did Defendant cite this as a reason in its answers to Plaintiff’s interrogatories in this litigation dated March 15, 2015.35 Having considered “the words of the contract, the alternative meaning suggested by counsel, and the nature of the objective evidence to be offered in support of that meaning,” the Court concludes that Plaintiffs interpretation must prevail.36

B. Wage Payment and Collection Law

Pennsylvania’s Wage Payment and Collection Law (“WPCL”)37 “provides employees a statutory remedy to recover wages and other benefits that are contractually due to them.”38 This may include the compensation sought by Plaintiff: “The WPCL defines ‘wages’ as including ‘any other amount’ pursuant to an employment contract. For example, bonuses, commissions, and stock options are ‘wages.’ Thus, if an employee demonstrates that any ‘amount to be paid pursuant to an agreement’ ‘remain[s] unpaid,’ then that employee may be entitled to liquidated damages.”39 Defendant has not argued any basis for denial of the WPCL claim apart from its arguments on the contract claim. Because Plaintiff has established that she received the 2012 incentive award, the Court will grant summary judgment on this claim as well.40

IV. CONCLUSION

Although the parties urge different constructions of the relevant agreements, the contractual language and the parties’ course of conduct compels the conclusion that Plaintiff was awarded both long-term and short-term incentive payments for the 2012 performance year. Therefore, the Court will grant Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and deny Defendant’s Motion. An order will be entered.

ORDER

AND NOW, this 19th day of September 2016, upon consideration of the Motions for Summary Judgment and the responses and replies thereto, and for the reasons stated in the accompanying memorandum opinion, it is hereby ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 18] is GRANTED.

2. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 19] is DENIED.

3. Within 21 days of the date of this Order, Plaintiff shall submit a proposed form of judgment order, setting forth the relief sought pursuant to the breach of contract and wage act claims, with any supporting documentation. Within 14 days of Plaintiff’s filing, Defendants may file an opposition to any of the relief sought.

It is so ORDERED.