Chan v. Barbour, Inc.
Chan v. Barbour, Inc.
Opinion of the Court
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Frances Chan, á woman of Chinese descent, alleges age, sex, and national origin discrimination by Barbour, Inc,, an international clothing manufacturer and retailer.
1. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff was hired as a manager at Barbour’s Ardmore, Pennsylvania store in 2008, and became US Retail Inventory Planning and Allocation Manager in 2011,
Although Plaintiff claims to have demonstrated' success in handling the responsibilities of Head of Retail for North America, Barbour did not promote her to that position.
Plaintiff alleges that she was mistreated by Sapienza and that Barbour permitted Sapienza to create a hostile work environment.
Plaintiff filed charges with the Pennsylvania Human Rights Commission (“PHRC”) and the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), and received a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC on September 6, 2016. On October 31, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Complaint asserting claims of age, sex, and ancestry discrimination in violation of the Pénnsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”).
In response to the Amended Complaint, Defendant filed a second motion to partially dismiss and to strike. In it, Defendant moves to (1) dismiss the later-added Title VII and ADEA claims as statutorily time-barred; (2) dismiss Plaintiffs claims for punitive damages under the PHRA and the Equal Pay Act as such damages are not available;
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Under Rule 12(b)(6), dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is appropriate where a plaintiffs “plain statement” lacks enough substance to show that he is entitled to relief.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) provides in pertinent part that “[t]he court may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” “[Striking a pleading is a drastic remedy to be used sparingly because of the difficulty of deciding a case without a factual record. Thus, although Rule 12(f) grants the court the power to grant a motion to strike, such motions are not favored and usually will be denied unless the allegations have no possible relation to the controversy and may cause prejudice to one of the parties, or if the allegations confuse the issues.”
III. DISCUSSION
A. Claims under Title VII and the ADEA
Defendant argues that Plaintiffs Title VII and ADEA claims are untimely. Upon receipt of a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, an individual has ninety days to file ADEA or Title VII claims.
Pursuant to Rule 15(c)(1)(B), “[a]n amendment to a pleading relates back to
Plaintiffs original Complaint and Amended Complaint share identical facts, and Defendant had fair notice of the federal discrimination claims, which are similar to the state-law discrimination claims raised in both documents. The Title VII and ADEA claims therefore relate back to the date of the original Complaint and are timely. Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs Title VII and ADEA claims will be denied.
B. Allegations Relating to a “Failure to Promote” Claim
Defendant argues that the Amended Complaint implicitly advances a “failure to promote” claim, and urges the Court to dismiss it as time-barred for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Defendant also urges the Court to strike Paragraphs 28-29, 82, 36-37, 39, and 69 of the Amended Complaint which discuss Sapien-za’s hiring, Chan’s lack of promotion, and the compensation differences between the two. It is not clear whether Plaintiff seeks to allege a discrete claim for failure to promote, and if so, whether such a claim would be time-barred. If Plaintiff wishes to assert such a claim, and can show it is not time-barred, she will be granted leave to amend to do so.
Regardless as to whether Plaintiff alleges a failure to promote claim, Defendant has not shown that striking Paragraphs 28-29, 32, 36-37, 39, and 69 is necessary.
IV. CONCLUSION.
For the reasons stated above, Defendant’s motion will be granted in part and denied, in part. An appropriate order follows.
. Am. Compl, (Doc, No, 6) ¶¶ 1, 3.
. Id. ¶¶ 10, 14.
. Id.n 25-26.
. Id. ¶ 27.
. Id. II29.
. W. ¶¶ 32-34.
. Id. ¶¶ 35-38.
. IdA 69.
. Id. ¶¶ -50-67,
. Id. ¶ 28.
. 43 P.S. § 951 etseq.
. 29 U.S.C, § 621 etseq.
. 42 U.S.C. § 2000eef set?.
. 29 U.S.C § 201 etseq.
. Plaintiff concedes that punitive damages are unavailable under the PHRA and the EPA ■as a matter of law.-Plff’s Opp. Mot. Dismiss (Doc. No., 12-1) at 2. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss will be granted as it relates to punitive damages.
. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007).
. ALA, Inc. v. CCAIR, Inc., 29 F.3d 855, 859 (3d Cir. 1994); Fay v. Muhlenberg Coll., No. 07-4516, 2008 WL 205227, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 24, 2008).
. Dann v. Lincoln Nat'l Corp., 274 F.R.D. 139, 142-43 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
. 29 U.S.C. § 626(e); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); see Jones v. Boyd, No. CIV. A. 97-3363, 1998 WL 314668, at *4 (E.D. Pa. June 11, 1998) ("The Court concludes that the ADEA is most analogous to Title VII and adopts a ninety (90) day limitations period for plaintiff's ADEA claim."), aff'd, 187 F.3d 626 (3d Cir. 1999). The filing deadline "is akin to a statute of limitations rather than a jurisdictional bar.” Seitzinger v. Reading Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 165 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999); see also Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393, 102 S.Ct. 1127, 71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982) (holding that time limitations in Title VII are not jurisdictional but are instead akin to statutes of limitations).
. Am. Compl. ¶ 73.
. The Amended Complaint was properly filed pursuant to Rule 15(a)(1).
. Neither party acknowledged the relation-back doctrine in their briefs. Furthermore, Plaintiffs response to Defendant’s timeliness argument focused on the exhaustion of administrative remedies rather than the timeliness of Plaintiff’s federal discrimination claims. In the interests of justice, the Court considers the relation back doctrine sua sponte. See Gallagher v. Borough of Downing-town, No. CIV. A. 98-3885, 1999 WL 1081070, at *3 n.1 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 1999).
. Bensel v. Allied Pilots Ass’n, 387 F.3d 298, 310 (3d Cir. 2004); see also Anderson v. Mercer Cty. Sheriff's Dep’t, No. 11-7620, 2013 WL 776237, at *5 (D.N.J. Feb. 28, 2013) (Title VII gender discrimination claim made in amended complaint was not time-barred by the ninety day limitation because the " 'conduct, transaction, and occurrence' surrounding Plaintiff's Amended Complaint are the same as the original Complaint” and Defendant had notice of claim); Walker-Robinson v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 11-4913, 2012 WL 3079179, at *7 (D.N.J. July 27, 2012) (ADEA claim made in amended complaint not time-barred by the ninety day limit because the facts and circumstances remained the same as those in the original timely complaint, and Defendant had adequate notice).
. See Newborn Bros. Co. v. Albion Engineering Co., 299 F.R.D. 90, 94 (D.N.J. 2014) ("even where the challenged material is redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous, a motion to strike should not be granted unless the presence of the surplusage will prejudice the adverse party”).
. See Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002) (holding that while "discrete discriminatory acts are not actionable if time barred,” the statute does not "bar an employee from using the prior acts as background evidence in support of a timely claim.”).
. Supp. Def. Mot. Dismiss at 11; see Airgood v. Twp. of Pine, No. 14-1249, 2016 WL
Reference
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- Frances CHAN v. BARBOUR, INC.
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