Bell v. Lindsay
Opinion of the Court
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff, Nathaniel Bell,
I. LEGAL STANDARD
“The underlying purpose of summary judgment is to avoid a pointless trial in cases where it is unnecessary and would only cause delay and expense.”
In evaluating a summary judgment motion," a court “must view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,” and make every reasonable inference in" that party’s favor.
II. DISCUSSION
After a work accident in 2008 that injured his back, Plaintiff was certified as unable to work and received workers’ compensation and social security disability payments.
Plaintiff asserts that he was forced to sleep, in the top bunk of his cell, which Defendants dispute.
Plaintiff avers that he only received mild pain medications and only sporadically, and at some point Ms. Smith told Plaintiff that he would have to purchase any pain relievers from the commissary, which was often out of stock and carried medication too mild to be effective.
The remaining Defendants in the case are Ms. Smith and Dr. Phillips. Plaintiff argues that Defendants manifested deliberate indifference to serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Plaintiff has produced substantial medical records establishing that his condition is serious enough to render him unable to work and eligible for disability insurance; he has received treatment both before and after his incarceration. According to Plaintiff, after he fell from the bunk bed, he was in such pain that he had to depend upon other inmates for his meals. Although Defendants dispute the seriousness of his condition, arguing that Plaintiff accepted a prison job and therefore was not in debilitating pain, these factual disputes are not suited to resolution on summary judgment.
The Third Circuit recently decided “for the first time whether and when medical expert testimony may be necessary to create a triable issue on the subjective prong of a deliberate indifference case.”
Defendants also argue that Ms. Smith could not be deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff as a matter of .law because Plaintiff was being treated by the prison doctor. However, in this case, there is evidence that Ms. Smith had direct knowledge of the alleged lack of treatment, responding to at least one of Plaintiffs grievances, and was coordinating the care, and Plaintiff avers that Ms. Smith directly denied him pain medication.
The motion for summary judgment will be denied. An appropriate order will be entered.
. Plaintiff spelled his last name as "BeU” in his Complaint, which was filed pro se. Many of the documents produced in connection with the summary judgment motion and response spell his last name as "Belle.” The Court will use the spelling Plaintiff provided when the action was commenced. Plaintiff’s .appointed counsel may file a.motion, or the parties may stipulate, to correct the docket if appropriate.
. Walden v. Saint Gobain Corp., 323 F.Supp.2d 637, 641 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (citing Goodman v. Mead Johnson & Co., 534 F.2d 566, 573 (3d Cir. 1976)).
. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
. Hugh v. Butler Cty. Family YMCA, 418 F.3d 265, 267 (3d Cir. 2005).
. Boyle v. Cty. of Allegheny Pa., 139 F.3d 386, 393 (3d Cir. 1998).
. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (internal citations omitted).
. Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp., 812 F.2d 81, 83 (3d Cir. 1987).
. Bell Aff. ¶ 8,
. Id. ¶ 12.
. Id. ¶¶ 13-15.
. Def. Ex. A; Bell Aff, ¶¶ 16-17; Plff. Exs. I, J.
. Ex. K.
. Bell Aff. ¶¶ 19-20.
. Id, at ¶ 20.
. Id. at ¶21. Defendants’ housing records show that Plaintiff was assigned to a bottom bunk from July 13, 2012 until. December .11, 2012, Def. Ex. B,
. Id. at ¶¶ 23r24.
. Id. at ¶¶ 25-26.
.Id. ¶ 27.
. Plff. Ex. V.
. Plff. Ex. W.
. Bell Aff. ¶ 28-30; Plff. Exs. G, I, P.
. Bell Aff. 1133.
. Id. ¶¶ 34-36.
. Id.n 37-41.
. It appears that Plaintiff may have been detained awaiting trial, rather than a convicted prisoner. The Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is inapplicable to pretrial detainees, who are instead protected by the due process rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment. See City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 243-44, 103 S.Ct. 2979, 77 L.Ed.2d 605 (1983). However, ‘‘[t]he Supreme Court has concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment affords pretrial detainees protections ‘at least as great as the Eighth Amendment protections available to a convicted prisoner,’ ” Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 581 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting City of Revere, 463 U.S. at 244, 103 S.Ct. 2979), and the Third Circuit evaluates the medical indifference claims of both pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners according to the same standard. See id.
. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976).
. Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987) (citation and internal quotations omitted).
. Schieber v. City of Philadelphia, 320 F.3d 409, 421 (3d Cir. 2003) (citation and internal quotations omitted).
. See Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999). The Court does not understand Plaintiff to assert a separate claim for injury resulting from the fall from his bunk.
. Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 235 (3d Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).
. Pearson v. Prison Health Serv., 850 F.3d 526, 535 (3d Cir. 2017).
. Id. at 536.
. Plff. Ex. F; Phillips Dep. at 88. Dr. Phillips also noted the difficulties associated with assessing unwitnessed claimed injuries in the prison context. Id.
. Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 69 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that "if the failure to provide adequate care in the form of physical therapy was deliberate, and motivated by non-medical factors, then [Plaintiff] has a viable claim. It is therefore important that the trier of fact hear [Defendant’s] testimony in order to assess his credibility, and that [Plaintiff’s] .counsel be permitted to explore the doctor’s motivation on cross-examination.”) (footnote omitted).
.Bell Aff. ¶¶ 29-32.
Reference
- Full Case Name
- Nathaniel BELL v. Cameron LINDSAY
- Cited By
- 1 case
- Status
- Published