Carlisle v. Shulkin
Carlisle v. Shulkin
Opinion of the Court
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Kenneth J. Carlisle, Jr., proceeding pro se, brings suit against Defendant David Shulkin, Secretary of the Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”), for actions taken against him during his employment at the VA Regional Office in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Defendant moves to dismiss, arguing that the complaint is internally inconsistent for seeking both enforcement and de novo review of the final agency decisions of the VA’s office of employment discrimination complaint adjudication (“adjudication office”). For reasons that follow, the motion to dismiss will be granted, and the complaint will be dismissed without prejudice.
1. BACKGROUND
The complaint alleges the following facts, which are assumed to be true for purposes of the motion to dismiss. Plaintiff is a United States Army veteran who served multiple combat tours in the Gulf War and currently suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”).
Thereafter, Plaintiff contacted the equal employment opportunity counselor at the VA, alleging that his supervisor discriminated against him based on his disability (PTSD), age (51), sex (male), and race (Caucasian).
On August 12, 2012, the adjudication office issued its first final agency decision, in which it concluded that although the VA had not discriminated against Plaintiff on the basis of age, sex, or race, it had discriminated against him on the basis of his disability by failing to engage in the interactive process and by denying him a reasonable accommodation.
On June 21, 2013, the adjudication office issued a second final agency decision, concluding that Plaintiff should receive $89,737.96 in compensatory damages,
Plaintiff accepted the monetary relief, but refused reinstatement. Instead, he appealed the adjudication office’s final agency decisions to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), challenging the amount of the compensatory damages award and seeking front pay. The EEOC affirmed the final agency decisions and denied Plaintiffs motion for reconsideration.
On August 8, 2016, Plaintiff filed a pro se complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, which was transferred to this Court.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Dismissal for failure to state a claim is appropriate if the complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to establish a plausible entitlement to relief.
III. ANALYSIS
As a preliminary matter, it is unclear whether Plaintiff seeks de novo review or enforcement of the final agency decisions. In a de novo action, “a federal employee unhappy with the administrative decision may bring his or her claims to, a district court, under Section 505(a) of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a), and receive the same de novo consideration that a private sector employee enjoys in a Title VII action, under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c).”
Here, the complaint is internally inconsistent because it seeks de novo review of parts of the final agency decisions while seeking enforcement of other parts of the same decisions.
IV. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the motion to dismiss will be granted, and the complaint will be dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff will be granted leave to file an amended complaint,- in accordance ■ with the limitations set forth in this opinion. An appropriate order follows. ■
. Compl. at 4.
. Id. at 24-26.
. Id. at 24.
. Id. at 25.
. Id. at 26.
. Id.
. Id. at 35, 37-38.
. Id. at 39-44.
. The adjudication office determined Plaintiff was entitled to $85,000 in nonpecuniary, compensatory damages, plus $4,737.96 in pecuniary losses, totaling $89,737.96 in compensatory damages. Id. at 157.
. Id. at 155-56.
. See id.
. In addition, Plaintiff alleges that the VA harassed and retaliated against him by notifying him that his earnings statement had been compromised and advising him to monitor his credit report for any potential identity theft. He also alleges some conduct that refers to whistleblowers.
. See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)).
. Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 128 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937) (internal quotation marks omitted).
. Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
. Santiago, 629 F.3d at 128 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
. Morris v. Rumsfeld, 420 F.3d 287, 290 (3d Cir. 2005) (citations omitted).
. Id. at 293 (quoting Scott v. Johanns, 409 F.3d 466, 471-72 (D.C. Cir. 2005)) (italics added).
. Morris, 420 F.3d at 290.
. Id. (citing Moore v. Devine, 780 F.2d 1559, 1563 (11th Cir. 1986); Haskins v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 808 F.2d 1192, 1199 (6th Cir. 1987)).
. See Timmons v. White, 314 F.3d 1229, 1233 (10th Cir. 2003) ("a plaintiff seeking relief under § 2000e-16(c) is not entitled to litigate those portions of an EEOC decision believed tó be wrong, while at the same time binding the government on the issues resolved . in his or her favor”).
. The fáct that the liability and compensatory damages' rulings were made in two separate decisions does not change the analysis. See Morris, 420 F.3d at 294.
. Compl. at 5. He also seeks de novo review of his discrimination claims based on age, ■ sex, and race.
. Id. at 7.
. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides that "leave [to amend] shall be freely given when justice so requires.” Although Plaintiff ha? no.t requested leave to amend, the Court will afford him the opportunity to do so to clarify whether he is seeking enforcement or de novo review of the final agency decisions.
Reference
- Full Case Name
- Kenneth J. CARLISLE, Jr. v. David SHULKIN, Secretary of the United States Department of Veterans Affairs
- Status
- Published