CATERBONE v. PNC BANK

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA STANLEY J. CATERBONE, : Plaintiff, : : v. : CIVIL ACTION NO. 22-CV-1574 : PNC BANK, : Defendant. : MEMORANDUM SCHMEHL, J. /s/ JLS JULY 12, 2022 On April 22, 2022, Plaintiff Stanley J. Caterbone, a frequent pro se litigant in this Court,1 emailed the Clerk of Court a 368-page submission. Although this submission was deficient as a complaint in a civil action in a number of respects, in an abundance of caution, the Clerk of Court treated it as a Complaint, opened a civil action, and assigned the matter to the undersigned for review. Because it was not clear to the Court that Caterbone, by emailing the submission, intended to initiate a federal lawsuit, the Court entered an Order on May 4, 2022 (ECF No. 8) requiring further filings from Caterbone consistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the relevant statutes. He was also directed to pay the filing fee for the case or submit a completed application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis.

Thereafter, Caterbone emailed to the Clerk of Court a 165-page “Emergency Injunction for Stay” containing the caption for this case. (ECF No. 13.) While this pleading set forth allegations, it was not signed as required by Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 11. On June 2, 2022 he emailed another 133-page “Emergency Injunction for Stay” that was also unsigned.

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS While the allegations in Caterbone’s original Complaint (ECF No. 1) were lengthy, rambling, and at times detached from reality, briefly recounted, he appeared to seek to sue PNC Bank over an incident that occurred at one of its branches where he maintains accounts and safety deposit boxes. His submission revealed that his bank account at PNC Bank was to be

He has repeatedly submitted unsigned pleadings and pleading that do not comply with Rules 8 and 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court’s Order of June 23, 2022 (ECF No. 15) again informed Caterbone that unsigned pleadings are not acceptable, and warned him that every pleading he submitted to the Court had to contain a handwritten signature. Rather than follow this simple directive, each of the submissions Caterbone emailed to the Clerk of Court thereafter failed to contain a handwritten signature. (See ECF Nos. 16, 17.) This is not the only case in which Caterbone has submitted unsigned pleadings or submitted pleadings with an unauthorized electronic signature. A cursory review of Caterbone’s recent prior cases indicate the following documents were submitted without compliance with Rule 11: Civil Action 21- 5683, ECF Nos. 3, 7, 10, 13; Civil Action 20-1951, ECF Nos. 1, 7, 11, 12, 14, 16, 17, 18, 20-1, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 34, 36; Civil Action 18-4222, ECF No. 2. closed as of April 27, 2022 because he allegedly “engaged in inappropriate and disruptive behavior towards employees of PNC Bank. . . . Accordingly, PNC Bank has made a business decision to close the above-referenced retail deposit account. . . . PNC will no longer provide you with banking services related to the above-referenced Account. . . . Please note: this decision is final.” (ECF No. 1 at 24.) The lease on a safety deposit box was also to be canceled. (Id.) Caterbone also submitted copies of his bank statements from PNC. Apparently, he had accused PNC of engaging in fraud and extortion, although the bases of the accusations were unclear. (Id. at 36-37, 44-45.)

In response to the Court’s first Order directing him to refile his pleading in a form that satisfied Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 10, Caterbone returned with his 165-page “Emergency Injunction for Stay” containing the caption for this case. (ECF No. 13.) Two weeks later, he filed a substantially identical copy of the same pleading.3 (ECF No. 14.)

Although unsigned, the Court will deem Caterbone’s “Emergency Injunction for Stay” (ECF No. 13) to constitute an Amended Complaint (“Am. Compl.”) and will screen the allegations pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

Caterbone asserts that he has held safety deposit boxes and a checking account at the Millersville and Duke Street branches of PNC Bank for at least three years. (Am. Compl. at 2.)

He visits the branches to use his safety deposit boxes several times each week to replace back-up computer drives with current back-up drives in an effort “to thwart the computer hacking and

The balance of Caterbone’s allegations concern allegations of torture by the use of microwave weapons to hijack his brain, which allegedly causes “Havana Syndrome” and that have been used against him since he became a federal whistleblower in 1987. (Id.) While PNC Bank is the only named Defendant, Caterbone alleges wide-spread corruption in the City of Lancaster and in its police department, ongoing COINTELPRO surveillance, break-ins, computer hacking, stalking, harassment, false arrests, false imprisonment, and psychological warfare with gaslighting on a daily basis. (Id.) He describes events from 2010 involving Fulton Bank (id. at 8-12), and a chronology dating from 1904 of harassment of his family and himself by government officials (id. 14-118). He also lists several pages of incidents where he has been accused of illegal trespassing (id. 119-121), and a list of allegedly false arrests from 1987 to 2007 (id. at 122-123). Finally, he attaches a copy of a mostly blank application he apparently filed with the Pennsylvania Board of Pardons seeking to commute his parole on his state convictions for stalking/repeatedly committing acts to cause fear, reckless endangerment, and simple assault in the case of Commonwealth v. Caterbone, CP-36-CR-6520-2017. (ECF No. 13- 3.) As noted, at the end of his pleading he invokes the RICO statute but makes no allegations about the elements of that claim.4 (ECF No. 13-3 at 17.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW Caterbone is granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Accordingly, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) requires the Court to dismiss the Complaint if it fails to state a claim. Whether a complaint fails to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), see Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999), which requires the Court to determine whether the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotations omitted). “At this early stage of the litigation,’ ‘[the Court will] accept the facts alleged in [the pro se] complaint as true,’ ‘draw[] all reasonable inferences in [the plaintiff’s] favor,’ and ‘ask only whether [that] complaint, liberally construed, . . . contains facts sufficient to state a plausible [] claim.’”

Shorter v. United States, 12 F.4th 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 774, 782 (7th Cir. 2015)). Conclusory allegations do not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Furthermore, the Court must review the pleadings and dismiss the matter if it determines, inter alia, that the action fails to set forth a proper basis for this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-

III. DISCUSSION A. Claims Under Federal Law Caterbone invokes the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) by name on the last page of his pleading. This is the only reference to a federal claim. RICO “makes it unlawful ‘for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.’” In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 362 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)). To state a civil RICO claim, a plaintiff must plausibly allege the following elements: “(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). “In order to have standing to litigate a civil RICO claim, a plaintiff must show that [he] suffered an injury to [his] business or property and that the injury was proximately caused by the defendant’s racketeering activities.” Miller v. Pocono Ranch Lands Prop. Owners Ass’n Inc., 557 F. App’x 141, 145 (3d Cir. 2014) (per curiam). To the extent Caterbone is raising RICO claims, his attempt to do so by invoking the name of the statute constitutes nothing more than a conclusory allegation wholly unsupported by factual allegations supporting the conduct, enterprise, pattern, racketeering activity, and injury elements.

Accordingly, Caterbone has failed to allege a plausible basis for standing to bring a RICO claim, as well as state a plausible RICO claim. Nor can the Court discern any other plausible basis for a claim based on Caterbone’s submissions.5

See, e.g., McGinnis v. Freudenthal, 426 F. App’x 625, 628 (10th Cir. 2011) (“Mr. McGinnis’ claims of electromagnetic torture [by government and prison officials] are delusional and unsupported by any factual basis. The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing these claims as frivolous.”); Price v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, No. 20-3015, 2020 WL 4368063, at *3 (E.D. Pa. July 30, 2020), aff’d, 845 F. App’x 106 (3d Cir. 2021) (finding plaintiff’s allegations to be factually frivolous where plaintiff asserted that “numerous law enforcement agencies, attorneys, prison officials, and medical professionals have used neurological and psychological technology to control the ‘four basic groups of his brain and mental functions’ and “that the use of this ‘technology’ and ‘mind control’ has caused him numerous impairments and drove him to criminal and erratic behavior”); Nduka v. Williams, 410 F. Supp. 3d 719, 721-722 (E.D. Pa. 2019) (finding pro se plaintiff’s allegations of “the existence of a wide-reaching conspiracy among various rappers, producers, and their ‘affiliates’ specifically designed to thwart his success in the music industry by hacking devices and engaging in a social media campaign to taunt [plaintiff]” were wholly incredible and warranted dismissal as factually frivolous pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)); Brown v. United States, No. 19- 154, 2019 WL 3753193, at *2-*5 (E.D.N.C. May 10, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 3783271 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 12, 2019) (dismissing pro se plaintiff’s claims that the “United States is attacking him with satellite directed energy weapons” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) because it lacked an arguable basis in fact and rose to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible); Rhodes v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, No. 16-0093, 2017 WL 1021314, at *4 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 16, 2017) (“the remainder of Rhodes’ complaint, which references unspecified actions allegedly taken by unidentified FBI agents related to harassment, torture (using ‘directed energy weapons’), theft, destruction of property, defamation, civil rights violations, attempted murder (‘by forced suicide’), and misconduct, suggests that any FOIA claims regarding these allegations are frivolous because “the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or wholly incredible.”); cf. Terry v. United States, 2014 WL 5106984, *1-2 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (allegations in paid complaint that NSA and others were using directed energy weapons to B. Claims Under State Law Because the Court has dismissed the RICO claim and there are no other non-frivolous federal law claims apparent in Caterbone’s pleading, the Court will not exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) over any state law claims. Accordingly, the only independent basis for jurisdiction over any such claims is 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), which grants a district court jurisdiction over a case in which “the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between . . . citizens of different States.”

Section 1332(a) requires “‘complete diversity between all plaintiffs and all defendants,’ even though only minimal diversity is constitutionally required. This means that, unless there is some other basis for jurisdiction, ‘no plaintiff [may] be a citizen of the same state as any defendant.’” Lincoln Ben. Life Co., 800 F.3d at 104 (quoting Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 89 (2005) and Zambelli Fireworks Mfg. Co. v. Wood, 592 F.3d 412, 419 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal footnotes omitted)). An individual is a citizen of the state where he is domiciled, meaning the state where he is physically present and intends to remain. See Washington v. Hovensa LLC, 652 F.3d 340, 344 (3d Cir. 2011). A national banking association is a citizen of the State designated in its articles of association as its main office. See Wachovia Bank v. Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303, 318 (2006).

It is the plaintiff’s burden to establish diversity of citizenship. See Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U.S. 66, 72 (1939); Quaker State Dyeing & Finishing Co., Inc. v. ITT Terryphone Corp., 461 F.2d 1140, 1143 (3d Cir. 1972) (stating that, in diversity cases, the plaintiff must demonstrate send voices into plaintiff’s head were “frivolous, delusional and fanciful” and did not confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court). complete diversity between the parties and that the amount in controversy requirement has been met); Jackson v. Rosen, C.A. No. 20-2842, 2020 WL 3498131, at *8 (E.D. Pa. June 26, 2020).

Caterbone does not allege the citizenship of the parties. Rather, he provides only Pennsylvania addresses for himself and Defendant PNC, which suggests that diversity is lacking.6 Accordingly, Caterbone has not sufficiently alleged that the parties are diverse for purposes of establishing the Court’s jurisdiction over any state law claims he intends to pursue.

IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Court will dismiss this case in part with prejudice and in part without prejudice. All federal law claims are dismissed with prejudice and all state law claims are dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. An appropriate order follows that includes the requirement, noted above, that Caterbone must show cause why an injunction should not be entered against him barring him from filing any further unsigned pleadings with the Clerk of Court.7

at 1038; see also Gagliardi v. McWilliams, 834 F.2d 81, 83 (3d Cir. 1987). Third, the scope of the injunctive order “must be narrowly tailored to fit the particular circumstances of the case before the [ ] Court.” Brow, 994 F.2d at 1038; see also Chipps v. United States Dist. Ct. for the Middle Dist. of Pa., 882 F.2d 72, 73 (3d Cir. 1989).

Caterbone has demonstrated a continuing pattern of abuse by emailing submissions to the Clerk of Court that do not contain a hand placed signature. It is unclear why he continues to abuse the judicial process by engaging in this conduct. Accordingly, this Order provides Caterbone with notice that, unless he can show cause otherwise, an injunction will be entered preventing him from filing unsigned documents in this Court, other than a notice of appeal of the dismissal of this case. In the event such an injunction issues and Caterbone thereafter files unsigned submissions with the Clerk of Court, the injunction order will instruct the Clerk to return such material to him without filing it, along with a copy of the injunction order. The scope of such an injunction order will be narrowly tailored to fit the particular circumstances of this case since it will not prevent Caterbone from filing pleadings that comply with Rule 11, and will not prohibit him from filing an appeal in this case.