IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA JORGE CHAVEZ, : Civil No. 1:24-CV-00345 : Petitioner, : : v. : : WARDEN ARVIZA, : : Respondent. : Judge Jennifer P. Wilson MEMORANDUM Pending before the Court is Petitioner Jorge Chavez’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to the provisions of

. (Doc. 1.) For the reasons set forth below, the petition will be dismissed as moot. BACKGROUND On February 22, 2024, while incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution Allenwood (“FCI-Allenwood”) in White Deer, Pennsylvania, Petitioner commenced the above-captioned action by filing a Section 2241 petition. (Doc. 1.) The court received the petition on February 28, 2024. (Id.) On March 19, 2024, the court entered an order serving a copy of the petition on Warden Arviza (“Respondent”). (Doc. 5.) Respondent filed a response to the petition on April 23, 2024, suggesting mootness following Petitioner’s April 4, 2024 release. (Doc. 9.) In the petition, Petitioner requests that the BOP give him credit for the period he was incarcerated in Peru and awaiting extradition to the United States

from October 10, 2022 to December 20, 2022. (Doc. 1.) Following Respondent’s filing suggesting mootness, the court reviewed the BOP inmate locator, which reveals that Petitioner was released from federal

custody on April 4, 2024. The BOP inmate locator is available at the following website: https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/. This website reflects that Petitioner, having a “Register Number” of “44050-004,” was “Released On: 04/04/2024.” See

Thus, on April 26, 2024, the Court issued an order directing Petitioner to

show cause why his petition should not be dismissed as moot. (Doc. 10.) Petitioner has been released from custody and has not updated the court of his address.1 The court’s April 8, 2024 order granting Respondent’s motion for an

extension of time has also been returned to the court as “unable to forward.” (Doc. 11.) DISCUSSION “Article III of the [United States] Constitution limits federal ‘judicial Power’

to the adjudication of ‘Cases’ or ‘Controversies.’” Abreu v. Superintendent Smithfield SCI,

(3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Toll Bros., Inc. v. Twp.

1 On February 28, 2024, Petitioner was notified of the affirmative obligation to update the court with any change in address. (Doc. 3.) of Readington,

(3d Cir. 2009) (quoting U.S. Const. art. III, § 2)). In order “[f]or a case or controversy to exist, a petitioner, throughout each stage of

the litigation, ‘must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the [respondent] and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.’” See id. (quoting DeFoy v. McCullough,

(3d Cir. 2005)) (quoting

Lewis v. Cont'l Bank Corp.,

(1990)). Consequently, “a habeas corpus petition generally becomes moot when a prisoner is released from custody because the petitioner has received the relief sought.” See

(citing DeFoy,

).

Nevertheless, a petitioner who has been released from custody “may obtain judicial review of a [habeas] petition by showing that he continues to suffer from secondary or collateral consequences of his conviction,” see

(citations omitted),

or sentence, see Burkey v. Marberry,

(3d Cir. 2009). Generally speaking, “collateral consequences will be presumed when the [petitioner] is attacking his conviction while still serving the sentence imposed for that conviction [and] where the [petitioner] is attacking that portion of his sentence that is still

being served.” See

(citing United States v. Jackson,

(3d Cir. 2008)). Once a petitioner has been released, however, the court does “not presume

that a conviction carries collateral consequences.” See Abreu,

(citing Burkey,

). Instead, the court “must ‘address[ ] the issue of collateral consequences in terms of the likelihood that a favorable decision would

redress the injury or wrong.’” See

(quoting Burkey,

). For that reason, “[i]t is not enough if ‘collateral consequences proffered by the petitioner’ amount to ‘a possibility rather than a certainty or even a probability.’” See

(quoting Burkey,

). Consistent with these principles, the court finds that, while the instant petition is generally moot, as Petitioner was released from federal custody on April 4, 2024, Petitioner may still obtain judicial review of his federal sentence if he can

show that he continues to suffer from secondary or collateral consequences of that sentence. See

Here, the period of time granted for Petitioner to demonstrate that he continues to suffer from secondary or collateral consequences of his federal

sentence has passed, and Petitioner has failed to respond. As a result, his petition will be dismissed as moot. CONCLUSION Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, Petitioner’s Section 2241

petition will be dismissed as moot. An appropriate order follows. s/Jennifer P. Wilson JENNIFER P. WILSON United States District Judge Middle District of Pennsylvania Dated: July 8, 2024