| IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA | JAMMY ALPHONSE, : No. 3:24-CV-0855 Petitioner : : (Judge Munley) | v. WARDEN RICKARD, | Respondent : | □□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□ DEDEDE DEED DEDEDE EEDEDIEID EDDIE □□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□ MEMORANDUM | Petitioner Jammy Alphonse is a federal inmate currently incarcerated at FCI Schuylkill, in Minersville, Pennsylvania. He initiated the above-captioned action by filing a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. | § 2241. Apparently, Alphonse is attempting to collaterally attack his conviction and sentence entered in 2022 by the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. Because it plainly appears from the Section 2241 petition that Alphonse is not entitled to relief, the court will dismiss his petition without a

response from the government. See

Rule 4.' | I. BACKGROUND Alphonse is currently serving a 94-month aggregate sentence imposed by |the United States District Court for the Distnct of Massachusetts for conspiracy to

| 1 See also

Rule 1(b) (permitting district court, in its discretion, to apply Rules | Governing Section 2254 Cases to Section 2241 habeas petitions).

| commit wire fraud, false representation of social security number, aggravated | identity theft, felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, and possession with intent to distribute fentanyl. See United States v. Alphonse, No. 1:22-CR- 10104-LTS, Doc. 35 (D. Mass. Oct. 6, 2022). It does not appear that Alphonse filed a direct appeal or a motion to vacate pursuant to

. See generally Alphonse, No. 1:22-CR-10104-LTS (D. Mass. ). | Instead, in May 2024, Alphonse lodged the instant Section 2241 petition in court. (Doc. 1). Although his petition is not a model of clarity, he seems to be collaterally attacking his

(g) (“section 922(g)”) felon-in-

| possession conviction through the saving clause found in

(e), relying primarily on the decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Range v. Attorney General of U.S.,

(3d Cir. 2023) (en banc), vacated, Garland v. Range, _ _S.Ct.___, No. 23-374,

| (July 2, 2024). (See Doc. 1 at 1, 3-15). Because the court does not have [jurisdiction to entertain Alphonse’s Section 2241 petition, it will be dismissed. DISCUSSION | As best as the court can discern, Alphonse is challenging his Section 922(g) felon-in possession conviction by arguing that an intervening change in Third Circuit case law renders this conviction unconstitutional. (See Doc. 1 at 1,

| 3-15).2 His attempt to utilize the saving clause,

(e), to | collaterally attack his felon-in possession conviction via a Section 2241 petition fails for at least two reasons. First, Alphonse could have raised his arguments based on new developments in case law in a timely Section 2255 motion. Second, even if Alphonse had already filed a Section 2255 motion, recent | Supreme Court precedent unequivocally forecloses Alphonse’s attempt to utilize

a Section 2241 petition to collaterally attack his conviction. Generally, the presumptive method for bringing a collateral challenge to the

| validity of a federal conviction or sentence is a motion to vacate pursuant to

. See Okereke v. United States,

(3d Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). Only in the exceedingly rare circumstance where a Section 2255 motion is “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of [the inmate’s] detention” can a federal prisoner proceed under Section 2241 instead of Section 2255. See

(e) (sometimes referred to as the “safety valve” or “saving clause’); In re Dorsainvil,

(3d Cir. 1997), abrogated by Jones v. Hendrix,

(2023).

|? Alphonse also includes several handwritten pages that appear to challenge the search of his | residence and certain sentencing enhancements. (See Doc. 1 at 2, 16-19). These are claims | that should have been raised in the trial court or on appeal. There is simply no basis for Alphonse | to assert them in a petition under

.

| For many years, the law in the Third Circuit (and the majority of other circuits) was that this “saving clause” in Section 2255(e) applied when an intervening change in controlling, substantive law renders the petitioner's prior | conduct noncriminal. See Bruce v. Warden Lewisburg USP,

, 179- 80 (3d Cir. 2017) (collecting cases), abrogation recognized by Voneida v. | Johnson,

(3d Cir. 2023). In other words, for more than two decades, the Third Circuit held that Section 2255(e) permitted a federal prisoner

| to resort to a Section 2241 petition when he “had no earlier opportunity to challenge” a conviction for a crime “that an intervening change in substantive law

may negate.”

at 180 (quoting Dorsainvil,

). In June 2023, however, the Supreme Court of the United States decided | Jones v. Hendrix, abrogating—among other circuit court decisions—In re Dorsainvil and causing a profound change in habeas practice with respect to Section 2241 petitions. See Jones,

. The Jones Court explicitly held that “§ 2255(e)’s saving clause does not permit a prisoner asserting an | intervening change in statutory interpretation to circumvent AEDPA’s restrictions

on second or successive § 2255 motions by filing a § 2241 petition.” Id. at 471. | Rather, Section 2255(e)’s saving clause is reserved for exceedingly rare situations where it is “impossible or impracticable to seek relief in the sentencing court,” such as when the sentencing court dissolves or when the prisoner is

|

| unable to be present at a necessary hearing. See id. at 474-75, 478. The savinc clause also “preserves recourse to § 2241 . . . for challenges to detention other than collateral attacks on a sentence.” Id. at 478; see also id. at 475-76. In all | other circumstances, a convicted prisoner's only avenue for filing a Second or successive Section 2255 motion attacking his sentence is expressly codified in |

(h): “newly discovered evidence,”

(h)(1), or “a

new rule of constitutional law,”

§ 2255(h)(2) (emphasis added). Jones, 599 | U.S. at 477-80. Alphonse’s Section 2241 petition fails under the law preexisting Jones and, of course, following it. First and foremost, Section 2255(e)’s saving clause does not apply here because Alphonse had the ability to raise his Range-based claim (which case was decided June 6, 2023) in a Section 2255 motion. After all, Alphonse’s one-year statute of limitations for a Section 2255 motion did not expire until September 29, 2023. See Alphonse, No. 1:22-CR-10104-LTS, Doc. | 35 at 1 (entering judgment on September 15, 2022); Feb. R. APP. P. 4(b) (providing 14 days in which to appeal criminal conviction);

(f)(1) (providing one year from “the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes

| final” to file Section 2255 motion). The fact that Alphonse failed to file such a | motion does not render Section 2255 “inadequate or ineffective” such that he can resort to Section 2241. See, e.g., Lanter v. Warden Lewisburg USP, 844 F.

| App’x 489, 490-91 (3d Cir. 2021) (nonprecedential) (explaining that simply | because petitioner failed to timely file an initial Section 2255 motion invoking intervening change in controlling law based on new Supreme Court precedent | did not render Section 2255 “inadequate or ineffective” and permit resort to a | Section 2241 petition through Section 2255(e)).3 | Additionally, after Jones v. Hendrix, Alphonse’s invocation of a purported change in controlling, substantive law no longer qualifies for resort to the saving | clause in Section 2255(e). Thus, even if he had filed an initial Section 2255 motion in the sentencing court, his instant Range-based claim does not meet the statutory requirements for a second or successive Section 2255 motion or render Section 2255 “inadequate or ineffective” such that he could file a Section 2241 | petition in this court. Essentially, the saving clause in Section 2255(e) does not apply to | Alphonse’s claim. Thus, he cannot collaterally challenge his 2022 conviction | through the instant Section 2241 petition. His petition, therefore, must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See Cradle, 290 F.3d at 538, 539.

| 3 The court further observes that the Range case likely does not represent an intervening change | in controlling, substantive law because it was subsequently vacated by the Supreme Court o | the United States. This issue, however, is immaterial to the court’s jurisdictional inquiry and thus | does not warrant further discussion.

|

CONCLUSION | Based on the foregoing, the court will dismiss Alphonse’s petition for a writ

of habeas corpus pursuant to

. An appropriate Order follows.

Date: FAG rr () / \ UDGE/JULIA K. MUNLEY | nited/States Di