IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ALLEEM ALBERT WALKER-BORDEN, : Plaintiff, : : v. : Case No. 2:25-cv-01581-JDW TRACY TRIPP, : Defendant. :

MEMORANDUM Alleem Albert Walker-Borden asks me to vacate a conviction on charges against him in Delaware County and asserts constitutional claims against his former public defender Tracy Tripp. Neither claim is viable under federal civil rights law, so I will dismiss both of them. Because I see no basis for Mr. Walker-Borden to salvage his claims through an amended pleading, I will not give him leave to file one. I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS In July 2024, Mr. Walker-Borden faced criminal charges in Delaware County, Pennsylvania, for firearms possession. Jury selection for his case occurred on July 17, 2024. After the Common Pleas Court empaneled the jury, Ms. Tripp pressured Mr. Walker- Borden to accept a plea deal, even though he wanted to go to trial. He did, and the public docket reflects that he received a sentence of three to six years in prison. , CP-23-CR-2675-2022 (C.P. Delaware). Several days later, he decided he wanted to withdraw his guilty plea, but Ms. Tripp told him that the court would not let him and refused to file motion. Mr. Walker-Borden called a different lawyer, who filed the motion, but the court denied it as untimely. He asserts claims for violations of his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and a state law claim for legal malpractice. He also seeks

dismissal of the Delaware County charges pending against him. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW A plaintiff seeking leave to proceed must establish that she is

unable to pay for the costs of her suit. ,

, 601 (3d Cir. 1989). Where, as here, a court grants a plaintiff leave to proceed , it must determine whether the complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted.

(e)(2)(B)(ii). That inquiry applies the standard for a motion to

dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). I must determine whether the Complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” ,

(2009) (quotations omitted). That means I must accept the factual allegations in the Complaint as true, draw inferences in favor of the

plaintiff, and determine whether there is a plausible claim. ,

(3d Cir. 2021). Conclusory allegations do not suffice. ,

. When a plaintiff is proceeding ,, I construe her allegations liberally.

,

(3d Cir. 2021). III. DISCUSSION A.

Mr. Walker-Borden has filled out the required paperwork and demonstrated that he cannot afford to prepay the required fees. I will therefore grant him leave to proceed . Because he is a prisoner, he will still have to pay the fees in increments,

regardless of the outcome of this case. B. Plausibility Of Claims Mr. Walker-Borden asserts claims based on alleged violations of his constitutional rights. The vehicle by which federal constitutional claims may be brought in federal court

is

. “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” ,

(1988).

1. Vacatur of conviction Mr. Walker-Borden seeks dismissal all of the charges in Delaware County, which I take as a request to vacate his sentence. “[W]hen a state prisoner is challenging the very

fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.” ,

(1973). I will therefore dismiss this claim without prejudice to Mr. Walker-Borden filing a petition seeking this relief after exhausting state remedies.

2. Constitutional claims against Ms. Tripp “[A] public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.”

,

(1981) (footnote omitted). “Attorneys performing their traditional functions will not be considered state actors solely on the basis of their position as officers of the court.” ,

, 277 (3d Cir. 1999). Because Ms. Tripp is not a state actor, her actions cannot give rise to a claim for

violation of Constitutional rights under Section 1983, so I will dismiss Mr. Walker-Borden’s constitutional claims against her with prejudice. C. State Law Claims Having dismissed Mr. Walker-Borden’s federal claims, I will not exercise

supplemental jurisdiction under

(c) over Mr. Walker-Borden’s state law claim. And there does not appear to be an independent basis for federal jurisdiction over that claim because Mr. Walker-Borden does not allege that he and Ms. Tripp are from

different states, nor does there appear to be a basis for him to do so. That means this Court has no jurisdiction to hear the state law claims, so will dismiss them without prejudice. IV. CONCLUSION I will grant Mr. Walker-Borden leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fees.

I will dismiss his claims asking me to vacate his state sentence and against Ms. Tripp with prejudice and his state law claims without prejudice. I will not give him leave to amend because there is no amendment that could cure the flaws with his pleading. An

appropriate Order follows. BY THE COURT:

JOSHUA D. WOLSON, J. July 31, 2025