IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

PAUL GAMBOA TAYLOR, No. 4:04-CV-00553 Petitioner, (Chief Judge Brann) v. JOHN WETZEL, Secretary, THIS IS A CAPITAL CASE Pennsylvania Department of Corrections; LOUIS FOLINO, Superintendent of the State Correctional Institution at Greene; and MARIROSA LAMAS, Superintendent of the State Correctional Institution at Rockview, Respondents.

AMENDED ORDER

SEPTEMBER 18, 2025 On March 9, 1999, the Court denied Petitioner Paul Gamboa Taylor’s petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to

, in which he argued, among other claims, that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present certain evidence of his alleged incompetency.1 The Court did not hold an evidentiary hearing on that claim because it initially deemed it procedurally defaulted.2 Although the Court later vacated its procedural default ruling, its

1 See Taylor v. Horn. No. 4:98-CV-01465-MWB, Doc. 14; Doc. 59-2 at 26–28. merits ruling was equally unsupported by an evidentiary hearing.3 On September 20, 2007, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the

Court’s denial of relief and concluded that the Court had not erred in declining to allow Taylor an evidentiary hearing related to his competency because he had already been allowed a hearing before the first PCRA court.4

On March 21, 2013, Taylor moved for relief from judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6).5 In his motion, Taylor argued that the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Martinez v. Ryan,

(2012), constituted “extraordinary circumstances” that required his case be re-opened and

the Court to “reconsider its rulings regarding the claim that trial counsel was ineffective.”6 Martinez allows a petitioner in federal court to present a procedurally defaulted claim of trial counsel ineffectiveness where he can show that procedural default was caused by post-conviction conviction ineffectiveness.7

Taylor argued that Martinez rendered erroneous the Third Circuit’s conclusion that his trial counsel ineffectiveness claim failed for a lack of evidence because the lack of evidence was caused by his post-conviction counsel’s ineffectiveness.8

3 See Doc. 3 at 33–34. 4 Taylor v. Horn,

, 439 n.19 (3d. Cir. 2007). 5 Doc. 13. 6

at 2–3. 7 504 U.S. at 14. 8 See Doc. 16. On October 15, 2014, the Court denied Taylor’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion.9 The Court recognized that, to the extent Taylor sought substantive reconsideration of

the prior denial of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim on the merit, his request was barred as an improper second or successive habeas petition. 10 Despite this acknowledgment, the Court still analyzed the substance of Taylor’s motion

because he argued that his motion was only intended to challenge the Third Circuit’s procedural ruling that he had “failed to develop” evidence in state court.11 Although the Court ultimately denied Taylor’s motion, its analysis intermingled consideration of Taylor’s procedurally improper ineffective assistance of counsel

reconsideration claim with consideration of his procedurally proper evidentiary reconsideration claim.12 On review, the Third Circuit interpreted Taylor’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion to

have consisted of two distinct parts: (1) a request to relitigate his trial counsel ineffectiveness claim; and (2) a challenge to the Court’s failure to conduct an evidentiary hearing.13 Though the Third Circuit affirmed the Court’s denial of Taylor’s motion as it related to his evidentiary claim, it vacated in part and

remanded for the Court “to dismiss Taylor’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion to the extent he

9 Doc. 41; Doc. 42. 10 See Doc. 41 at 14–15 (acknowledging Gonzalez v. Crosby,

(2005), bars “second or successive habeas petitions disguised as Rule 60(b) motions[.]”). 11

at 16–18. 12 See Doc. 41 at 15–34; Doc. 42. 13 Taylor v. Comm’r of Pa. Dep’t of Corrs., No. 14-9004,

, at *3–*4 (3d. Cir. Aug. 13, 2025). challenged the ruling on his trial counsel’s ineffectiveness claims on the merits, as that constitutes a second or successive petition that he did not receive permission to

file under

(b)(2).”14 The Court now acts in compliance with the Third Circuit’s mandate.15 AND NOW, upon consideration of the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY

ORDERED that: 1. The Court’s October 14, 2014, Order (Doc. 42) is AMENDED to reflect that Petitioner Paul Gamboa Taylor’s motion for relief from judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) (Doc. 13) is

DENIED for the reasons explained by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Taylor v. Comm’r of Pa. Dep’t of Corrs., No. 14-9004,

(3d. Cir. Aug. 13, 2025), as

well as for the specific reason that, to the extent Taylor challenges the Court’s earlier ruling on his trial counsel’s ineffectiveness claims on the merits, that challenge constitutes an improper second or successive petition under

(b)(2).

2. The Clerk is ORDERED to CLOSE this case.

14

. 15 Doc. 46. 3. There is no basis for the issuance of a certificate of appealability. See

(c).

BY THE COURT:

s/ Matthew W. Brann Matthew W. Brann Chief United States District Judge