UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

DERREK LARKIN,

Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:25-cv-00795

v. (SAPORITO, J.)

ARVIZA, .,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM Plaintiff Derrek Larkin, a prisoner proceeding , has filed an amended complaint (Doc. 27) raising a series of allegations against personnel affiliated with FCC-Allenwood. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, he will be permitted to seek injunctive relief based on his allegations of inadequate medical care, but all other claims will be dismissed. I. BACKGROUND Larkin’s initial complaint sought injunctive relief related to the alleged confiscation of his CPAP machine. That complaint was dismissed as moot based on the defendant’s uncontested evidence that Larkin had been provided a new CPAP machine, (Doc. 23), but Larkin was permitted to file this amended complaint. Larkin broadly alleges that eight defendants affiliated with FCC- Allenwood have engaged in a wide variety of “verbal and mental abuse”

and “abuse of position and power.” However, the essence of his complaint concerns his efforts to secure a CPAP machine and the defendants’ alleged retaliation after he pursued administrative remedies and filed

this lawsuit. Larkin alleges that when he arrived at FCC-Allenwood, it took more than six months for him to receive a CPAP machine, despite a court

order that he be provided one. He ultimately received the machine, but it was later confiscated during a cell search. This search in turn resulted in “falsified” disciplinary charges, allegedly imposed in retaliation for

Larkin filing prison grievances. Larkin was transferred to the Secure Housing Unit, where he was refused access to a CPAP machine. He filed numerous “cop-outs1” and had “hundreds of in person interaction[s]” with

staff about this issue, but “90 percent” of his requests went unanswered. Larkin also made repeated requests to be seen by the “psych department” for mental health concerns, which were allegedly ignored or denied.

1 The term “cop-out” may refer to an “Inmate’s Request to Staff Member,” a method for prisoners to seek informal resolution. , , , No. 1:10-CV-00135,

, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 22, 2010). Larkin alleges that he has been subject to ongoing harassment

based on his attempts to grieve and litigate the CPAP issue. On an unspecified date, Lt. Carpenter and two John Doe officers allegedly stopped Larkin to perform a pat-down search, during which they

allegedly “humiliated, mentally and verbally abused” Larkin. After the search, one of the officers said: “You[’re] the sh[*]thead who likes to file lawsuits.” Larkin said that he wanted to be able to sleep at night

(apparently in reference to the CPAP machine), “and for the staff to realize that he still has rights to request and file if need be,” to which one officer replied: “Well, don’t come to prison,” while another smirked and

laughed. Larkin was then escorted to Carpenter’s office, where he allegedly received “verbal and mental abuse . . . non-stop [and] without reason.”

Carpenter questioned him “for the better part of 10 minutes” about this lawsuit, asking: “What chance do you really have?” and “How much good time you really want to lose?” Carpenter then arranged for Larkin’s cell

to be searched, and allegedly told the searching officer: “Make sure you f[*]ck it up nice for him.” Larkin was also strip searched, allegedly for no “proper reason.” On October 22, 2025, Larkin requested a replacement hose for his

CPAP machine, because the hose had been damaged during a cell search. Boyer, a “medical officer,” allegedly told Larkin that he was “too busy to get a replacement hose,” and that he should try again next week when

his “luck might be better.” Larkin “begg[ed] and plead[ed]” for the equipment, and asked “how he was going to sleep until ‘next week’,” to which Boyer allegedly replied: “That[] does not look like my problem.” An

onlooking officer, Moyer, “added something on to [Boyer’s] inappropriate statements,” but the complaint does not explain what Moyer added. Throughout the complaint, Larkin names a series of other actions

that he attributes to retaliation. His administrative remedies have “all in some way been stonewalled” by the staff, as part of an alleged “conspiracy” to limit, delay, or obstruct grievances. “On more than one

occasion,” unspecified correctional officers have “addressed [Larkin] to speak about” this lawsuit. He thus blames retaliation for the denial of a visit with his wife; a “falsified threat assessment” leading to another

period in the SHU; and three “falsified shots/incident reports.” At some unspecified time in the SHU, Larkin “stated [loud] enough so the whole SHU range could hear him that he had ‘rights.’” An unspecified officer allegedly responded: “You only have the rights I give you.” A case

manager allegedly told Larkin: “This is what you get when you don’t lay down . . . maybe now you’ll learn your lesson.” In addition, unidentified staff allegedly withheld or delayed his legal and personal mail in the SHU

for as long as “10-16 days without reason,” “open[ed] and cop[ied legal] mail without [Larkin’s] consent,” and “illegally denied [Larkin] all forms of communication with his family.”

Larkin asserts constitutional violations based on retaliation, “abuse of power,” “withholding/tampering with mail,” “obstruction of administrative process,” “mental and verbal assault,” “intimidation,” and

deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, in various combinations, against eight defendants: Warden Arviza, Deputy Warden Wezneski, Dr. Cullens, Lt. Carpenter, Boyer, Moyer, and the two John

Does. He seeks monetary relief and immediate release to home confinement.2 II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court is obligated to screen a civil

2 The complaint also includes a reference to potential “declaratory judgment on some issues,” but does not indicate what declaratory relief Larkin is seeking, if any. complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity

or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a); , 230 Fed. App’x 195, 197 (3d Cir. 2007). The Court must dismiss the complaint if it is “frivolous” or “fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). The Court has a similar obligation with respect to actions brought and actions concerning prison conditions.

(e)(2)(B)(i); . § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1); ,

(W.D. Pa. 2008) (summarizing prisoner litigation screening procedures and

standards). The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim under § 1915A(b)(1), § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), or § 1997e(c) is the same as

that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. , 481 Fed. App’x 705, 706 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam); ,

(M.D. Pa. 2010); ,

. “Under Rule 12(b)(6), a motion to dismiss may be granted only if, accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a court finds the plaintiff’s claims lack facial

plausibility.” ,

(3d Cir. 2011) (citing ,

(2007)). In deciding the motion, the Court may consider the facts alleged on the

face of the complaint, as well as “documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.” ,

(2007). Although the Court must accept the fact allegations in the complaint as true, it is not compelled to accept “unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences, or a legal conclusion couched as a factual

allegation.” ,

(3d Cir. 2013) (quoting ,

, 195 (3d Cir. 2007)). III. DISCUSSION

A. Monetary Relief Larkin’s claims for monetary damages cannot proceed. In ,

(1971), the Supreme Court recognized an implied right of action for

damages against federal officials for constitutional violations. However, the right does not extend to cases presenting a different “context” from those previously recognized by the Supreme Court. “If the case is

different in a meaningful way from previous cases decided . . . then the context is new.” ,

(2017). If the case presents a new context, the Court must consider whether there are

other “special factors” that cast doubt on “whether the Judiciary is well suited, absent congressional action or instruction, to consider and weigh the costs and benefits of allowing a damages action to proceed.” . at

136. Ultimately, “if a court concludes that even a single reason exists to pause before applying in a new context, then special factors counseling hesitation exist and a remedy does not lie.”

,

(2022) (quotations omitted). In , the Supreme Court recognized a damages remedy where a plaintiff alleged that he was detained, and his apartment searched,

without probable cause.

. The Supreme Court subsequently permitted an Eighth Amendment claim for damages against a federal prison officer for denial of adequate medical care. In

that case, an inmate with asthma was kept in prison against the advice of doctors, denied medical attention for eight hours after a severe asthma attack, given drugs that made his attack more severe, treated with a faulty respirator, and not timely taken to the hospital, which resulted in

his death. ,

, 16 n.1 (1980).3 However, Larkin’s allegations do not fit into either context. To the extent Larkin intended to assert a Fourth Amendment claim

based on allegedly unreasonable searches, “[t]here can be little doubt that [his] Fourth Amendment claim is a new context because it involves allegations regarding the search of a prison cell – not a private residence

as was the case in .” , No. CV204380RBKAMD,

, at *7 (D.N.J. Mar. 27, 2024) (citing examples). Other factors counsel against extending into

this context, including prison administrators’ legitimate interest in limiting contraband and maintaining prison security. ,

(3d Cir. 2016) (given these interests,

prisoners’ Fourth Amendment rights are “very narrow”). Larkin’s medical care claim also presents a different context. “Although the Court does not discount any discomfort, pain, or emotional

3 The Supreme Court has also recognized a remedy in the context of a gender discrimination claim, ,

(1979). distress [Larkin] has suffered,” this complaint, unlike , does not

describe an imminent medical emergency.4 Moreover, the provision of chronic medical care “is a specialized activity requiring a high degree of training and qualification,” which courts are ill-equipped to regulate,

particularly in the prison context.5 Therefore, Larkin states no viable claim for monetary relief based on any of the alleged constitutional violations.

B. Injunctive Relief The Court must also consider whether Larkin has alleged facts sufficient to pursue injunctive relief. As an initial matter, regardless of

the merit of his claims, the Court cannot grant his request of release to home confinement.

(b)(5) (placement decisions of the Bureau of Prisons are “not reviewable by any court”);

,

, at *5 n.2 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2020).

4 ., No. 1:23-CV-00861,

, at *15-16 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 25, 2025); , No. 4:21-CV- 737,

, at *9-10 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 21, 2024), report and recommendation adopted,

(M.D. Pa. May 1, 2024).

5 , No. 1:22-CV-00057,

, at *9 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 8, 2023) (citation omitted); ,

, at *10. However, construing the complaint liberally, as required for a

plaintiff, the Court interprets Larkin as requesting the cessation of any ongoing constitutional violations. ,

(2001) (where a remedy is unavailable, injunctive

relief is “the proper means for preventing entities from acting unconstitutionally”). The Court finds no plausible basis for injunctive relief based on

Larkin’s claims of retaliation. To state a case of First Amendment retaliation, a plaintiff must allege that (1) he was engaged in constitutionally protected conduct, (2) he suffered an “adverse action”

by prison officials sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his First Amendment rights, and (3) the protected conduct was a “substantial or motivating factor” in the prison officials’ decision to take

the adverse action. ,

(3d Cir. 2017) (quoting ,

(3d Cir. 2010)). Larkin attributes a wide variety of actions to “retaliation,” but in

general, he has not pled facts (beyond conclusory speculation) that show a retaliatory motive for these actions. For example, he does not identify who was involved with the alleged mail interference, the denial of a visit with his wife6, or the confiscation of his CPAP machine, nor explain why

these unnamed individuals would be motivated by his administrative grievances or this lawsuit. , , , No. 3:11-CV-1581,

, at *17 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 2012) (complaint reflected

“a preternatural, global, subjective sensitivity to alleged retaliation, with [the plaintiff] ascribing some retaliatory motive to virtually every action that occurs at the prison”).

At most, the complaint plausibly alleges retaliation on a single day during which Larkin received a pat-down and a cell search and Lt. Carpenter and the two John Doe officers commented on his lawsuit.7

6 An attached “Inmate Request to Staff Member” shows that Larkin’s request for a “special visit for 8-9-25 for [his] wife” was denied “due to the receipt of [two] 100 level incident reports . . . in the past year.” The identity of the decision-maker is not discernable from this document. See (Doc. 27-1 at 15).

7 Larkin notes “more than one” instance of officers approaching him to “speak about” his lawsuit, but does not explain how those officers were responsible for actions against him. Disparaging comments or other verbal harassment, although distressing, are not themselves “adverse actions” that sustain a retaliation claim. ,

, 306 (3d Cir. 2009); ,

(3d Cir. 2007). Although the Court acknowledges Larkin’s allegations of fear that he will suffer unspecified abuse or retaliation, Larkin’s subjective fear is not sufficient to grant injunctive relief. ,

(W.D. Pa. 2006) (“Injunctive relief will not (continued on next page) Assuming that the searches were in some way motivated by the lawsuit,

the complaint does not say when this interaction occurred or suggest ongoing conduct by these officers or ongoing consequences from this incident.8 Similarly, his allegations of interference with mail during prior

confinement in the SHU do not plausibly suggest an ongoing violation justifying injunctive relief. (Doc. 27 at 8, 14). However, Larkin may proceed on a claim for injunctive relief

premised on deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, including the alleged failure to properly maintain his CPAP machine and provide mental health care.9 ,

;

be granted merely to allay the fears and apprehensions or to soothe the anxieties of the parties.”).

8 ,

(3d Cir. 2006) (“To establish standing in an action for injunctive relief, a plaintiff must show that he or she is likely to suffer future injury from the defendant’s illegal conduct. Past illegal conduct is insufficient to warrant injunctive relief unless it is accompanied by continuing, present adverse effects.”) (quotations and citations omitted). Larkin points to the October 22, 2025, incident in which he was allegedly denied a replacement hose for his CPAP machine. While the response Larkin attributes to Boyer is deplorable, the complaint does not plausibly allege that Boyer’s response was motivated by Larkin’s grievances or lawsuit, or that Boyer was even aware of them.

9 Larkin’s complaint alludes to other legal theories that suggest no (continued on next page) ,

(3d Cir. 2017). The appropriate

defendant for such a claim is an official “responsible for ensuring that any injunctive relief is carried out.” ,

(citation omitted). Therefore, Larkin will be permitted to proceed against Warden

Arviza. IV. CONCLUSION Larkin may proceed on a claim for injunctive relief against Warden Arviza premised on deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, but

all other claims will be dismissed. An appropriate order follows.

Dated: December 9, 2025 JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, JR. United States District Judge

plausible claim for injunctive relief. A prisoner has no constitutional right to a grievance process, so his allegations that administrative remedies were “stonewalled” do not suggest a viable claim.

(3d Cir. 2005). To the extent he intended to assert a claim premised on searches of his cell, “prisoners do not have a Fourth Amendment right to privacy in their cells,” ,

, 316 (3d Cir. 2001), and the complaint does not suggest a risk of an ongoing constitutional violation justifying injunctive relief. , , , No. 24-CV-5692,

, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 2, 2024), aff'd, No. 25-1387,

(3d Cir. Aug. 7, 2025).