Carlos Fernando Bolom Tzi v. Jamal L. Jamison, Warden, Federal Detention Center

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA CARLOS FERNANDO BOLOM TZI CIVIL ACTION v.

No. 26-0099 JAMAL L. JAMISON, WARDEN, FEDERAL DETENTION CENTER

Henry, J. January 15, 2026 MEMORANDUM Carlos Fernando Bolom Tzi1 is one of many people who have recently been detained by immigration authorities under the authority of a new decision by the Bureau of Immigration Ap- peals (BIA). The BIA’s interpretation of Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 235, codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1225, would permit it to treat as “seeking admission” an immigrant who was not in- spected upon arrival in the country, no matter how long ago that arrival occurred.2 This distinction deprives a detainee like Tzi of any hearing at which he could try to prove that he should be released on bond. Because I join the analysis of hundreds of other decisions in recent months rejecting the BIA’s analysis, I grant Tzi’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus and order his immediate release, subject to possible later rearrest.

I. BACKGROUND On January 8, 2026, Tzi filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order. In his papers, Tzi states that he is detained in the Phila- delphia Federal Detention Center (FDC). Tzi’s petition is sparse and unaccompanied by exhibits.3 Nevertheless, as the respondent himself represents, Tzi was arrested by ICE under the mandatory detention provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1125 (INA § 235) and therefore determined that he would not be permitted a bond hearing. Br. in Opp. (“BIO”) 3.

II. DISCUSSION I do not proceed from a blank canvas. Instead, as the respondents acknowledge, “[t]he specific legal question raised by the petition has been considered by numerous courts,” of which “[t]he vast majority—including all decisions in this district (more than 70 to date)—have rejected the government’s position.” BIO 1; compare id. with Soumare v. Jamison, 2025 WL 3461542 (E.D.

Pa. Dec. 2, 2025) (citing the government’s similar disclosure at the time of merely “[t]he majority”

I am cognizant of the need to move quickly when someone appears to be detained illegally under the persuasive analysis of hundreds of federal judges. I nevertheless caution counsel that the present filings, and particularly the petition, are clumsy and could easily have failed were the government to have raised serious objections. Among other things, the petition lacks direct alle- gations regarding the nature of Tzi’s arrest and detention and only implicitly contains sufficient information to ascertain the legal basis for granting relief. Nevertheless, the parties entered a stipulation permitting my review of facts presented in the petition and apparently in the motion exhibits as well. ECF 6 (“The material facts are thus undisputed and the petition and motion for a temporary restraining order may be decided on the papers without a hearing.”). of numerous courts including all five Third Circuit district court decisions at that point). The “spe- cific legal question” resolves into the preliminary issue of jurisdiction followed potentially by ar- guments on the merits that center on Section 1225, but which may also touch on the Constitution’s Due Process Clause as well as immigration regulations.

By November, another judge of this Court had determined that there had been 288 deci- sions considering the “specific legal question raised,” in 282 of which similar district courts have found jurisdiction to be proper and proceeded to rule on the merits in favor of the petitioner. De- mirel v. Federal Detention Center Philadelphia, Civ. No. 25-5488, 2025 WL 3218243, at *1 (E.D.

Pa. Nov. 18, 2025); see also id. ECF 11-1 (appendix collecting 288 cases). By late November, a judge on the Southern District of New York calculated the figure at 350. Barco Mercado v. Francis, No. 1:25-cv-06582-LAK, slip op. at 10 & n.22 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2025). There is not appellate authority on the matter from the judiciary, although the government has begun the process of filing appeals in some circuits.4 The parties are entitled to the giving of reasons, but I must balance the depth of my com- position against the fact that I have little new to say, and Tzi is suffering an ongoing detention which I have determined to be unlawful. I therefore rely more than other times for the expression of my reasoning on the explanations already set out by my colleagues.

The respondents first object to the Court’s jurisdiction. They raise three paragraphs of the INA: 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(g), 1252(b)(9), and 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).5 In short order: Section 1252(g) is E.g., Prisoner Case with Counsel Docketed, Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, No. 25-20496, Dkt. 1 (5th Cir. Nov. 11, 2025).

BIA is an appellate court, but not a part of the judiciary. Although it decides appeals taken from immigration courts, it does not decide appeals taken from United States district courts like the 288 compiled in the Demirel appendix.

Turning to the merits, the question is whether Tzi is properly detained under the mandatory detention provisions in 8 U.S.C. § 1225. According to respondents, this detention falls within the ambit of § 1225(b)(2)(A): “[I]n the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the ex- amining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained . . .” (emphasis added). The respondents claim that Tzi was “seeking admission” in this section although he had been in the country since 2019 and was detained in the last weeks of 2025. This reading suffers from several textual prob- lems: It is not a plain reading of the text, since it would be strange to say that Tzi sought to be admitted to a place he had already entered. Kashranov v. Jamison, 2025 WL 3188399 at *6–7 (E.D.

Pa. Nov. 14, 2025). It threatens to make meaningless the concurrent requirement that the same “alien seeking admission” be an “applicant for admission.” Demirel, 2025 WL 3218243, at *4. It would similarly make Congress’s recent enactment of the Laken Riley Act, Pub. L. No. 119-1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025), which separately expanded mandatory detention, “beside the point.” Demirel, 2025 WL 3218243, at * 4 (citing Stone v. I.N.S., 514 U.S. 386, 397 (1995)). But see Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. at 222 (offering alternative textual analysis).

Because I find the statutory arguments sufficient to hold unlawful his present detention, I need not reach constitutional or regulatory arguments.

The respondents do not argue that Tzi is presently detained pursuant to both § 1226 and § 1225. Section 1226, which permits detention but would generally permit the detainee to seek bond, was cited in the warrant for his arrest, pet. ex. B (as INA § 236), but not in the respondents’ papers. The government has occasionally and recently argued that these two sections cover non- overlapping groups of detainees. See Demirel, 2025 WL 3218243, at *5. Since Tzi has not had a bond hearing, even if I were to hold that he is detained pursuant to § 1226, his detention without a bond hearing would be unlawful.

Finally, as to the very brief motion for a temporary restraining order, the relief sought by the motion is not especially clear. It requests an order restraining the government not from detain- ing Tzi but from removing him during the pendency of his asylum claim, as well as a hearing at which the respondent may show cause why that order should not be converted into a preliminary injunction. The motion relies on constitutional provisions with citation to authority only for the standard of review. Although I generally hold a respondent to its burden to provide a meaningful opposition, and here the government has essentially offered none, such a movant nevertheless bears the burden of persuasion. I decline the opportunity to develop Tzi’s constitutional theory without the assistance of his counsel.

III. CONCLUSION For the reasons given above, Tzi’s present detention is unlawful. I will issue an order grant- ing him a bond hearing upon any future detention under § 1226.