District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania, 2026

Gusir Dayshon Boyer-White v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, et al.

Gusir Dayshon Boyer-White v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, et al.
District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Decided February 2, 2026
Gusir Dayshon Boyer-White v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, et al.

Trial Court Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA GUSIR DAYSHON BOYER-WHITE, : Plaintiff, : : v. : CIVIL ACTION NO. 25-CV-6550 : COMMONWEALTH OF : PENNSYLVANIA, et al., : Defendants. : ORDER AND NOW, this 2nd day of February, 2026, upon consideration of Plaintiff Gusir Dayshon Boyer-White’s Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (ECF No. 1), Prisoner Trust Fund Account Statement (ECF No. 3), and pro se Complaint (ECF No. 2), it is ORDERED that: 1. Leave to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.

2. Boyer-White, #0082585, shall pay the full filing fee of $350 in installments, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b), regardless of the outcome of this case. The Court directs the Warden of Chester County Prison or other appropriate official to assess an initial filing fee of 20% of the greater of (a) the average monthly deposits to Boyer-White’s inmate account; or (b) the average monthly balance in Boyer-White’s inmate account for the six-month period immediately preceding the filing of this case. The Warden or other appropriate official shall calculate, collect, and forward the initial payment assessed pursuant to this Order to the Court with a reference to the docket number for this case. In each succeeding month when the amount in Boyer-White’s inmate trust fund account exceeds $10.00, the Warden or other appropriate official shall forward payments to the Clerk of Court equaling 20% of the preceding month’s income credited to Boyer-White’s inmate account until the fees are paid. Each payment shall refer to the docket number for this case.

3. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to send a copy of this order to the Warden of Chester County Prison.

4. The Complaint is DEEMED filed.

5. For the reasons stated in the Court’s Memorandum, the Complaint is dismissed as follows: a. All claims against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the Coatesville Police Department, and Warden Howard Holland are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). b. The Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), as barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). The dismissal is without prejudice to Boyer-White filing a new case only in the event his underlying conviction is reversed, vacated, or otherwise invalidated. c. The Fourth Amendment false arrest and false imprisonment claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

6. Boyer-White may file an amended complaint within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order if he can assert facts to cure the defects noted by the Court with respect to his false arrest and false imprisonment claims. Any amended complaint must identify the defendants in the caption of the amended complaint in addition to identifying them in the body of the amended complaint and shall state the basis for Boyer-White’s claims against each defendant. The amended complaint shall be a complete document that does not rely on the initial Complaint or other papers filed in this case to state a claim. When drafting his amended complaint, Boyer- White should be mindful of the Court’s reasons for dismissing the claims in his initial Complaint as explained in the Court’s Memorandum. If he files an amended complaint, Boyer-White may not reassert any Heck-barred malicious prosecution claims or any claim that has already been dismissed from this case with prejudice. Upon the filing of an amended complaint, the Clerk shall not make service until so ORDERED by the Court.

7. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to send Boyer-White a blank copy of the Court’s form complaint for a prisoner filing a civil rights action bearing the above civil action number. Boyer-White may use this form to file his amended complaint if he chooses to do so.

8. If Boyer-White does not wish to amend his Complaint and instead intends to stand on his Complaint as originally pled, he may file a notice with the Court within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order stating that intent, at which time the Court will issue a final order dismissing the case. Any such notice should be titled “Notice to Stand on Complaint,” and shall include the civil action number for this case. See Weber v. McGrogan, 939 F.3d 232, 241 (3d Cir. 2019) (“If the plaintiff does not desire to amend, he may file an appropriate notice with the district court asserting his intent to stand on the complaint, at which time an order to dismiss the action would be appropriate.” (quoting Borelli v. City of Reading, 532 F.2d 950, 951 n.1 (3d Cir. 1976))); In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696, 703–04 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding “that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed with prejudice the otherwise viable claims . . . following plaintiffs’ decision not to replead those claims” when the district court “expressly warned plaintiffs that failure to replead the remaining claims . . . would result in the dismissal of those claims”).

9. If Boyer-White fails to file any response to this Order, the Court will conclude that Boyer-White intends to stand on his Complaint and will issue a final order dismissing this case.! See Weber, 939 F.3d at 239-40 (explaining that a plaintiff’s intent to stand on his complaint may be inferred from inaction after issuance of an order directing him to take action to cure a defective complaint).

BY THE COURT: HON. MIA R. PEREZ ' The six-factor test announced in Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984), is inapplicable to dismissal orders based on a plaintiff's intention to stand on his complaint. See Weber, 939 F.3d at 241 & n.11 (treating the “stand on the complaint” doctrine as distinct from dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for failure to comply with a court order, which require assessment of the Poulis factors); see also Elansari v. Altria, 799 F. App’x 107, 108 n.1 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam). Indeed, an analysis under Poulis is not required when a plaintiff willfully abandons the case or makes adjudication impossible, as would be the case when a plaintiff opts not to amend his complaint, leaving the case without an operative pleading. See Dickens v. Danberg, 700 F. App’x 116, 118 (3d Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (“Where a plaintiff's conduct clearly indicates that he willfully intends to abandon the case, or where the plaintiff's behavior is so contumacious as to make adjudication of the case impossible, a balancing of the Poulis factors is not necessary.”); Baker v. Accounts Receivables Mgmt., Inc., 292 F.R.D. 171, 175 (D.N.J. 2013) (‘[T]he Court need not engage in an analysis of the six Poulis factors in cases where a party willfully abandons her case or otherwise makes adjudication of the matter impossible.” (citing cases)).

Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.